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
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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS



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14 March 1985

EAST EUROPE REPORT

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

GDR, CSSR POLITICIANS SIGN COOPERATION AGREEMENT

LD210656 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1925 GMT 20 Feb 85

[Text] Prague, 20 Feb (ADN)—The preservation of peace and the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe were the most important tasks of the present time, for the future of the peoples depended on them. Zbynek Zalman, chairman of the Czechoslovak People's Party (CSL), and Gerald Goetting, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU), expressed this view at a friendly meeting in Prague on Wednesday.

The constructive peace policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states corresponds with the interests of all who, regardless of political, social or ideological differences, wish to respond to the arms buildup by aggressive imperialist circles with a coalition of reason and realism.

Both party chairmen welcomed the agreement between the USSR and the United States to start negotiations on the complex of space and nuclear weapons. They pointed to the danger posed to peace and security in Europe by revanchist endeavors. They stated that the GDR and the CSSR would always give a resolute rebuff to all manifestations of legalistic aggression, territorial demands and revanchist tendencies.

The chairmen of the CDU and the CSL stressed the great importance of stable relations, close cooperation and firm friendship between the GDR and the CSSR for the strengthening of socialism in both countries, the consolidation of the unity and unanimity of the socialist community of states and the guaranteeing of peace and security in Europe. They noted with satisfaction that bilateral cooperation in all spheres of social life was being resolutely extended and deepened.

The parties to the talks informed each other about the initiatives of their countries and parties in preparation for the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite fascism and the liberation, and about the activities of their parties in 1985.

Gerald Goetting and Zbynek Zalman signed an agreement on cooperation between the CDU and the CSL for 1985.

ALBANIA

UN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE SESSION REVIEWED

AU061123 Tirana ATA in English 0904 GMT 6 Feb 85

[Text] Tirana, 6 Feb (ATA)--The spring session of the disarmament conference of the UNO resumed its proceedings in Geneva. At the opening speech of the session held by the U.S. and Soviet representatives, there were reiterated the usual slogans on the desire of the two superpowers on peace and disarmament, illusions were cherished that this year progress may be expected in the proceedings of the conference because of the new Soviet-American bargains on weapons, which will begin next month.

Such slogans have been heard for 6 years running since the time when this conference began, but nothing has been attained in favor of peace and disarmament. Until now, the conference has not been able to achieve anything on the problems it had decided to deal with. While the sessions leave the place to one another, projects were also presented on the prohibition of the production of arms and armaments. This has not hindered the two superpowers to continue the conventional and nuclear armament race. According to the data represented at the conference by the Swedish representative, Theorin, the United States and the Soviet Union, have intensified the undergoing tests of nuclear weapons over the recent years. So, the total number of nuclear tests conducted by the two superpowers till the end of 1984 amounts to 1,278. Last year alone, 43 nuclear explosions were conducted in the underground shooting range.

CSO: 2020/67

ALBANIA

RESUMPTION OF STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE NOTED

AU301005 Tirana ATA in English 0900 GMT 30 Jan 85

[Text] Tirana, 30 Jan (ATA)--A new session of the so-called Conference on Disarmament and Security in Europe began its proceedings in Stockholm on 29 January.

This farce, which entered into its second year, is a continuation of such previous farces, staged by the two imperialist superpowers the United States of America and the Soviet Union to cover up their frenzied [words indistinct] Madrid and elsewhere, nothing was achieved in the four sessions of Stockholm conference held last year. The endless chattering on security and peace in the European continent, continued again, and they were accompanied by a series of proposals and counter proposals by Moscow and Washington. The new session started in the same spirit. The head of Soviet delegation, Grinevskiy presented the known proposal of the Warsaw Treaty member countries regarding their commitment not to be the first to use the military power, at a time when the armament race between the two superpowers and the military blocs manipulated by them is being more and more intensified especially in the field of nuclear armament and when Europe is being turned into a gigantic arsenal of conventional and mass annihilation weapons.

These farce [singular as received] serve the United States and the Soviet Union also as bridges of communications to reach agreements. It is not fortuitous that both Moscow and Washington expressed their optimism over the progress that will be made in the present session, which in fact implies new Soviet-American bargains to the detriment of other peoples. In regard to this, the head of American delegation, Goodby declared that the new round of talks in Stockholm begins in much better circumstances. Thanks largely to the excellent results of the Shultz-Gromyko meeting.

CSO: 2020/67

BULGARIA

U.S. CAPABILITY TO ALTER WEATHER CONDITIONS CONDEMNED

Sofia GRAZHDANSKA OTBRANA in Bulgarian No 1, 1985 pp 34-46

[Article by Kiril Karaivanov, member of the Council on the Preservation and Reproduction of the Environment at the State Council of the Bulgarian People's Republic: "Insidious Weapons in the United States' Arsenal"]

[Text] In the West, there have always been and are scientists and military men who use the fruits of science and technology for insane purposes by inventing even more cunning forms of weapons, including those which can influence the climate. After the Second World War, a handful of maniacs in the United States' military-industrial complex attempted to harness huge natural forces in order to pursue their antihuman goals. Using these forces as a weapon can be seen from three points of view: directly offensive, indirectly offensive, and defensive.

Even at the beginning, the American strategists showed a very strong interest in developing the first two types. The head of the scientific research and development administration of the United States Defense Department said at one point that the Defense Department's interest in changing the climate was linked with the desire to influence natural phenomena which form the processes governing the weather, which could have an unfavorable influence on the course of military activities. These included fog, clouds, storms, as well as hurricanes and typhoons. Depending on their presence or absence, the climate exerts a practical influence on all anticipated military operations. It is highly probable, he said, that if one of the sides could succeed in secretly creating nimbus clouds over dry land, and especially over the ocean, it would be able to conceal its activities from any observers, and in this sense it had to be viewed as a component in the system of armaments.

In his address to the associates of the United States Aeronautics Research Institute, Admiral Louis de Flores cynically announced in 1961: "In conclusion, permit me to call on the American people to establish control over the climate that would be equal in scale and significance to the Manhattan Project, which created the first atomic bomb."

The military circles in the United States spur along this research with their solid financial support of the military departments. Together with

signal troops and departments for research in the United States naval and air armed forces, experiments are being conducted on influencing the climate. The results even today are highly classified. Subsequent experiments are directed toward artificially creating conditions for destructive droughts. Under the aegis of the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the United States created Project Stormfury in 1962, with the ambitious task of influencing the strength and direction of hurricanes.

What has been carried out thus far illustrates sufficiently well the interest and quick reaction of the United States Defense Department, which evaluated in a timely way the new possibilities for utilizing the achievements of science for its military and strategic goals, for enlarging its arsenal with new types of "human weapons" for mass destruction.

Are the military aspects of influencing the climate a utopia or a reality?

A number of facts confirm its use in Indochina. In 1971 Jack Anderson reported, on the pages of THE WASHINGTON POST, on a top secret operation taking place on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. At the same time, in questioning by the Congress, the secretary of defense, Melvin Laird, denied this fact. His denial was unconvincing, because in the "Pentagon Papers," published in 1971, it was noted that in 1966 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed the successful use of this weapon in influencing the climate of Laos. And that is how it was seen by the military strategists of the United States, as a weapon for artificially influencing the climate, with the goal of escalating the war in Indochina.

In Volume 4, page 421 of the "Pentagon Papers," the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to President Lyndon Johnson, pointed out that this was the only way to expand the war and yet have a minimal negative reaction in terms of public opinion. The Pentagon's involvement was significantly deeper, as witnessed in the response of the secretary of defense, published in THE WASHINGTON POST:

"The secret project, known as 'Intermediar-Compatriot,' began to be carried out in 1967, with the aim of disorganizing the enemy's rear guard. Its immediate executors supposed that it alone would increase the precipitation on the jungle paths and roads during the rainy season. This caused floods, which made the roads impassable. As a result of this, Ho Chi Minh's troops found themselves in a monsoon zone for the whole period from May to September . . . Up to now only a small circle of people, who have the greatest power, clearly recognize that the United States Air Force had forced nature to assist them."

The behavior of the American aggressors in Vietnam was quite rightly anathematized by world public opinion.

But let us raise the curtain a little bit higher. This is the response of John Foster, head of the Scientific Research and Development Administration of the United States Defense Department, to the questions of senators:

"Certain types of work in this area were secret. Knowing that Congress would be interested in them, Defense Secretary Laird gave me orders to be sure that the chairs of congressional commissions would be informed first hand. The full information contained detailed data about all secret work on changing the climate which had been carried out by the Defense Department."

But was that all? In July of 1973, Seymour Hersch published in STRAIGHT TIMES a number of revelations about former agents of the CIA. In these revelations he noted that the clouds over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had been developed with chemical reagents with the aim of evoking acid rain, which was capable of halting work at radar installations which directed land to air missiles. In addition to being a means for neutralizing radar and hindering the movement of troops, influencing the climate over the territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam had the aim of securing a rain and cloud cover for South Vietnamese subversives and agents of secret services to penetrate into the territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, in order to create optimal conditions for United States Armed Forces' bomb attacks on the socialist republics of Vietnam and Laos, in order to divert the human and material resources of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam away from military actions, as well as to disrupt travel and other means of communication.

Hersch succeeded in compelling the people he interviewed to admit that the initiator of the operations was the CIA.

The fact that Indochina represented an ideal firing range for the application of the flood weapon took on a sad familiarity. According to data from 1971, during the 3 months of floods in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam about 1 million people perished. In terms of its results, this exceeded even the starvation and floods of 1945.

There is no doubt that if the populace and troops in Vietnam had been prepared in advance to struggle against natural disasters, the number of victims would have been significantly smaller.

There are many facts which demonstrate clearly that the United States often resorted to using climate influence as a weapon.

The quantitative indicators of the scale of clouds created by the United States Air Force over Southeast Asia as a part of the "Intermediar-Compatriot" operation during the period from 1967 through 1972 are characterized by the following data: 2,602 flights carried out, 47,409 containers of silver iodide scattered.

The American war machine was not satisfied only with Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Under direct dictation by the military-industrial complex, official Washington blessed the use of one more equally effective weapon--artificially induced drought. This weapon was used for the first time in 1970 against Cuba within the framework of a doubly secret Pentagon operation dubbed "Nile Blue."

What are the facts? In an interview given to a national radio network in the United States in June of 1976, Major Lowell Pont, formerly a scientific associate of the International Corporation for Science and Technology, which was a component part of the United States Defense Department, announced that the CIA and the Pentagon had created clouds with tradewind air currents, which carried precipitation toward Cuba (naturally outside its territory). In 1970, the United States expanded the experiment in response to Fidel Castro's announcement of an expected good harvest of sugar cane. Major Lowell Pont noted: "Creating the clouds on the Cuban coast lowered the quantity of precipitation. This was achieved by artificially evoking the clouds' precipitation as soon as they reached the island. You are correct in saying that we tried to put an embargo on rain clouds."

The drought weapon was reflected in the sugar cane crop in Cuba, which turned out to be much lower than expected. And all of this was carried out according to plan, methodically, on the part of the "greatest democracy" in the name of "freedom."

In order to achieve strategic superiority and destroy the balance in nuclear forces, the United States has directed its efforts toward the creation of a new type of weapon which comes close to atomic weapons in its contagiousness. And again a scientific discovery has been chained to the military's wheel. What are we talking about? It is well known that the ozone layer of the stratosphere protects the earth from fatal ultraviolet radiation from the sun. It is also known that a molecule of ozone can be destroyed by ultraviolet rays with a wave length of 250 millimicrons. In addition to this, there are many chemical substances, such as nitric oxide, hydrogen, hydrogen peroxide, in radical or free molecules, which are capable of destroying the ozone screen, as they influence the course of photochemical reactions which proceed from it.

It is fully possible to introduce into the stratosphere large quantities of compounds such as nitric oxide, hydrogen compounds and their radicals, and other chemical reagents. It is well known that a short time after that the United States began testing experimental weapons which would cause 2 kilometer-wide holes in the ozone shield. Ultraviolet rays, passing through such a hole, would need only 4 minutes to destroy life in cities or places where the sunlight fell because of the hole in the ozone layer. And if this were to happen at the time when the sun was at its zenith, everything alive which could not cover itself from the direct radiation would be destroyed.

The ominous list of such weapons has still not been exhausted by what has thus far been described. There are, for example, weapons to cause forest fires with artificial lightning, to activate earthquakes or artificially created tidal waves and tornado, etc., among the real weapons of mass destruction. These are especially dangerous as a means of conducting secret undeclared wars on a local and regional scale.

Experience shows that the weapons used by the American imperialists for changing the climate, despite the great damage caused in Vietnam, could not determine the outcome of the war. And they could not divert the people of Cuba from their aspiration for socialist development. No matter how insidious these weapons are, if the people and Civil Defense are prepared for a struggle against floods, fires, earthquakes, and other disasters, and prepared to overcome their results, the effect of their application will not be so great.

Naturally, the militarists at the Pentagon continue to perfect these weapons. This compels the organs of the Civil Defense system to exhibit watchfulness, to prepare the people systematically, to increase constantly their readiness to struggle against disasters, because it is completely clear that the use of new weapons for changing the climate will lead precisely to the already known natural disasters. The effect of these weapons must be recognized very well by the forces of Civil Defense and the entire population, in order to apply effective countermeasures in rescue and immediate emergency restoration work.

12334

CSO: 2200/110

BULGARIA

FORMAL, FRUITLESS LOCAL PARTY CONFERENCES CRITICIZED

Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 27 Jan 85 p 1

[Article by Atanas Dishev: "Before We Say: 'May I Have the Floor!'"]

[Text] A communist's constant constitutional right and obligation is to participate actively in party meetings and meetings of public organizations at the collective where he works, to state his opinion openly and honestly about questions put forth for discussion. The party's strength and the strength of our socialist society are due to the support of the collective's mind, experience, and wisdom, of its knowledge and capabilities, its ideas and suggestions, the criticism and recommendations of communists and of all workers.

However, do we not sometimes forget or abuse this right and obligation? Each of us has probably taken part, at least once, in never-ending and fruitless sessions or meetings at which there is a lot of talk that is far from useful or does not have any utility at all. Once it happened to me that I waited until the end of such a session at a certain administration, because I had to speak with one of the leaders on an urgent topic. About an hour later he came out, with the tired face of a martyr, and instead of saying hello, he said, "We almost drowned in talk!" I believe that the great Soviet poet Vladimir Mayakovskiy might have had this in mind when in his poem "To Those Who Are Always in Session" he asked this question: "Aren't we finally going to have one session that will eliminate all other sessions?"

Experience shows that there are people in almost every collective who always take the floor, regardless of whether they have something to say or not. Carried away with their own pseudo-eloquence, they lose their sense of proportion, make the other people tired and bored, and waste precious time that could have been used in a wiser and more useful way. Such people are called "speakers on the payroll" or "subscriber" speakers. Just such a "subscriber" got even smarter at one meeting: he made two statements, one written and the other oral.

Moreover, such "time thieves," infected with great self-assertiveness and oratorical verbiage, often influence modest and honest workers in a depressing way by taking away, either directly or indirectly, their right to have the floor and to share perhaps more useful and helpful considerations and thoughts about the questions being discussed.

There is also another type of "master" speaker. He does not take the floor very often, but he rather skillfully measures out doses of praise and pseudo-criticism in order to please someone higher up. It might seem very odd, but these speakers are often successful in making a career without being the most capable workers. We say, ironically but fairly, that such people "make it by talking." This is why we should always remember the simple folksy truth: The one who talks a lot doesn't get the work done.

A communist's active participation in discussion and decisionmaking on all questions directly related to production, administrative, or party-ideological matters is a measure of his political maturity. He does not have the right to stay aloof, to pass over the truth in silence, or to say: "Is it up to me to straighten out the world?" Because "straightening out" the world by way of revolutionary change through revolutionary thinking and revolutionary action is the cornerstone of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of scientific communism. This is why a communist should not remain a passive and mute observer of what is going on around him, but rather a conscious participant in the discussion and then the execution of decisions already made.

However, prior to raising our hand at a meeting in order to take the floor, we should think over well the question of whether we have something to say or not. And if we do have something to say, let us say it briefly, in a succinct and business-like way, without superfluous verbiage and oral decoration. In this way we will save not only our own time but the time of those around us as well.

12334

CSO: 2200/112

BULGARIA

QUALITY OF MILITARY TRAINING CRITICIZED

Sofia ARMEYSKA MLADEZH in Bulgarian No 1, 1985 pp 9-12

[Interview with Lieutenant General Stefan Kovachev by Lieutenant Colonel Trendafil Vasilev: "Criteria for High Quality in Military Work"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Complex and responsible tasks must be carried out by the young men of the army during this academic year. The main one, which has marked their intense days and nights, is the struggle to raise combat readiness and affirm modern criteria for the quality of military work. A representative of the editors held a conversation on this topic with Lieutenant General Stefan Kovachev, candidate of military science.

[Question] Comrade lieutenant general, could you define what is meant by the concept of modern criteria for the quality of military work?

[Answer] The question of quality has turned into a key problem of the party's global strategy for building a mature socialist society, based on universal intensification and utilizing the latest achievements of scientific progress. Hence the call of the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Comrade Todor Zhivkov, for a "revolutionary change in thinking and in the approach to the tasks of our development . . . Because everything we undertake and decide in the following two decades, up to 1990, to 2000 and beyond, depends on the readiness and ability of the subjective factor to reorganize its thinking and acting in a way that meets the criteria not only for today, but for the future as well."¹

In this light, our commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations are fundamentally concerned with problems linked to modern criteria for evaluating the quality of military work as an important factor in raising the troops' combat readiness to a qualitatively new level.

1. T. Zhivkov, "Za reshitelen obrat v nasheto mislene i rabota" [For a Decisive Change in Our Thinking and Work], Sofia, 1984, p 10.

We understand well that military work is specific, complex, and multileveled, and that it is impossible to define the criteria for evaluating its quality within the framework of a short conversation; thus I will limit my remarks chiefly to the area of educational and instructional activity.

The question naturally arises of what the modern criteria for evaluating the quality of combat drills and political education are. There is no doubt whatsoever that the truest criterion for evaluating the quality of military work in educational and instructional activity, expressed in the efficiency of the individual drill, study, and training, is precisely meeting the requirements of the dialectic principle of military training and instruction, the requirements of the regulations, directives, courses, programs, methods, and the normative base for the troops' actions under various conditions of combat circumstances. The criteria for the future are these same requirements, but refracted, rectified, supplemented, enriched, and refined in correspondence with the new, greater combat capabilities of the modern weapons and technology being implemented and the ability to use them in combat. The criteria for today and tomorrow must likewise offer the possibility of evaluating the quality of the command-organizational work of the commanders and the leaders of the drills, as well as the training of the students. The level of their field, naval, and aerial training (not only of them as individual executors but chiefly as a whole, as a combat collective) must be evaluated, and this must become the measuring stick for their ability to conduct active, highly maneuverable combat activities under the complex conditions of modern warfare.

[Question] Are there cases of differences and inconsistency in applying the criteria, and if so, what are the reasons? How will we overcome them?

[Answer] It is well known that as a rule the criteria are constant and stable, but they are not eternal. This is so because the changes in weapons and combat equipment are quite dynamic, and this leads to changes in their utilization in combat, in the normative base for using them, and thus to changes in the very criteria for evaluation. We cannot approach wheeled and self-propelled artillery with one and the same criterion, and this applies to the most modern systems of tanks, antiaircraft missile complexes, etc. It is clear from the very question that alarm is caused not by the changeability in a number of norms and indicators, which serve as the criteria for evaluation, but in the inconsistency of applying them.

This does happen in educational practice, and there are quite a few cases of differences and inconsistency in applying the criteria of evaluating the qualities of combat drills and political education, and thus essentially in the quality of military work. Let us take as an example the criteria for evaluating firing training, where in accordance with the course in marksmanship the chief indicator is the number of holes in the target, and here it should seem there is no room for differences and inconsistency.

Is this true, however, in practice? Here is a characteristic example. There is a firing exercise with a tank weapon as part of training. At the end of the firing, the leader (the company commander) makes an analysis and gives a mark of excellent. A more senior commander who is present, stressing in his conclusions the great significance of hitting the targets with the first shot, the impermissibility of single shots with a machine gun, and the fact that a number of marksmen conducted the exercise a few seconds slower than the time specified by the firing course, fundamentally gives a mark of good, and in his analysis, which takes into account the circumstance that a number of combatants have not conducted the exercise with their gas masks on, lowers his mark to satisfactory.

This example shows convincingly that there are differences in applying the criteria for evaluating the quality of military work. The reason for this is rooted primarily in the approach to the criteria for evaluation which arise from profound knowledge and most of all from rich content in the firing course, from the feeling of responsibility and exactitude with regard to not permitting conventionality and simplifying the training, from the ability of applying in practice the requirements of the principle about learning what is necessary for combat.

Let us take another example, this time in the field of tactical training. At one company tactical session, which took place while combat at the location was still being organized, it was felt that the commander had the theoretical knowledge, that he complied with the requirements of combat regulations, and that he knew how to put together the necessary combat documents with regard to payroll. At the beginning of combat, the company was deployed in a timely way for the attack, correctly passed through the mine-explosive placements, and occupied the enemy's front trenches. The leader, as he evaluated the high level of attacks on the enemy's defensive positions on the front line, drastically lowered its firing resistance; but this did not deter the company commander at all, and he continued the attack according to his plan, in the form of a moving line, despite the possibility of changing this combat line, in order to strike at the enemy's flank and continue the attack deeper and more quickly. In response to the critical notes that he did not show the necessary initiative, decisiveness, and daring which the concrete situation required, he said that he was simply acting according to the regulations. In a formal way, there had been no deviation from the regulations' requirements in the combat situation, but the actions clearly had not taken into account the rapidly changing tactical situation and he missed an appropriate opportunity for a rapid and decisive rout of the enemy.

Differences were shown in this case in the evaluations by the representatives of higher authorities who were present, who affirmed that the criteria for evaluating the quality of military work were being applied differently, chiefly because of the inadequate level of familiarity and the requirement of training under conditions which are as close to combat as possible, which encourage the students to aspire to manifest

independence, initiative, making creative decisions, followed by decisive actions (which are not expected by the enemy) by the subdivision, as an obligatory condition for victory in modern combat. This is the path to follow in overcoming differences in applying the criteria for evaluation of quality in military work, for reorganizing the approach to thinking and action in the spirit of the Bulgarian Communist Party's long-range program for solving the problem of quality, the key problem. The criterion in this area is that of the worldwide level, the achievements of the fraternal Soviet Army, and of our own leading units.

[Question] What are your observations about the influence of discipline on the work of the commanders in order to produce high-quality military work?

[Answer] My long years of experience in the field of educational and instructional work have shown that discipline and, even more concretely, instructional discipline are extremely significant in raising the quality of military work. There is no doubt whatsoever that, if the drill begins late and is over early, if the training does not encompass the entire staff, if the planned study questions are not worked out under complex conditions, the most up-to-date methods and the richest experience the commanders possess will not help in attaining the academic goals in a concrete drill, study period, or training. And if we keep in mind that the main indicator of quality in military work is bringing the result closer to the goal, then there can be no argument that without strong, conscious discipline it is impossible to have further improvement in the quality of military work.

[Question] In your opinion, how can the Komsomol organizations and associations cooperate in affirming the systematic application of modern criteria for high-quality military work?

[Answer] There is a wide range of possible work for the Komsomol organizations and associations in carrying out this important task.

First of all, the Komsomol, with all its educational activity, raises the feeling of duty and responsibility among young soldiers and commanders and cooperates in raising the level of their combat readiness.

The Komsomol organizations and associations can count on mobilizing the soldiers who belong to it for active participation in the drills and study sessions. Excellent familiarity with the weapons and combat equipment, complete fulfillment of the norms, exercises, and combat tasks offer the young soldiers the possibility of completely mastering their specialties, of becoming masters of combat. The troops' participation helps the commanders in the process of instruction, in conducting battles.

The Komsomol organizations and associations can cooperate, with various ways and means, in raising the level of professional training for the

young commanders, in preparing for and carrying out all activities in strict compliance with the requirements of our regulations, directives, courses, and principles of military education and training. Most of all cooperating in carrying out the basic principle that has been tested and confirmed in many skirmishes: that we need to learn what is necessary for combat. This is the truest path to defining, affirming, and systematically applying modern criteria for high-quality military work.

12334

CSO: 2200/110

BULGARIA

ARMY POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION URGES BETTER TRAINING, DISCIPLINE

Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 11 Jan 85 p 2

[Article: "Army Komsomol Facing High Requirements"]

[Text] The Bureau of the Main Political Administration of the People's Army, at its regular session, discussed the condition and work of the Komsomol organizations in the Bulgarian People's Army and adopted specific measures aimed at radically improving their work and helping to improve combat and political preparedness.

It was noted that during the past years there has been a considerable increase in the army Komsomol organizations' and societies' share in fulfilling the tasks of improving the combat preparedness of the detachments and the education of the army youth, as reflected by the increase in the number of outstanding soldiers, class specialists, the development of the TNTM [Youth Technical and Scientific Creativity] movement and the better results achieved in the National Political Competition.

What matters at the present stage of fulfillment of the decisions of the 12th BCP Congress and the National Party Conference is to find new reserves for the purpose of further improving the organizational framework of the army Komsomol organizations and societies, to increase their share in the education of young soldiers and to carry out the responsible tasks of combat and political preparedness.

To solve this problem, the Bureau of the Main Political Administration of the People's Army made a number of specific suggestions.

The methods and the contents of the ideological and educational work of the Komsomol organizations and societies should be perfected and enriched. The work must be aimed at inculcating high moral and political qualities, such as faith in communism, high sociopolitical activity, sense of responsibility for the common cause, unwavering readiness to participate actively in the daily study process, comradeship, and mutual assistance. It must be even more closely

linked to the daily tasks facing the detachments. Each Komsomol activity must have rich political and emotional content, so that it may stimulate the awareness of the young people, make them think and influence their ways, actions and conduct. More attention should be given to the task of improving the work in the field of combat education, to the training and education of the young soldiers in such moral and combat qualities as high psychological stability, selflessness, discipline, initiative, and capability to overcome all difficulties of military life.

The coming celebration of the 40th anniversary of the victory over Hitler's fascism and Japanese militarism, of the 30th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, the 100th anniversary of Bulgarian unification and the upcoming 12th World Youth and Student Festival in Moscow create favorable conditions for ever more purposeful work in class-political, party and international education.

The Bureau of the Main Political Administration of the People's Army pointed out that we must find new ways and reserves for increasing the share of the Komsomol organizations and societies in carrying out in an outstanding manner the tasks of the daily study process.

What is needed is a new way of thinking, a new creative approach to work and further perfection of the Komsomol style of work, exemplified by turning the weekly curriculum into a mirror of youth enthusiasm and daring. What is most important now is to change the thinking and the approach of the Komsomol leadership toward the organization of the weekly cycle and to increase their participation in this process.

The correct choice of the methods of Komsomol work is of particular importance. It was noted that the time had come to radically break with certain manifestations of formalism, with the penchant of certain members of the Komsomol leadership for "boisterous" and needless ceremonious activities and the launching of numerous empty initiatives. One must also reduce useless bookishness in Komsomol work and think about reducing the great number of commissions and staff offices, many of which exist only nominally.

The struggle for raising the Komsomol contribution to combat and political preparedness is closely linked with the struggle for mastering and implementing the achievements of the current scientific and technological revolution.

The Bureau of the Main Political Administration of the People's Army notes that the Komsomol leadership now must demonstrate a new way of thinking, a creative approach and a wider scope in its effort to increase its contribution to the study and implementation of the latest achievements of military and technological progress. In practice this means that the Komsomol organizations and societies

must become efficient pillars of support for the commanders and the chief helpers of the party organizations in carrying out the tasks that are connected with the automation of the command of the armed forces, the improvement of the material training base and the introduction of modern techniques into the training process. A new approach is required as regards the mastery and use of modern arms and war technology at the disposal of the detachments. The youth initiative under the slogan of "Scientific and technological progress and outstanding experience are the field of youth daring" and the TNTM movement must be further developed.

Strengthening the role of the army Komsomol organizations and societies is firmly linked to increasing the youth's share in raising discipline and strengthening the military collectives. The task consists of radically changing the way of thinking, as well as the attitude and approach of the Komsomol organizations vis-a-vis this problem. The Main Political Administration of the People's Army demands that the problems relating to raising discipline and strengthening the military collectives be constantly in the center of attention of the Komsomol leadership. They must be regularly discussed at Komsomol meetings in a principled, businesslike and detailed manner. The channels for carrying out approved decisions must be improved.

The political organs and party leadership must help to enrich the internal organizational life of the Komsomol organizations and societies. This calls for improving the quality of meetings and sessions, for doing away with a simplistic approach toward their preparation and the elaboration of an agenda featuring topics and problems of interest to the young people.

The secretaries of the Komsomol organizations and societies are entrusted with new and more responsible tasks. They are chiefly responsible for implementing--in the work of the Komsomol party committees--the prerequisites for revolutionary thinking and a creative approach to work. This is why they must demonstrate a greater sense of purpose, efficiency, greater competence, creativity and ability to recognize what is important; they must be able to choose and use the most efficient ways and means of work, and they must strengthen their contacts with the members of the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union.

The Bureau of the Main Political Administration of the People's Army notes that the fulfillment of the responsible tasks for improving the role of the Komsomol organizations and societies is impossible without further strengthening the party leadership over the army Komsomol. The time has come for the political and party organizations to study the problems facing the youth collectives better; they must systematically analyze these problems and competently direct the work of the Komsomol committees on a day-by-day basis. They must improve the selection, training and education of the Komsomol cadres and concentrate on

selecting more young officers and sergeants for the posts of secretaries of Komsomol societies. Also of great importance is the improvement of the political organs' work with the commanders. In this respect, particular attention must be paid to improving their ability to use the support of the Komsomol organizations and societies and direct their work.

The time has come for the political organs and the party and Komsomol leaderships to study in detail the decisions of the Bureau of the Main Political Administration of the People's Army in order to understand their meaning fully and establish the organizational framework for carrying them out.

12653

CSO: 2200/107

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

WESTERN PROPAGANDA ATTACKED AS INTERFERENCE

Prague ZIVOT STRANY in Czech No 1, 1985 pp 25-26

[Article by Jan Vesely, worker in the Central Committee of the CPCZ: "The Fight Against Foreign Ideological Influences--A Component of Ideological Work"]

[Excerpts] The development and fortification of the socialist social order in our country and on an international scale does not leave the bourgeoisie or the proponents of capitalism in peace. All forces who use exploitation and oppression of the workers to safeguard their wealth, profits, their political power and the privileges to which they have no rights stand in opposition to socialism. The events of recent years once again clearly confirm that the greater the successes of socialism and of revolutionary progress, the more ferocious is the resistance of the class enemy.

Bourgeois anticommunist propaganda becomes activated as a very important component of "the crusader campaign" of imperialism against socialism. With the aim of weakening and disintegrating it, both efforts to defend the right of capitalism to exist as well as the most varied attacks upon the countries of real socialism, lies and slanders of the socialist social order and the policies of the communist party are increasing. Precisely because socialism is today a deciding factor in social development throughout the world, its enemies in their fight against it are resorting to treacherous methods of ideological subversion and "psychological warfare."

In activities aimed against the socialist countries the task of the military-industrial complex, the Pentagon and the appropriate "services" of NATO are growing. With tenacity of purpose, activity of an ideological subversive character within the framework of the CIA is also being activated. It is primarily broadcast ideological subversion which is aimed against the socialist countries. The well-known "cold war" stations with such names as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (a total of 54 broadcasters and more than 1,650 employees) have as their mission the spreading of disinformation, slander and lies about socialism and, simultaneously, by falsely advertising the "Western way of life," the kindling of fundamental disagreements among the populace with socialism, the casting of doubt upon socialism's results and primacy, and the gradual creation, on a mass scale, of a longing for such "reforms" within our society which would lead it back toward capitalism. A similar task is

fulfilled by the main propagandist organ of the U.S. Information Agency, the Voice of America, whose broadcast capacity and antennas are oriented primarily against the socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia.

The propaganda campaigns of imperialism organized against the populace of socialist countries are based on brazen interference in their internal affairs. In the eyes of the recipients, the theories and practice of socialism are to be discredited first and its results and the experiences of its establishment are to be called into doubt. In the forefront is an effort to create opposition between socialist countries and their citizens and, particularly, to tear them away from the Soviet Union. In doing so, it is typical as far as the methods and processes of ideological subversion activity are concerned for the capitalist governments to "ascribe" to socialism those faults, defects, crisis phenomena and problems which they themselves are unable to solve. This is manifest, for example, in the campaigns conducted regarding the "Soviet military threat," in the "support" of the fight for human rights, in the striving for "democracy" in socialist countries, in the "fight against terrorism" and in many other cases.

The resulting effect of these campaigns, however, returns like a boomerang to their originators. An increasing number of people, not only in the socialist countries but also in nonsocialist countries, are realizing that it is imperialism, with its warlike programs, with a dictatorship of the monopolies, the merciless exploitation of the majority, which is in fact guilty of the crassest violations of political, socioeconomic, human and personal rights. It is the governments of the imperialist countries who, in place of real government by the people, maintain only the false illusion of democracy and who do not hesitate to use force and insidious methods of intimidation, occasionally of liquidation, not only of inconvenient individuals but entire groups of the populace or even entire nations. The fact that the mentioned campaigns sooner or later fail emanates primarily from realistic social conditions within the socialist society. Because every honest citizen of a socialist country can convince himself, based on his own experiences, about the humanistic essence of the socialist social system.

However, this should not lead us into carelessness, into underestimating the danger of the refined and systematic effect of anticommunism on all strata of the population in our country. An essential condition for success in the battle against the forces of imperialism and its influence is political and ideological vigilance, as well as the class approach of citizens with respect to societal events. However, these characteristics cannot be cultivated if the influence of the objective primacy of socialism is not followed by well-thought-out ideological work, offensively conducted information and political educational activity, systematic world view education in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

Current conditions in the sharp class battle between two antithetical social systems and two world views demand a further deepening and improvement in political education work. It is necessary everywhere to strive for the increased effectivity of the ideological battle. We must learn, at all levels, to deliberately connect analysis and clarification of every important political

event, every basic political-ideological thesis with the critical analysis of bourgeois, revisionist, in a word class-alien views and falsifications.

Enemy views must be convincingly criticized, their untenable position revealed, and those processes and facts from our life which serve as the host for the parasite of bourgeois propaganda must be clarified and facts which are used by propaganda must be brought into the correct context. The initiative and timely expression of contemporary problems and questions, which are of interest to the working people or which disturb them, and the most rapidly possible open clarification of our position with regard to these questions and paths for their solution are of equal importance as truthful and timely information on domestic and foreign events. Both facilitate the effective neutralization of the possible influence of bourgeois propaganda, caused by various "voices" from the capitalist world, they serve to prevent the most varied inventions, whispering campaigns, possible panics, etc.

The specific means which it is necessary to better and more frequently utilize in the everyday activities of party organs is that which V. I. Lenin calls "organizing universal political revelation" of the class enemy. The ideological aktiv, well-prepared agitators, informants and propagandists of party organizations must uncover, on the basis of concrete facts and examples, the false myths regarding the permanence and life capacity of capitalism; they must show various, sometimes even primitive and sometimes refined processes which are intended to cover up facts that the capitalist states, despite the hundreds of years of their existence, are not capable of solving burning social problems--life in peace, full employment, development of mass education, equal rights among nations and many additional questions and social problems.

A summarizing characteristic is made possible by comparing the socialist way of life with the way, or as is frequently written in the bourgeois press, with the quality of life in those countries where imperialism reigns. Our principal weapon in the fight against anticommunism is the weapon of truth. We must use it effectively and responsibly even in unmasking the bourgeois way of life, in clarifying the deep contradictions between the way it is depicted in official propaganda and the way it looks in the hard reality of today's capitalist world. We shall find plenty of concrete facts and data for this unmasking, not only in Marxist analyses but even in many materials and publications of the bourgeois province.

We must strengthen the offensive nature in propaganda and counterpropaganda work of party organizations everywhere. In the final analysis, this requires initiative and activity in identifying and solving concrete questions and problems. This is a matter of long-term and short-term programs which correspond to the requirements of socialist development and progress, which are in harmony with the interests of the working people and which find their concentrated expression in political programs and resolutions of the communist party. A rightful place in this offensive process is also occupied by the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory and a convincing body of ready information and political-educational work.

Occasionally, the question is posed in such a way that we should never leave it without a response and without paying appropriate attention to inventions, slanders and falsifications of enemy propaganda. However, such a procedure would be an error. It would only play into the hands of the anticommunist centers which would like to push us into defensive positions with their provocations and divert us from the solution of the tasks which are decisive for the development of socialism. Surely it is necessary to know well the effects of enemy anticommunist propaganda, to follow and analyze their tendencies and changes. However, we concentrate our propaganda and counterpropaganda in harmony with the actual needs of socialism in such a way that they emanate from the internal legality of our development so that we can fortify the economic, political, social and spiritual certainties and values of our society.

The obligation of our entire ideological front consists in fundamental, convincing and effective propaganda pertaining to the historic successes of socialism and its real primacy. We must also emphasize its capability to serve up and solve arising problems in societal development. Toward this end, we wish to further utilize the great strength of active socialist patriotism and conscious internationalism; we wish to strive for their deepening and consolidation.

An effective system of propaganda and counterpropaganda encompasses substantive trends, means, methods and forms of activity. It includes not only a system for obtaining information and its operational dissemination, a systematic following of the changing ideological situation and public opinion but also a coordinated and differentiated utilization of a wide scale of instruments and forms of political-educational work, both traditional, proven, as well as new ones corresponding to changing conditions. The work connected with the selection and training of qualified ideological cadres also belongs in this area. Utilization of this complex should always contribute to the correct comprehension of the primacy of socialism, toward the formation of a Marxist-Leninist conviction and an active stand among communists and other citizens. Simultaneously and in organic unity with the above, it is necessary to more deeply and more convincingly uncover the essence of contemporary imperialism and its ideologies. Only on this basis is it possible to successfully prevent efforts by anticommunist centers to disrupt the socialist conscience, to impose bourgeois stereotype thinking, morals and actions on the citizens of our country. Only in this way is it possible to offensively combat the various petit bourgeois and other anachronisms of the old society and of a nonscientific world view.

5911

CSO: 2400/277

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

SPONSORING OF NEW PARTY MEMBERS DISCUSSED

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 5 Feb 85 p 1

[Excerpts] The permanent tasks of every basic organization of the party include care for the development and improvement in the quality of the membership base. It is truly an unpopular task. Communists accepted into the party after 1970 today form one-half of the membership base, in some enterprises and establishments they account for even more than half. From the time of the 16th Congress to 1 January of this year, the party accepted more than 230,000 of the best workers, technicians, cooperative farmers, mostly young people, into its ranks. This fact places a much higher requirement with regard to selection, acceptance and training of candidates and young members onto party organs and organizations. Particularly okres committees must deepen their differentiated aid rendered to basic organizations in fulfilling the tasks connected with the formation of party ranks, particularly where the required results have not been attained and where the strengthening of party influence is essential. It is largely a matter of seeing to it that candidates and young party members are trained, familiarized and able to gather experiences in fulfilling candidate tasks in concrete political work which is the most effective school and, simultaneously, constitutes a reliable screening tool and a location where they can prove themselves. Older, more experienced communists, guarantors and patrons, who should help them, play a significant role.

Much depends on how well the basic organization knows the person whom they are accepting into the party. In this connection, among others, the role of the guarantor or sponsor assumes prominence. Let us remember that sponsors can be communists who have been in the party at least 3 years and who know the recommended individual from the work environment and from his or her public activities for at least 1 year. They can even be organs and organizations of the Socialist Union of Youth who may even recommend nonmembers of the SSM up to 21 years of age.

Today, the majority of organizations is already taking care to see to it that sponsors are both from the workplace of the candidate as well as from his residence area or that the candidate is a young communist. This is so to ensure that these are people who know the proposed candidate very well, know his political maturity and commitment, his approach to work and the results he attains. Their signature on the application form constitutes a significant political position and represents for the basic organization one of the

guaranties of a correct and objective evaluation of the proposed candidate during the acceptance proceedings.

The sponsor guarantees that his recommendation objectively captures the political, work, moral and character qualities of the person recommended. And his signature on the application form is not a signature at a bank on a check. It is a signature beneath his own personal opinion regarding the position of a person with respect to socialist society. In other words, in his way, a signature beneath the future. That is why it is a very serious act and cannot be seen as a current everyday event which begins and ends for the sponsor with a mere signature.

Although the resolution of the membership meeting of the basic organization regarding the acceptance of a candidate member of the CPCZ places the responsibility for his education upon the committee and the entire basic organization, this does not, however, mean in any case that the moral obligations of the sponsor vis-a-vis the comrade whom he recommended to the party for acceptance, and for whom he guarantees with his name, should end.

Therefore, it is correct that the majority of sponsors devote themselves to the young candidates of the party even after their acceptance. This is not a matter of keeping an eye on the individual and guiding him by the hand. On the contrary. The point is to give him every opportunity to apply his capabilities and knowledge in the fulfillment of tasks to channel his initiative and to monitor him to see how he acts on occasions when he is required to demonstrate his membership in the party, when he must raise his voice either in defense of its interests or to effectuate its resolutions.

The overwhelming majority of candidates want to do well during the candidacy. And are quite frequently influenced by the behavior and conduct of members, particularly their sponsors. If the candidate sees in a sponsor a person whom he can visit, say, at midnight for counsel and knows that he will never be turned away, this is more than a moral support for him.

Frequently, the long-term and systematic preparation of people for acceptance as a candidate for party membership is underestimated. Experience shows that this is a result of unconsidered, superficial selection, of little knowledge of people. Then a beginning is made where an end should have been made--that is to say, at the point of submitting the application for party membership.

In some organizations, at the time young people are accepted for party membership, they not only read the opinions of sponsors but the sponsors themselves appear at party meetings with their recommendations. This obligates them morally to help the candidate in the future. Meetings between sponsors and candidates within the organizational committee during the course of the candidacy period have also proven to be beneficial.

The Socialist Union of Youth bears a great responsibility for preparing young people for acceptance into the CPCZ. Its organizations should recommend as candidates for party membership the best members and, furthermore, should make better use of the exclusive rights they have--of being one of the sponsors of

the candidate. No other organization has this right. And nevertheless it frequently remains in the background. For example, last year in the North Bohemia Kraj, not quite half of the accepted candidates were from the membership of the SSM and the youth organization acted as sponsor for only every fourth candidate. In other krajs the same story is true. We must look for the reasons in frequently formal activities of some SSM organizations, in their unimaginative program for the young and in the formal character of the Socialist Union of Youth education.

The mission of sponsors is not fully evaluated in all organizations of the party. In many organizations, it is not assigned a great importance. Generally, this is in those organizations where problems in intraparty life exist, where mass political work is stagnating, where the activity and authority of communists are not at the desired level. Those are organizations which are experiencing problems in accepting candidates for party membership. On the other hand, in organizations where authority is based on such pillars as the consistent implementation of party policy, irreconcilability with shortcomings, attention to everything which takes place within the area of activity of the basic party organization, everything which bothers people or makes life miserable for them, in such organizations they are fulfilling their requirements without any problems because young people are becoming convinced that that which communists say goes. In these organizations, even sponsors who underestimate their mission, are called to party responsibility.

5911

CSO: 2400/278

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

WEST GERMANY REOPENS EMBASSY IN PRAGUE

AU201959 Paris AFP in English 1952 GMT 20 Feb 85

[Text] Prague, 20 Feb (AFP)--West Germany reopened its embassy here today following closure last 5 October after 160 East Germans occupied it in a bid to reach the West.

A metal barrier has been built inside the door of the Lobkowitz Palace, which houses the embassy, and guards stand duty to prevent a repetition of the politically embarrassing occupation.

The reopening was not announced officially and repairs are still underway after the last East Germans left on 15 January.

The public are not allowed in the consulate section and visas have to be requested from travel agents.

West German diplomats fear another "invasion," particularly in May when thousands of East Germans spend long weekends here in Czechoslovakia.

Last summer 1,400 East Germans went to the embassy to ask for immigration permits. Most returned home to make an emigration request in line with official procedure.

But 160 stayed to wait for Bonn's decision, including a niece of East German Premier Willi Stoph.

The niece, Ingrid Berg, and her family finally returned home, as did the others later, and were allowed to emigrate. By summer all 160 are expected to be in West Germany.

CSO: 2020/71

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

BRIEFS

LDC TRADE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT--Economic cooperation with developing countries is associated with growing difficulties for the GDR, as was conceded at a seminar of the Institute for International Relations of the Academy for Political and Legal Science in Potsdam. It was asserted that the position of developing countries in the capitalist world economy gave rise to conditions "which tend to work against economic cooperation between the GDR and these countries." In the 1980's this was seen "more clearly than previously." The socio-economic backwardness and limited politico-economic sovereignty of third world states were said to place limits on a planned and dynamic development of economic cooperation. GDR exportation to these countries was rendered difficult by reason of the drastic deterioration in most developing countries' solvency due to the negative balance of payments, and also by reason of the increasing tendency toward protectionism. Moreover, the West's "confrontation policy" and high interest policy were said to have "generally aggravated" conditions for the development of economic relations between the GDR and the non-socialist economic area, including the developing countries. The "conflicts provoked and supported by imperialism" had also had immediate repercussions on the GDR's economic relations with the developing countries, it was said. [Text] [West Berlin IWE TAGESDIENST in German No 21, 8 Feb 85 p 1.]

CSO: 2300/302

HUNGARY

PROSPECTS MIXED FOR WEST EUROPEAN WORKERS' MOVEMENT

Budapest TARSADALOMTUDOMANYI KOZLEMENYEK in Hungarian No 3, 1984 pp 398-407

[Article by Janos Johancsik: "Prerequisites for Cooperation Within the West European Working-Class Movement"]

[Text] Mutual relations between the communists and social democrats, who form different sections within the working-class movement as a whole, belong among the political phenomena in which ingrained prejudices, selective interpretation of facts, and conflicts between aspirations and reality often produce one-sided judgments. Anyone who today attempts to analyze the conditions of cooperation between communists and social democrats, on the basis of the observed real phenomena and experience, is just as likely to draw favorable as unfavorable conclusions regarding the future prospects of such cooperation, depending on which of the equally existing but opposite trends he regards as the more significant. A complex set of factors shapes the path from the evolution of the possibilities for cooperation, through the recognition of the need for cooperation and the expression of interest in it, to the realization of collaboration. And these factors are changing constantly, strengthening or weakening the chances for the development of cooperation. In the course of investigating the conditions for cooperation, the researcher can aid the assessment of the possibilities by comprehensively exploring the significant factors. The utilization of these possibilities can become conscious political effort only on the basis of suitably selected political priorities. In other words, the conditions that have evolved can be shaped further and transformed in certain respects.

The conclusion drawn from the century-old history of the working-class movement and confirmed time and again in practice--i.e., that the working class can win the class struggle only if it acts in unity, and that collaboration determines the effectiveness of this struggle--has by now become a generally recognized fact within the political and trade-union movements. Yet in practice we do not find that this correctly recognized truth has become the general rule for the working-class movement's political action, and that the movement as a whole has been able to rise above the ideological and political factors that divide blue-collar workers, employees, and democratic forces in a wider sense.

It can be said also of relations between the communists and social democrats that not only have the obstacles to cooperation not ceased, but in some respects even new ones have been added. The events of the past 10 to 15 years,

ranging from the development of the general world situation to the political changes within the two sections and the shift in the balance of power between them, have further complicated the chances for the realization of cooperation. On the one hand, the altered circumstances--primarily the effects of the capitalist world's depression upon the worsening situation of the working masses, and the threat to world peace--are intensifying in many respects the need for collaboration. On the other hand, also the retarding effects have intensified.

Depression and Working-Class Movement

A variety of factors are shaping relations between the communists and social democrats in Western Europe: historical traditions; the balance of power between the two sections of the working-class movement; development of the economic, political and ideological environment in which the two sections operate; the impact of external, international influences; and the subjective conditions, the personal and political factors that affect relations between the two sections. Among them we should single out first of all the intensification and protraction of the capitalist world economy's depression as the factor that most recently has basically been determining the conditions of the working-class movement and class struggle. Primarily the situation arising in the wake of the depression defines the working-class movement's scope of action. The answers to the requirements of this situation, to the economic and social problems stemming from it, and the strategic standpoints of the two sections shape the courses of action in which the communists and social democrats today are able to base their cooperation on narrowing differences of opinion and identical standpoints.

But it is not all the same how we approach the political consequences and strategic opportunities of the depression. The capitalist world economy's current depression has lasted a decade so far. Its duration is a warning that although historical experience is an important tool for exploring the evolved situation and can help us find the right answers to the problems that have arisen and demand answers, historical analogies nevertheless can be misleading. They cannot replace by any means the exploration and evaluation of new phenomena, nor can they exempt us from elaborating new answers based on a realistic assessment of the situation.

From the flood of information about the current depression it is obvious that although it has already reached or exceeded--in terms of some of the economic indicators in the developed capitalist countries--the level of the capitalist world's earlier great depressions, its impact on the working class and the activity of the working masses nevertheless differs from the impact experienced in the capitalist world's earlier great depressions. Admittedly, the depression that began in the 1970 also plunged into crisis state monopoly capitalism's system of regulation, on which the long period of prosperity during the postwar decades was based, and which served as the foundation for the "affluent society" and "welfare state" that Western Europe developed to an extent varying by countries. In spite of this we find--especially so far as the effects of the depression on revolutionizing or radicalizing the working masses are concerned--that this system's depression-damping effect has worked even after the disturbances in the functioning of the economy appeared. During

the preceding decades of prosperity that offered relatively secure livelihood, wage earners were able to set aside reserves, which increased their ability to endure the initial onslaughts of inflation and unemployment. The impact of the latter was alleviated also by the system of social security institutions, until the rising costs gradually limited their operation. Aside from this, the negative consequences of the depression have affected workers in a differentiated manner. In the extent to which living conditions worsened, there have been differences among the gainfully employed, including the workers in growth and ailing industries, the unemployed, the elderly, youths, and retired persons. This has acted in the direction of dispersing the working-class movement, has favored corporative and particular movements, and has strengthened the trends toward turning inward and declining solidarity within the movement. Government policies serving the interests of monopoly capital have only intensified the trend toward the working-class movement's atomization when, in conjunction with sharing the burden of the depression, they strived to shift the main burden onto the workers and to channel the debate on sharing the burden toward debate among the social strata (for example, when setting the priorities in the allocation of national income).

When relative social security ceased in the societies of the developed capitalist countries and the rapid rise of inflation and unemployment threatened to reduce living conditions, the workers were aroused to defend their social achievements. Their determination was reinforced also by nostalgia for the rising standard of living that substantial strata of the working classes experienced during the preceding period of prosperity. This ties in also with the influence of the bourgeois liberal and other reformist ideologies that strived to integrate the working class into the capitalist system during the period of economic growth, and attempted to lay the foundations of a capitalist society based on consensus. Institutional reforms also served to integrate the exploited classes into the capitalist system. By providing additional outlets through which class conflicts and tensions could be reduced, these institutional reforms made it less likely that the intensification of social contradictions as a result of the depression might shake the foundations of capitalism's social system.

Under these conditions the negative social effects of the depression have intensified the social movements, but as a rule these movements have not reached the point where they begin to question the system itself. In the wake of the depression, a revolutionary situation has not matured in the developed capitalist societies of Western Europe. During this period, the working class has not become politically ripe for a direct social revolution, the internal demand for such a change has not developed and has not found expression among the working masses. But in some of the less developed countries of Western Europe, where the fascist systems collapsed and thereby raised the possibilities of democratic revolutionary change, the influence of the United States and developed societies of Western Europe--this being their sphere of influence--has proven strong enough to prevent any threat to the capitalist system itself and to reorganize these societies in accordance with the rules of the capitalist system (to different degrees, in the case of Spain and Portugal).

In the countries of Western Europe, dissatisfaction of the masses afflicted by the depression has brought down governments. Which not only means that stable right-wing governments have been forced to relinquish power to social democratic (or socialist) governments. In several countries, where it became impossible for the social democratic governments to continue their Keynesian economic policies and no new alternative was found to lead the economies out of depression, the conservatives have gained in political influence--in conjunction with a shift to the right in the administration of the leading capitalist country, the United States--and this has cleared the way for neoconservative economic solutions. By limiting the workers' social achievements and treating a rise in unemployment as inevitable, conservative economic policy ruthlessly implements the economic and technological changes that have become necessary. In exchange for selectively employed restrictions, it promises to curb inflation and to bring about an economic recovery, with a return to the previous state of rising prosperity.

The growing strength of conservative trends, in international politics and the individual countries' domestic policies as well, has been accompanied by new waves of anticommunist ideological offensives. They are motivated mainly by fear that social discontent and cabinet crises in the Western countries could bring the communists into government.

One effect of the shift in the balance of power that began in some of the countries has been an intensification of the already existing competition for influence between the social democrats and the communists. Within the large Western communist parties, the exploration of strategies and ideological problems during the 1970's brought to the surface also negative phenomena: internal disputes and uncertainties developed, and in most cases all this caused the parties to lose influence within society. Failure of the social democrats' Keynesian alternative, which promised an "affluent society" and "welfare state," has not strengthened the communist parties. The communists' alternative of socialism, which underwent a facelift in the 1970's, was too abstract and theoretical; for objective reasons, it was not a very effective goal suitable for immediate realization. And the immediate alternatives for the solution of the economic crisis, such as the policy of an "historical compromise," were initially popular but reached an historical dead end, because of resistance by the conservative domestic and international forces of capital.

Moreover, building socialism now has less direct appeal to Western workers than it had during the depression of the 1930's when the appalling economic conditions were in sharp contrast with the momentum and social results of building socialism in the Soviet Union, despite its lower level of economic development. Due to the historical lag in the area of modernization, the difficulties of structural change, the unfavorable development of the world market dominated by capitalists, the capitalist pressure on the socialist economies, and the rising defense costs forced on them, there appeared signs of stagnation or recession in the economic and social-welfare spheres of the countries building socialism, and political crises also arose for other objective and subjective reasons. These phenomena jointly prevented the alternative of "really existing socialism" from becoming a factor that would have mobilized the working masses of the depression-plagued Western countries to liquidate the capitalist system.

The picture that the Western working masses formed of really existing socialism even became tarnished at that time; besides objective factors, also the anti-communist offensives, and public criticisms of the socialist systems by certain Western European parties played a role in this.

Thus, regardless of how severely the depression of the 1970's affected the working population's material welfare and how uncertain it made their livelihood, it did not make a revolutionary change toward the capitalist system's liquidation timely within the societies of the countries in Western Europe. This basically influenced the development of relations between the communists and social democrats, between the revolutionary and the reformist sections of the working-class movement.

Prerequisites for Cooperation

The political developments triggered by the world economy's depression have increased the need for cooperation between the communists and social democrats. They are finding themselves more and more often on the same side in the domestic and international political arenas. Another factor favoring cooperation: in most cases it is collaboration of the leftist forces that makes both worker parties effective, capable of taking action, and practical in their reforms, especially when the measures to be adopted in the interest of wage earners strongly polarize the political forces of capitalist society. Despite the profound and fundamental differences between the two sections, in some of their ideological standpoints, and especially in their political ones, we find an increasing number of common points of agreement that make collaboration possible. In their own programs one can find goals pointing in the same direction: toward leading the economy out of the depression.

Thus both the communists and social democrats are opposed to the conservative, deflationary economic policies that directly worsen the social welfare of wage earners, take away their social security, threaten to perpetuate unemployment and to undermine the system that has evolved for safeguarding the interests of workers (the authority of the trade unions), and attempt to shift the economic burdens one-sidedly onto workers and employees. They are adopting similar stands also in the classical debate on sharing the depression's impact. And in the charged atmosphere that has developed in relations between social classes, both movements are defending the safeguarding of the workers' interests and the rights of the trade unions against the intensifying attacks by right-wing forces and conservative capitalist circles, and the two movements are striving to even broaden the trade unions' rights.

Despite the differences in their character, both parties have committed themselves to preserving bourgeois democratic freedoms and institutions: they deem it necessary to defend these freedoms and institutions from the authoritarian trends that emanate from right-wing circles. Both parties have declared war against the extreme right, for liquidating the manifestations of terrorism and neofascism that threaten the working-class movement and the functioning of the leftist political forces. The aspirations of the two parties are identical not only in defending the evolved system of bourgeois democracy, but also in the sense that the programs of both parties call for the

democratization of the existing system of institutions, and for strengthening and developing further the institutions' democratic features. This applies to the countries where the fascist regimes that survived fascism's World War II defeat have collapsed (Portugal, Spain and Greece), and also to the countries where centralized power structures have been established under right-wing governments to limit parliamentary democracy (for example, the system of "personal rule," a presidential system peculiar to France). And finally, this applies also to countries where the classical form of bourgeois democracy is breaking down, and the resulting constant cabinet crises are paralyzing political power's ability to institute reforms (for example, in Italy). The programs of both parties contain plans to introduce new forms of democracy, intended to alter the legal status and position of the workers in relation to the capitalist owners and employers. In the reform efforts to broaden the workers' rights (the rights of the trade unions, the authority of the enterprise councils, etc.), the social democrats are leaning toward modes of solution that are particular, while the communists prefer global solutions; but common elements can be found that could serve as the basis of joint action for altering the balance of power and the existing power relations.

There are many common points in the assessment and criticism of the cultural situation and life-style of the societies of Western Europe, and also in the plans to modify them. Regarding culture and life-style, both sections deem the development of democratic structures necessary, and many reform proposals to this end can be found in their programs. More recently, they have been criticising also environmental protection. The solution of the working and living environment, and of other questions pertaining to the coordinating role of the policy on urban development, appears as elements of the alternative of a capitalist society, and both movements regard this alternative as a basis of reference when arguing the need for a socialist solution. The fact that a separate political movement (the "greens") has been launched under the banner of environmental protection enhances the latter's political significance.

There are important points of agreement also in the communist and social democratic parties' standpoints on foreign policy, although the two parties do not view the international situation and the development of international relations from the same basis and with the same commitment. Identical or nearly identical points can be found in their programs on the defense of peace and the development of international relations and cooperation. Both parties believe that in political action it is important to raise and consider the global problems. A halt to the arms race, prevention of the further spreading of nuclear arms, elimination of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, or general disarmament can be found as long-range objectives in the aspirations of both sections. Beyond a certain point, the social democrats found that they could not follow, and they themselves turned against, the measures of the confrontation policy that the American administration started to implement in the mid-1970's against the policy of detente. That the social democratic parties in the NATO countries are committed to the Western alliance is reflected in their standpoints on the shift in the international balance of power and its restoration. Within this, however, they are in favor of a dialog, of maintaining and developing East-West relations, and of preserving the achievements of detente that unfolded in the early 1970's, in accordance with the particular economic

interests of the countries of Western Europe. And on these issues the social democrats are in agreement not only with the communist parties of their own countries, but with the socialist countries' foreign-policy efforts as well.

In the light of historical experience, the ideological and political points of agreement between the communists and social democrats can serve as the basis of their cooperation, but in themselves these points of agreement will not necessarily lead to cooperation. Usually two circumstances played a role in the historical unions to date between the revolutionary and reformist sections of the working-class movement. First, the popular strata forming the working-class movement's base became increasingly radicalized,, and there was a shift to the left in the social democratic section. Secondly, the revolutionary section proved capable of representing, specifically and with initiative, the immediate aspirations of the widest social strata, and thus attention focused on intermediate-range objectives, instead of long-range ones (e.g., the periods of popular front alliances, antifascist resistance, and revolutionary upsurge after the defeat of fascism, between 1934 and 1947). This played a significant role in the communists' ability to broaden their influence among the masses, and thereby to acquire an importance in the political life of the individual countries such that political stability could not be created without them.

To the extent that cooperation did develop, it was never free of contradictions. Each section saw the prospects of cooperation in linking the other section to its own long-range objectives and absorbing it. And if cooperation between the two sections proved only temporary, the historical periods of unity were associated with significant results of the working-class movement: important progress was made during these periods toward making society more democratic and developing the political and social rights of the masses.

The social democrats became the chief beneficiaries in the 1970's of the political consequences stemming from the economic and social changes wrought by the establishment of state monopoly capitalist regulation and by the scientific and technological revolution in the 1950's and 1960's. They were best able to broaden their electoral base, to strengthen their already existing dominance within the working-class movement in several countries, or to change in their own favor the balance of power between the two sections in some countries. In the 1970's, the French Socialists succeeded in winning the support of a larger share of the electorate than the French Communists. Generally speaking, the gains of the social democrats increased the competition between the two sections and affected adversely the cause of cooperation between the communists and social democrats.

Hard pressed by the absence of any realistic possibility of immediate revolutionary change on the one hand, and by the social democrats' growing influence on the other, the communist parties have experienced identity crises, and in many instances also their mass influence has declined. Even in the situation created by the depression, however, emphasis on the prospects of an immediate revolution and the revival of sectarian forms of behavior are not a feasible way for the communist parties to solve their identity crises. At the same time, due in part to the depression, the alternative that the social democrats had developed during the preceding decades likewise found itself in a crisis:

it ran out of steam in its basic aspects, and was unable to cope with the depression or to oppose the conservative trends that have become the dominant in the world economy (not only in the Federal Republic of Germany, but also in the case of the French Socialists whose ideology and statements are more radical). As the mass influence of the social democrats, too, has begun to decline in conjunction with this crisis, there have been attempts to streamline policy also within their parties.

In formulating their strategy, it appears expedient for the communist parties --from the viewpoint of reaffirming their identity, increasing their mass influence, and also of creating realistic conditions for cooperation with the social democrats--to strive to establish an alternative that meets the following requirements: by integrating the particular interests and at the same time rising above them, it is able to protect the interests of the popular masses against the depression's effects manifesting themselves in a differentiated manner; offers specific solutions that directly affect wide working strata within society; and contains practical answers to the depression's real problems. And if shaping this alternative does not mean a shift from concentration on the details of the future to the adoption of a pragmatic standpoint, rather emphasis on the immediate tasks while keeping in perspective capitalist society's radical transformation and thereby establishing an organic link with the long-range outlook, then the working-class movement's revolutionary section will be able to prove its own viability in a period when, and in countries where, the capitalist system's revolutionary liquidation is not the immediate order of the day.

If we examine specifically the relations between the communists and social democrats (or socialists), the situation today presents a very diversified picture. On the basis of the converging political standpoints as outlined above, there is cooperation in its various aspects (and this sets special tasks for the communist parties striving for cooperation): cooperation between the two parties in or outside parliament, in other representative bodies, in local politics and in the organization of mass movements; cooperation among the trade unions; and cooperation between communists and social democrats in voluntary associations and movements such as the peace movement, for example. Furthermore, the social democratic parties are establishing relations with the large communist parties of Western Europe, respectively they are holding talks with the communist parties of the socialist countries as well. All this relates to different aspects of cooperation, in which the social democrats are behaving selectively. A typical manifestation is the rejection of relations with the domestic communist party, but a willingness to maintain relations with other large communist parties in Western Europe or with the socialist countries' communist parties. However, relations with the latter are limited to the discussion of international problems and do not include other questions of the working-class movement, an area in which the social democrats rule out the possibility of cooperation.

Peace Movement and Cooperation

A possible area of cooperation between communists and social democrats, gaining in importance at present, is the struggle against war and another round of

the arms race. The peace movement that unfolded in this area in recent years --it may be regarded as a new peace movement on the basis of its specific characteristics--has created a new situation. Without analyzing in detail on this occasion the present conditions and forms of the struggle for peace that determine the possibilities of cooperation between the communists and social democrats, here I merely wish to point out a few characteristic features.

At the turn of the decade from the 1970's to the 1980's, the working-class movement and its organizations in the Western countries seemed to be preoccupied with the depression's growing social problems, primarily with protecting jobs, and less aware of the need for peace activity. This was because in the early 1970's the results of the policy of detente, in whose elaboration and adoption certain social democratic parties and governments had assumed an important role, easily led public opinion to leave the task of defending peace to government policy. And it appeared that the governments headed by social democrats, or the influence of these parties on the governments, would be sufficient guaranty for this. Active support of the peace movement by the traditional large working-class organizations was hampered initially also by the objective fact that the two large military alliances had been guaranteeing for years the individual countries' security, and a close link had been established between the nations' security and the military alliances' interests especially with the shift in the balance of power in the wake of the arms buildup in the 1970's. Citing the interests of security and the need to maintain the balance of power, in some countries of Western Europe even the communist parties that formulate their standpoints with cabinet-level responsibility gave preference to parliamentary or government action.

Spontaneous elements and groups formed on local initiative played the main role in the peace movement that unfolded against the development and introduction of the neutron bomb, and then against the deployment of American missiles in Europe and the new wave of nuclear armament following NATO's twofold resolution of December 1979. The participation of the working class and its organizations in the peace movement that arose in this manner was not commensurate with their actual importance within society. But the social and political forces outside the traditional working-class movement--ranging from church circles, through groups that previously had been politically passive, to extremely anticapitalist political forces--were assigned a big role. Yet this peace movement, extremely heterogeneous in its social structure, has always remained objectively open to the working-class movement's forces, whether communists or social democrats.

So far as the social democrats' attitudes to security policy, the timely questions of the arms race and the peace movement are concerned, we find very different standpoints among, and even within, the individual parties. Among the social democrats, in our opinion, contradictory phenomena are the dominant. These manifest themselves, for example, in that they oppose the new round in the arms race, but at the same time they reject also contact with the peace movements. Or in general they advocate positive principles in favor of peace, but at the same time they support a political practice that leads in the direction of NATO's military aspirations. From the viewpoint of correctly assessing these and similar contradictions, it is important to draw a distinction between

the social democratic parties' attitude to the peace movements, and their standpoint on the questions of international security and peace. These are closely related, but nonetheless separate, elements of social democratic policy.

Besides their relegating the questions of peace and security to the competence of government policy, what initially held back the social democratic parties in several countries from joining the new wave of the peace movement was that the communists had assumed a leading or active role in the new peace movements. Furthermore, the social democrats shunned the peace movement also because it became intertwined with radical alternative movements that challenged the system and cast doubt on the legitimate, parliamentary channels of politics, regarding the solution of the great political questions affecting the popular masses. The decisive contradictions, of course, were between the peace movements and the official standpoints of the social democratic parties. These contradictions stemmed primarily from the Atlantic commitment of most prominent social democratic parties, i.e., their standpoint that confuses national defense interests with NATO interests, whereas the latter are determined--through Reagan's policies--by the extreme wing of the imperialist forces. This is the view that Willy Brandt, for example, expressed in the interview he gave NEPSZABADSAG (on 29 October 1983), in which he said that 70 percent of West Germany's population opposed the deployment of American missiles, but 90 percent approved of participation in the Western alliance. On this basis, these social democratic parties regarded the peace movements as "one-eyed," because of their anti-American edge; opposed everywhere, even within their own ranks, the demands for unilateral nuclear disarmament; and declared war on "neutrality," i.e., the standpoints termed neutral and pacifist. They wanted to seize the initiative and to take the wind out of the peace movement's sails, by launching peace drives of their own.

But when it turned out that the peace movements unfolding independently of the social democrats were finding wide response within society and were expressing the popular masses' growing fear of a possible nuclear war, and that the alternatives--for example, the environmentalists in West Germany--were winning voters away from the social democrats, the attitude of the social democratic parties began to shift toward the peace movements, especially in the case of the parties that were in opposition. A few of the social democratic parties had joined the peace movement earlier and even radicalized its demands, e.g. in the Scandinavian and Benelux countries. More recently, the integration of the new social movements and the attraction of the social forces within the peace movement's tide into the social democratic movement have become important elements in the efforts of the social democratic parties to revamp their policies. Thus the peace movements offer increasing opportunities for cooperation between the communists and social democrats, even independently of the latter's intentions.

While the social democratic parties' attitude to the peace movements is based primarily on consideration of domestic politics, the possibility of cooperating with the social democrats at the level of international politics is determined by their standpoints on the questions of security policy, missile deployment and nuclear disarmament. Here we find significant differences of opinion--ranging from the standpoints of Craxi and Mitterand, to those of the Dutch

Labor Party, British Labor Party, the Swedish Social Democratic Workers' Party or the Spanish and Greek socialists--on the extent to which timely controversial questions should be subordinated to the considerations of NATO. Besides these significant differences that any policy wishing to strengthen international relations must take far-reachingly into consideration, the policies of the social democrats have one characteristic in common. In a departure from the standpoints of the present United States administration and of NATO's right-wing, conservative political circles, the social democrats would like to avoid a new round in the arms race and to see Europe safer from the threat of a nuclear catastrophe; therefore they recognize the need for disarmament and favor solving problems at the negotiating table. While the arms policies of the American administration and right-wing NATO circles now pose the main danger in international politics, the social democrats' standpoint outlined above makes them a potential ally of every social movement that wants to halt the arms race and prefers negotiations to a policy of force.

The upsurge of the peace movement has opened up a new front for the communist parties, one that offers them an opportunity to become the vanguard of the working class in the struggle for the solution of the problems affecting wide social strata, over and above the problems stemming from the depression, and thereby to broaden their mass influence and to gain greater political importance and prestige. Moreover, by striving for cooperation with the progressive forces, including the social democrats, and by collaborating with them, the communist parties can score successes in the struggle against the imperialists, which is an essential condition for the working-class movement's survival and its further growth as well.

1014

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HUNGARY

ENERGY SUPPLY PROBLEMS IN COLD WEATHER DETAILED

Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 24 Jan 85 p 5

[Excerpts] The country's fuel shortage is common knowledge. Many homes lack an adequate stock of coal and supply is lagging.

There are 3.95 million homes in Hungary, 11.6 percent of which use solid fuel (coal and wood) for cooking, 43 percent for heating. This 43 percent includes the heating of individual homes and buildings as well as central heating.

700,000 homes use network gas for heating, 900,000 for cooking, 450,000 for water heating. Propane-butane gas in cylinders is used for cooking by more than 2 million families. There is a gradual switch-over from burning oil to burning solid fuel or gas; the present estimate of the number of families using oil is 660,000.

Long-distance fuel supply is used in 760,000 homes, and 140,000 homes use electricity for heating. Significantly more, 580,000 homes use electricity for cooking. Water for washing and bathing is heated electrically in 1.2 million homes. Thus there is a great demand in Hungary for fuel, especially during cold winters such as this year's.

Reason for Coal Shortage

Homes using solid fuel have been having problems since the beginning of the winter, i.e., since last November. The supply of firewood is adequate throughout the country. Although the selection is limited, there is coal available in Budapest's fuel depots. On the other hand, supply in towns around Budapest and in the rest of the country is inadequate in terms of both quantity and selection.

The coal mining industry's production target for the first quarter of 1985 is 1.3 million tons of coal; imported coal will amount to 350,000 tons. Accordingly, the mines should produce 15,300 tons daily but only 40 to 60 percent of that is being produced. Reasons for the lag include a labor shortage, geological problems, and lagging investments.

With regard to coal imports, we may expect, on the basis of earlier years' business, imports of coal and briquetts from Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia,

the Soviet Union and the GDR. However, we can expect only 290,000 tons of imported coal instead of 350,000 tons in the first quarter, and even that is being late in arriving.

The earlier lag in domestic coal production is also instrumental in the present shortage: 1984's initial shortage was already about 200,000 tons.

Although people must stand in line, and may buy only 500 to 1,000 kg of coal in a single purchase, there are not many homes with an entirely empty fuel storage room, only they cannot stock enough fuel for security and comfort.

Problems in Metallurgy

Metallurgy is one of the greatest users of industrial energy: almost 30 percent of overhead costs go for the purchase of various fuels. It is understandable, then, that the industry was hard hit by the official limits set on fuel consumption.

Lajos Sajben, chief fuel specialist at the Hungarian Iron and Steel Industrial Union, said that, according to the information given by the Ministry of Industries, the 4 largest metallurgical enterprises (the Danube Iron Works, the Lenin Metallurgical Works, the Ózd Metallurgical Works, and the Csepel enterprises) were able to prepare in time for the change. For some large equipment that also work with alternate fuel (such as the Siemens blast-furnaces, bloom furnaces or air heaters of the furnaces) can be fueled by oil instead of gas if a previous plan is worked out.

In itself, the change-over would not have presented any technical problems (it "only" increases production cost), had not been any problems in acquisition and delivery. But since even the amount of oil they received was inadequate for a continuous production, the latter had to be reduced already in the second week of the year. This had various effects on the enterprises which produced 20,000 tons less steel and 14,000 tons less rolled articles than planned.

The last few days have been a little warmer and thus the lag in production also decreased by 30 to 40 percent. The other enterprises (mainly in the Borsod region) were hindered in their continuous production by a limited supply of electricity.

The limits imposed on the use of energy have cost the large metallurgical enterprises an extra 60 to 80 million forints to date, their lost revenues amounting to about 320 to 340 million forints. And although these enterprises are doing everything possible to recover their losses, the effect of reduced production will probably affect the processing industry. Because of dwindling stocks at the beginning of the year, the Rába and the Csepel automotive factories are already complaining because of a shortage of sheet metal.

Enough Firewood is Available

Customers were able to buy firewood at the depots of the Fuel and Building material Trade Enterprises even in the past weeks. Hungary's forests produce 8 million cubic meters of wood annually, 2.4 million cubic meters of which, i.e., 1.9 million tons, are sold as firewood; 63 percent of it is produced by lumber companies, 29 percent by farming cooperatives, and the remaining 8 percent by other lumber enterprises, e.g., by state farms and water companies.

In the first 3 years of the 1980's, the state forest economy had to produce an annual quota of 850,000 tons of firewood, which they had to deliver at the depots of the Fuel and Building Material Trade Enterprise. The farming cooperatives and other lumber companies sold most of their wood to local customers. There was plenty of wood, so much so that retailers could not sell all of it; in 1983, for instance, they sold only 86 percent of the 850,000 tons. Last year the quota was lifted, and the distributors signed a contract with the producers for 740,000 tons of firewood. Not even that was entirely sold out: the amount sold last year was 654,000 tons.

This decreased demand is understandable, for more and more homes switched to more modern ways of heating. On the other hand, producers would like to see an increase in sales, and thus they did everything possible to increase local sales, trying to increase their exports as well, which amounted to 55,000 tons last year.

As hard winter arrived in the past weeks, the Office of Forestry and Timber Industry of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry requested the wood producers via telex to make an inventory of their stocks. It turned out that 250,000 tons of firewood could be delivered and sold on a short notice! Lumbermen were working in the forests even when the mercury dropped to minus 15 to 20 degrees Celsius, and within a few days the extra deliveries began to take place. In places where there were not enough vehicles available, the producers called upon the army for help.

Long Lines Waiting for Coal

"This cannot be called coal; it is dust mixed with a little coal," says teamster Jozsef Doma, foraging the black pile with his fork. "Of course, as a last resort, people will buy this, too. But the buyer must pay extra for the sifting or do it himself."

The Fot depot of the Fuel and Building Material Trade Enterprise consists mainly of piles of pulverized pearl briquets and Polish coal. And they keep crumbling.

"It is impossible to take care of thousands of tons as one can take care of 40 or 50 quintals at home. We encouraged people to buy in the summer but they did not. And by now it is so crumbled that it would be useless to them. Still, 100 to 150 people stand in line already at daybreak every day. We always ask whether we should distribute the coal evenly among the buyers or

should we sell as much as anyone wants, but then, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, someone at the end of the line may get nothing. It is difficult to please everyone, people are uptight. On the other hand, we have plenty of firewood - as a last resort, that will also give heat. True, it is 2 to 3 times more expensive to use wood to generate the same amount of heat as with coal," says Mrs Jozsef Takacs, manager of the depot.

Dunakeszi, on the other hand, does not even have pulverized coal, and every morning 200 to 300 people stand in line shivering.

"We open at 7:30, by 8 o'clock the freshly arrived amount is divided on paper into 5-quintal portions. After that, our "only" task is to calm those who perhaps repeatedly stood in line in vain. Of course, we never succeed," relates Mrs Istvan Brulich the everyday tribulations.

"And the old and sick people who cannot stand in line?"

"It is extremely difficult for us to make exceptions, even when it would be warranted. Social control is so strict that any kind of favoritism is impossible. But we always comply with the request of the Council or the Red Cross organization by delivering the coal or wood to those in need."

"How long does it take for a family to use up 5 quintals of coal?"

"Depending on the size of the home, 1 or 2 weeks."

"Repeated deliveries will no doubt make heat more expensive."

"Not really, for the teamster cannot charge more than 20 forints for each quintal in local deliveries, no matter in how many installments he delivers 50 quintals. Only the amount of tips may increase this way. The teamsters do not benefit from this shortage of coal: they must work more for the same amount of money."

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POLAND

BEDNARSKI SEES INTERNAL, EXTERNAL IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

Warsaw IDEOLOGIA I POLITYKA in Polish No 10, Oct 84 pp 5-16

[Article by Henryk Bednarski, PZPR Central Committee secretary: "Fulfillment of the Ideological Tasks of the Party Under Current Conditions"]

[Text] The ideological tasks of the 13th and 16th Plenums of the PZPR Central Committee and the National Conference of the PZPR Delegates are being implemented in a complicated economic and political environment. The influence of these circumstances on the efficiency of measures in the sphere of ideology and indoctrination is not unambiguous: after all, there are factors which facilitate ideological and propaganda work and point to its higher standing in the entirety of party practice. At the same time, we are dealing with conditions impairing the achievement of satisfactory results.

Three circumstances strongly point to the need for more aggressive ideological work by the party:

--The analysis of the experience of the 1970's reveals that neglect for this sphere of party tasks, its excessive saturation with the narrowly defined practical content and divorcement from the class analysis which led to the weakening of the party's ideological influence on the populace and especially on the working class and the young, does not yet belong to history.

--The intensified ideological and propaganda offensive of the world and especially U.S. imperialism and the forces of the so-called domestic opposition echoing it calls for more intensive counteractions on our part.

--The crush of urgent and complicated tasks regarding industry and the market prompts the party aktiv to concentrate on administrative matters and brings about separate analysis and planning of economic, political-organizational and ideological and propaganda activities.

The recent period say many positive changes in the political situation and the consciousness of the Polish society. This was brought about by the considerable

effort of the aktiv and the ideological front of the party. The course and results of elections to the people's councils, celebrations of the 40th anniversary of People's Poland, the amnesty and the situation in the country on 31 August prove this convincingly. However, we should not overlook both the magnitude of the tasks and the dangers occurring in the ideological work.

Circumstances which impair the achievement of gratifying results in the ideological and indoctrination work are of an economic, political and psychological nature.

Difficult economic conditions, especially the results of a decrease in the standard of living, inflationary processes and market difficulties, certainly influence adversely the efficiency of ideological work. They cause indifference and frustration in the populace and reduce the interest in issues transcending day-to-day concerns.

Among the ideological and political dangers affecting the implementation of propaganda and indoctrination tasks we should mention the following:

--The state of passiveness and disinclination to get involved in social activity, the declining belief in its impact. This state of affairs owes much to the experience of 1980 and 1981, to the rise of public hopes caused by new forces and social phenomena and the subsequent shattering of these hopes by the developments and the unmasking of the genuine intentions of the leaders of Solidarity, and so on.

--The party's insufficiently advanced process of regaining the confidence of the populace as revealed by the research on political attitudes.

--The ongoing propaganda war of varying intensity waged against Poland by global, especially American, imperialism. Despite the increasingly realistic views of the international relations and interest of Poland indicated by the results of public opinion studies, a segment of public opinion still shows receptiveness to the contents of actions hostile to the socialist motherland, political demagoguery and so on.

--The ideological and indoctrination influences of the Catholic Church. While these influences do not lend themselves to unambiguous political evaluations in individual cases, they are primarily based on the anticommunist worldview system and theory and in the long run work in accordance with the essence of that system.

--The manifestations of a "confusion" of sorts in the sphere of theoretical and historical awareness, also in the ranks of the party, which have not been overcome. First of all, they are expressed in the attitude toward the 40-year

history of the People's Poland, in the manner of interpreting the essence of bourgeois and socialist democracy, in understanding the environment at the outset of the process of socialist construction in Poland, etc. Certain purportedly Marxist articles in the press which proceeded directly to question of whether Polish society is mature enough for systemic changes or altogether question the socialist nature of systemic accomplishments in People's Poland have not served to clear up this confusion but, on the contrary, have aggravated it further.

--The inadequate level of basic economic knowledge of the populace, which facilitates yielding to demagoguery and hinders the understanding of the essence of socioeconomic processes.

--The persisting appeal of historic and political symbolism of a clearly anti-communist variety to a segment of social communities, especially the intellectuals (the "sanacja" regime [after 1926], the ND [National Democracy] party, clerical symbolism and so on).

--The lack of a uniform basic ideological line in various elements of the system of education and upbringing in our socialist state, especially with regard to economics, history and world view. This is the case in, for example, college education, where smoothly operating programs combining instruction with indoctrination are lacking, and in some colleges, especially the large and prestigious ones, a segment of the cadre assume a passive, neutral or altogether unfriendly attitude toward the socialist state. Political divisions are clearly apparent in artistic communities. These phenomena affect the results of our work and reduce the efficiency of the socialist practice of ideology and indoctrination in its entirety.

The above-mentioned phenomena in the intellectual and artistic communities result in part from the fact that as a party we sometimes fail to anticipate the intentions of our adversaries and learn from the methods and techniques they are using (this observation may also apply to other spheres of activity and communities). It sometimes happens that instead of aggressively advancing our own goals we accept the content and methods imposed by the adversary who, for example in certain communities, uses well the technique of camouflaging his political goals.

In outlining our tasks we should bear in mind that the frontline of ideological work does not run through a strictly defined place and is not exclusively associated with the operation of individual specialized PZPR elements. It embraces the entire party, all of its elements and individual members. The resolute advancement and vigorous presentation of this statement should be viewed as an unquestionable achievement of the 13th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee. In that sense, the 13th Plenum created the need to reexamine the entirety of

PZPR policy, the most significant strong and also weak points of the party as a combatant on the ideological front. First, the implementation of the stated necessary cohesion of all spheres where party tasks are carried out (economic, political-organizational and ideological indoctrination) and, second, the actual importance attached to ideological activities by all the PZPR elements and organizations are these strong or, conversely, weak points.

For example, reducing the reports on the implementation of the resolutions of 13th Plenum to enumerating the initiatives and efforts of the elements which are, so to say, responsible for the course of ideological and indoctrination work and propaganda in their line of duty has all the features of bureaucratic simplification.

In outlining the current ideological tasks of the PZPR, we should also bear in mind that they do not follow exclusively from the goals stated at the "ideological" 12th and 13th Plenums of the PZPR Central Committee. The leading echelons of the party have already stated the opinions and tasks in the sphere of honoring the ideological and indoctrinational duties of the PZPR after the 13th Plenum.

Therefore, ideological tasks should be viewed in a broader context, not only in relation to the Central Committee resolutions but also in light of important sociopolitical events, especially the results of the National Conference of PZPR Delegates and the 16th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee, the course of elections to the people's councils and celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the People's Poland.

We solicit the tests of the efficiency of our work. Materials for evaluations are drawn from, among other things, various public opinion surveys. A comprehensive evaluation of the impact of carrying out ideological tasks is found in the opinion survey of delegates at the National Conference of PZPR Delegates. The delegates come from various class and vocational communities; thus, their opinion may be considered to represent that of the party.

The survey was made in February 1984. The results of the survey point to the basically critical evaluation of the sphere of PZPR ideological practice and especially to the low priority attached in the party to the implementation of the resolutions of the 12th and 13th Plenums of the Central Committee.

To be sure, 82.1 percent of the respondents stated that since the Ninth PZPR Congress a process of ideological consolidation has occurred in the party. However, further responses reveal that ideological activity as such does not occupy a sufficiently strong position among the factors responsible for this consolidation. These data must concern us and provoke some thought. Why does

an overwhelming majority of representatives of the leading party aktiv think that the implementation of resolutions of the two important Central Committee plenums did not perceptibly facilitate the intensification of ideological work?

It seems that the still inadequate awareness of the hierarchy of implemented ideological values in many elements of the party is a factor in the unsatisfactory level of implementing the resolutions of the central PZPR echelon. All compromises and deviations from this hierarchy, which is unambiguously dominated by the criterion of social justice, result in the reduced significance and authority of the entire sphere of the party's ideological activities, which is difficult to offset.

The efficiency of ideological and indoctrination work in the PZPR is also weakened by the insufficient attractiveness of the methods and instruments used in this work, such as the level of training sessions, the quality of propaganda and information publications, visual propaganda aids, etc.

Analyses which are regularly prepared by the Central Committee Ideological Department show that discipline in carrying out ideological tasks is deficient in many party organizations. The sphere of party training is the most vivid example. The issue of formal discipline is but one and by far not the most important aspect of efficiency in ideological work. However, it cannot be neglected, because the attitude toward the merit of the phenomenon often comes through in a generalized form in the attitude toward discipline and also because bad discipline dampens the possible actual impact in ideology and indoctrination.

The issue of instilling Marxism-Leninism, the ideological and theoretical basis of the program and the current content of party policies, among its members is of paramount importance.

The system of comprehensive training through ideological meetings adopted by the Politburo of the Central Committee in 1982 has been received positively by the entire party. Under current conditions, it has turned out to be an effective form of training, providing for a uniform interpretation of the problems of party policy.

It can be stated on the basis of provincial PZPR committees' evaluations and results of inspections that 96 percent of the OOP's [departmental party organizations] and POP's [basic party organizations] carried out indoctrination activities within the framework of recommended ideological meetings. No training was undertaken primarily in numerically small POP's and OOP's, largely in rural communities, and also in some enterprises (including the large ones), mainly in organizations consisting of retirees.

However, the record of party training in basic organizations has been uneven. About 43 percent of organizations held five or more ideological meetings. About 40 percent of the organizations held three to four meetings, and 12 percent merely one to two ideological meetings.

Average attendance at the ideological meetings ranged between 60 and 70 percent. This shows that the discipline in the ranks of the party is not too strict, since the training takes place in the course of statutory meetings. It seems that some echelons, KZ's [plant committees] and POP's are too lax in justifying the absence of party members from the meetings and do not analyze the true reasons for the failure to discharge statutory party duties. The problem of attendance at the ideological meetings should be thoroughly analyzed by all party organizations.

Community training has been launched in a majority of provinces. To a relatively high degree, it has embraced teachers, especially of history and civics, and the rural community. Training sessions are much less frequent in the community of artists, journalists and employees of state administration.

The inspection of training work in the rural community and in colleges carried out by the proper departments of the Central Committee has shown that its level by far does not meet the expectations and needs.

The increase in the number of PZPR candidates apparent over recent months is not accompanied by the organization of respective forms of training by the KZ's, POP's and superior echelons. The inspection of training work in the 208 largest industrial enterprises carried out by the Ideological Department of the PZPR Central Committee showed that in 10 percent of the enterprises there is no training for candidates in any form.

Much attention was paid to improving the ideological and political knowledge of the aktiv in the last training year. The completed reports and elections campaign in the party and the turnover of cadres associated with it necessitated a considerable increase in the number of courses for the aktiv organized by party echelons and ROPP's [regional centers of party activities].

The guidelines of the Secretariat of the Central Committee for the past training year included the provision that the WUML [evening university of Marxism-Leninism] should primarily train the cadres of instructors and lecturers for party training and the ideological front aktiv. This principle has been observed in a majority of cases. However, the fact that over 21 percent of the largest industrial enterprises do not train their party cadres at the WUML gives rise to concern. Little concern with the attendance of students on the part of party organizations and basic level echelons should also be viewed negatively.

The interest of the ROPP's in training work has increased substantially. Most of the ROPP's organize training courses and WUML branches. However, the training work of ROPP's should be evaluated individually.

The last year of party training brought progress in the development of training work in the party. The year saw the self-sacrificing effort of the echelons, organizers and lecturers. However, the reviews by the executive boards of provincial committees and the inspection materials obtained by the Ideological Department of the Central Committee prove that the development of this work has been rather uneven. The interest in party training shown by the basic level echelons is insufficient. The results of this year go to prove that there are certain achievements where the leadership of echelons appreciated training work, where it was thoroughly planned and where persistence and discipline in carrying out this work were not lacking.

Party training must become an issue for the entire party, a concern for all party organizations and echelons. It is all the more essential because some party organizations and echelons still display the lack of understanding and appreciation for its role and functions. This results in the varying level of training, its still low efficiency in many cases and the lack of training work in some party organizations.

In the new year of party training, all echelons and organizations are obligated to undertake the planned well-organized activities with a view to the full and persistent implementation of the training program. First of all, we should see to it that party training takes place in all the POP's and is taken by all party members. Party echelons should prepare and organize the training well in advance and provide maximum assistance in the form of training material and instructions, especially to the organizations operating in communities where the party still has limited political influence.

Given the importance of ideological work, ideological meetings should be diligently prepared with regard to both the method and the merit of the issues and should end in the adoption of certain tasks for the POP and its members in political work in their community.

With a view to the due priority of ideological issues, their discussion should not be combined with other items on the agenda.

Party organizations must organize training meetings along with the monthly statutory party meetings wherever such an opportunity exists.

Party organizations at all levels should provide ad-hoc assistance in organizing meetings and persistently review their course. Provincial committee executive

boards will conduct a preliminary review of training activities in their jurisdictions in January 1985, and in June 1985 they will review party training in its entirety.

In the new year of party training, all echelons and party organizations should respond positively to the appeal by the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, General of the Army Wojciech Jaruzelski, made on behalf of the Central Committee at the meeting with the meritorious lecturers of party training on 29 September 1984: "We should make it our goal that the participants of every training meeting should be 'different' after the meeting from what they were before: better equipped with arguments, more confident in their political choice, more resilient in the ideological struggle which our party wages every hour of every day."

Party echelons in large enterprises were obligated to set up SAR's [workers' aktiv schools] due to the need to raise the consciousness of the working class. Workers enjoying authority in their communities, among others, party, trade union and workers' self-government activists, foremen, crew leaders and young workers recommended by youth organizations, should be primarily sent to the schools.

As the number of those joining the PZPR grows, the training of candidates assumes particular importance. It must become the focal point of concern of its organizers, the basic level echelons or the ROPP. POP executive boards which refer the candidates to training should persistently control their attendance in classes. Among other criteria, mastering basic information on the party confirmed by a test should be a prerequisite for admission to the party.

The WUML, the supreme form of party training, should be more fully used for the ideological education of party, state and economy leaders.

The cadre of lecturers is vitally important in carrying out training activities.

Redoubling our efforts to propagate the declaration "What We Are Fighting For, Where We Are Headed" is a task of great significance in the ideological work of the party. The importance of this document as, among other things, an instrument of aggressive influence of the party on the populace and winning it over for our ideological and political reasoning is hard to overestimate. The general content and individual statements and views of the declaration must be a permanent component of actions undertaken by party organizations and elements in mass ideological and indoctrination work, propaganda and party training. Too little familiarity with the declaration on the part of those who should be its most important propagators, i.e., rank and file party members, is an alarming phenomenon. In view of this, it becomes necessary to undertake the following actions:

First--proper preparation and comprehensive holding of ideological meetings in the POP's devoted to the declaration. These meetings should open the cycle of party training in the year 1984-1985. Care should be taken to avoid any deviation from this principle.

Second--materials and publications devoted to the content of the declaration, showing its connection with the policy of the party and concrete measures, pointing out the role of the declaration in the life of every party collective, should appear in the local party press to a greater degree than they have thus far. Readable journalistic work which gets through to the convictions and emotions, faithfully reflects the intent of the declaration and translates its values and principles into the language of the reader is needed. It would be feasible to extend these actions to the enterprise press and programs of the public address systems. We should encourage enterprise party organizations to undertake this.

Third--other actions of an ideological nature such as, for example, ideological and theoretical conferences and seminars organized by the provincial and lower echelons should draw more from the content of the declaration. Their agenda should also be linked to the views and statements contained in the declaration, so that these views provide the essential point of departure for the discussion within the framework of these events. This applies in particular to the events organized to celebrate the 40th anniversary of People's Poland and the 40th anniversary of victory over fascism and Japanese militarism.

Fourth--an initiative should be mounted in the educators' community in order to make the declaration the subject of civics lessons in schools and in the broadly defined upbringing work with the students.

Fifth--it is necessary to see to it that the declaration becomes one of the leading topics of ideological and upbringing work carried out by the institutions of the upbringing front. This applies in particular to political education in the socialist youth unions.

Undertaking and carrying out the above-mentioned actions serving to propagate the content of the declaration is an important ideological obligation of all provincial echelons.

The PRON [Polish Movement for National Rebirth] plays an ever-increasing role in the process of winning the citizens over for participation in solving the important problems of our country. This became very clear in the course of the political campaign of elections to the people's councils. Yet another step toward achieving national understanding has thus been taken. The decision on amnesty made on the 40th anniversary of the July [1944] Manifesto also played an important role in this process.

Redoubling the efforts aimed at overcoming apathy and indifference to public affairs still displayed by a considerable segment of the populace still remains a very important task. The PRON has a special role in solving this problem.

The experience of PRON so far points to the need for the following actions by the party members involved in the movement:

- ensuring the further development and strengthening of the PRON elements and councils, especially at the basic level, in residential subdivisions, villages, enterprises and in individual social and vocational communities;

- increasing the aggressiveness and looking for new efficient modes of action;

- concern with the PRON's own identity and independence in the operation of its structures;

- adding people who enjoy authority and have experience and skills needed to work in a mass social movement to the PRON aktiv operating in individual communities.

Special attention should be drawn to the "National Action of Aid to Schools," a concrete program initiative of the PRON requiring support, also on the part of party organizations and echelons. This initiative is generating an increasingly powerful social response. It should lay the groundwork for general social activation in individual communities with regard not only to improving the equipment level of schools but also building a wide-ranging social education front.

The fall elections of local self-government are the next important task facing the party members active in the PRON. This is a political campaign of no lesser importance than the elections to the people's councils.

The Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee evaluated the course of celebrations of the 40th anniversary of People's Poland to date in its meeting on 31 July 1984. This course proves the advancement of the process of rallying the populace around the program of stabilizing our country. This process is manifested in, among other things, considerable participation and growing activity of individual social and vocational groups in volunteer projects and work and in anniversary celebrations and events. No attempts to disrupt the course of anniversary attempts and celebrations have been registered.

Similarly, the 45th anniversary of Hitlerite Germany's attack on Poland was marked with mass participation and patriotism. The ceremony in Warsaw at the Royal Castle on 31 August, peace demonstrations on 1 August in Chelm, Gdansk, Katowice and subsequently on 8 and 9 September in Bydgoszcz and Mlawa in

Ciechanow Province attracted thousands of participants and generated a powerful response in the entire country. Mass participation by young people along with the members of the elder generation was a very important feature. This was an authentic meeting of generations with a strong patriotic charge.

The further course of the political campaign around the 40th anniversary of People's Poland should serve to drive home the correctness of the way chosen by the left-wing forces in order to restore the independence of Poland and to bring about the social rebirth of the motherland as a socialist state. While recalling the heroic struggle of our people on all fronts of World War II, the populace should be made aware that preserving the peace is most important. Celebrations of the 40th anniversary of victory serve to recall our dramatic experience, but also the awareness that the forces of imperialism would like to win through a policy of confrontation forced on the world primarily at our expense.

"Ideological and organizational foundations for celebrating the 40th anniversary of victory over fascism," which are the guidelines for activities up to May 1985, have been prepared. At the end of this year, the Politburo will pass a program resolution on the celebration of this anniversary, which crowns the celebration of the 40 years of People's Poland.

Current socioeconomic conditions and tasks associated with the shaping of social awareness make it necessary to outline several basic directions and tasks which must be reflected in the ideological work of the party. These are:

1. The necessity to link ideological work consistently to the main social, political and economic processes. Only in this way will the unity of ideology, economy and politics be implemented. Ideological and indoctrinational activities must be strictly tied to the need to solve the vital problems of the working class and all working people. Hence the importance of the ideological aspect of activities following the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee.
2. Concentration of ideological work on the younger generation of the working class, the high and vocational school students, in colleges.
3. Improvement in the aggressiveness, attractiveness of the means and methods and the discipline of carrying out ideological and indoctrination activities.
4. Improvement in the long-range projecting of needs and planning of intended actions in ideological and propaganda work, including the decoupling of future ideological work from the presumed intentions of the adversary, the resolute advancement of our own positive program.

5. Solution of organizational and legal problems which hamper the ideological and indoctrination activities, especially in large working-class communities (among other things, the status of enterprise centers of education and information, funding for the ideological and indoctrinational activities).
6. Continuation of the process of unmasking the true interests and intentions of the West and its supporters in Poland within the framework of the "anti-communist crusade"; revealing the clash of the concrete goals of this campaign and the interests of Polish society.
7. Reinforcement of ideological and indoctrinational actions aimed against the manifestations of clericalism, especially against the elements of overt active anticommunism in the theoretical, doctrine and propaganda practices of the Catholic Church. These actions should concentrate on the implementation of the most significant principles of the religious policy in the People's Republic of Poland: freedom of consciousness and religion; the lay character of public life, and especially of the state and its educational institutions; counteracting the use of religious forms for carrying out activities aimed against the political system and the state; recognition of the fact that, while the clash of differing philosophical concepts in the sphere of worldview is natural, in the political sphere the untraversable limit to this is imposed by the necessity to comply with the Constitution of the PRL and the reasons of the Polish socialist state; aggressiveness in the worldview and ideology of the PZPR, including the promotion of a conscious attitude toward religion by party members; the search for areas of cooperation with the churches and religious communities in furthering the important social and national interests.
8. Combination of short- and medium-range actions with the implementation of long-range educational programs. Embarking on the implementation of economic, historic and lay education programs. These programs are important due to their role in comprehensive unification of the ideological front and the fact that they are the expression of the positive long-range ideological and indoctrination goals of the party. The use of, among others, the 18th Days of Books "Man-World-Politics" in implementing these programs.
9. Active participation by school and college party organizations in the discussion on preparing a Central Committee plenum on national education in 1985 and the involvement of party organizations in colleges and research facilities in the work on preparing the Third Congress of Polish Science. The need to implement in full the suggestions of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee on college education of March 1984 and the suggestions of July 1984 on primary and secondary education.

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POLAND

INTERNAL OPPOSITION SEEN AS 'TROJAN HORSE' IN SOCIALIST BLOC

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[Article by Janusz Niewitecki: "The Antinational and Anticomunist Activities of the Political Underground in Poland"]

[Text] World politics today bear the stamp of a policy of confrontation between capitalism and socialism in the sphere of ideology, politics and economics, a policy imposed by American imperialism. American strategists, supported by the antisocialist diversionary centers of other capitalist countries, have developed a doctrine by which the anticommunist crusade will bring about the downfall of the world socialist system.

The doctrine of confrontation, developed by the Reagan administration, is based on the assumption that a policy of blackmail and sanctions toward the USSR is beneficial for the United States and the entire capitalist system. The belief is that by accelerating the arms race, reducing trade with the East, and applying restrictive policies in the areas of culture and science, the United States will achieve a clear military, economic and ideological advantage which will paralyze the USSR and its allies.

According to the Reagan administration, the West can weaken and neutralize the positive influences of Soviet policy and the forces of socialism in various parts of the world only through a policy of confrontation. Contrary to logic and objective facts, the American administration since the early 1980's has attempted to use the policy of confrontation and growing pressure on the USSR, Poland, and other socialist countries to force changes and transformations within the socialist states in a direction which will be favorable for the West.

I.

As part of this global policy of confrontation, Poland has been subjected to particularly brutal methods of internal and external pressure. After analyzing Poland's economic and social status, which as compared with that of other CEMA countries is not good, the American administration has implemented a policy of economic pressure as the most effective tool of its foreign policy toward our country.

There was also another aspect in giving Poland a priority place in the strategy of confrontation. The United States administration felt that Poland is the socialist country whose internal situation and international implications to a much greater degree than that of other regions of the world influence the totality of relations between the USSR and the United States. That is why events in Poland, deliberately promoted by the West, became one of the pretexts for abandoning the policy of detente and cooperation in global East-West relations.

The events which took place in Poland in 1980 prove that the imperialistic psychological warfare centers inspired the destructive processes in our country. This was shown also by the ideological diversionary and training activities of the Western propaganda centers. They gave broad support to the wave of strikes. This tells us that the United States Government, in its policy toward Poland, was backing the extremist and antisocialist elements operating in the former Solidarity movement, counting on that movement to make some specified changes in the political system of our country. The dissolution of the socialist community was to begin with Poland. In Poland was seen the possibility of changing the arrangement of forces in Europe and, as a consequence, revising the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. An attempt was made to use events in Poland to realize global American interests.

The United States commitment in support of the extremist and antisocialist goals of former Solidarity was revealed in full force in the middle of 1981. This gave the counterrevolutionary forces the courage to strive for a confrontation with the socialist state. The distinct cooperation of the antisocialist forces in Poland with their American protectors then became evident.

This was proven not only by the propaganda line broadcast by American radio (Radio Free Europe and Voice of America), but also by the expanded system of American contacts with representatives of the Solidarity leadership and other antisocialist groups. Employees of U.S. diplomatic posts in Poland often participated in these contacts.

The American administration was almost certain that the development of the situation in Poland during 1980-1981 will bring about a victory of the anti-socialist forces and make Poland a "Trojan horse" in the socialist bloc.

The American strategists and politicians considered different solutions to the Polish situation, together with the persistently promoted view of possible intervention on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries. But the solution which really took place--the solving of problems by the Poles themselves--appeared to be unacceptable to them. It turned out that the Polish state was strong enough to resist the attempts at counterrevolution. This produced confusion and a rarely encountered obstinacy towards those forces in socialist Poland which resisted the attempt to use Poland as a tool in the confrontational policy of the United States.

This became particularly evident after 13 December 1981. It was then that the Reagan administration began to attack the party and the Polish Government with unparalleled arrogance and savagery. All available means intended to bring

about a further deterioration of the economic situation and force Poland to yield to American demands were brought into play. These means were in the nature of an ultimatum--either a return to the pre-13 December 1981 status, or relations with the United States will be broken off, and sanctions and various types of restrictions will be applied. The United States also took steps aimed at isolating Poland internationally.

II.

An examination of the situation in Poland after 1980 confirms the thesis that when a crisis occurs the internal and external enemies of socialism always become more active. Counterrevolutionary forces appear which always use the same methods, according to a universal scenario developed by Western anti-communist centers; a scenario which contains both general propaganda instructions as well as detailed courses of action. We will discuss four of the basic ones here.

1. Attempts were made to discredit Marxist-Leninist theory and the general principles and ideas of socialism. Both KOR (Workers' Defense Committee) and KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland) really began their activity from the fierce attacks on the basic principles and ideas of socialism. The extremist activists of Solidarity soon accepted the ideological platform of these groupings, especially KOR, and attempted to use the August 1980 protest of the working class for their struggle with socialism.

The pseudosocialist phraseology which the political enemies of people's authority employed meant that many people, particularly the young, permitted themselves to be taken in. The fact that the Solidarity activists eliminated the word "socialism" from the program of this union is worth noting. (In the program accepted at the Congress this word was completely ignored, while at the meeting of the National Commission in Radom it was rejected outright.)

2. The leading role of the party in society was questioned. In all documents and speeches by KOR and KPN leaders the party and its leading and guiding role (recorded in Poland's Constitution) was particularly attacked. Solidarity accepted this course of attack by the counterrevolutionary organizations also. Conflicts connected with the registration of the union, which were caused by attempts to eliminate from its statute the point concerning the leading role of the PZPR, were only preliminary to further escalation of measures in this direction. In all programs, announcements and speeches made by the opponents of socialism, the word "party" was not used. It was replaced by the words "government," "authorities," etc. Solidarity members who tried to establish a dialogue with the party were blackmailed and consistently eliminated from the leadership of the union at all levels. The attack on the party and its leading role in society also appeared in a dispute over the future form of workers' self-governments. Strenuous efforts on the part of opposition activists were aimed at totally restricting the party's influence over the management of means of production. In the final months of 1981, at the inspiration of the antisocialist forces, removal of the PZPR from workplaces was begun.

3. An attack was begun on public ownership of means of production. KPN spoke out directly on the need to return them to private ownership, while

the KOR program was more camouflaged in this regard. Means of production, according to the KOR concept, were to be the property of the workers' self-governments. Solidarity later drew up a specific, detailed program containing a demand for group ownership. Caution was exercised here, realizing that our society after 37 (at that time) years of socialism in Poland was strongly attached to what was one of the primary achievements of our political system.

Thus the economic propaganda of the political opposition was aimed at pointing out the ineffectiveness of the public sector. Strikes, violations of law and order, constantly new demands for wage increases and various benefits, which had no coverage in goods, the forcing of granting of a 5-day workweek (all Saturdays off)--all actions which even the most stable economy could not withstand--were aimed at helping to break up the socialist state.

4. Attempts were also made to undermine Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union and other countries in the socialist bloc. Here all opposition groups were of one mind. Differences occurred only as to the technique to be used. The promotion of anti-Soviet attitudes among society, and particularly among the youth, was to serve as preparation for implementing these plans. The opposition's entire propaganda-publishing machine worked toward this end. The publication of various materials slandering the USSR, pulling out of the historical junk-heap those persons who "made themselves famous" at one time by their anti-Sovietness the leaflet-poster campaigns attacking our alliances--all of this was done for just one purpose: to sow hatred for the Soviet Union. The coronation of Solidarity's many months of activity in this area was the so-called "message to the working people in Eastern Europe," voted through at the Union's First Congress.

III.

The Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity arose as a result of the country's internal situation. Initially its activists emphasized that the union has no political aspirations, that it is based on Poland's Constitution. But after 10 November 1980, that is, after Solidarity was registered, it quickly began to depart from these declarations, selecting, more and more clearly, the course aimed at confrontation with the socialist state. The reason for this was the penetration into the union's leadership circles of advisors and experts from the antisocialist groups, mainly from KOR and KPN, who were connected with the centers of ideological diversion in the West. From that time on Solidarity slowly became a tool in the hands of the counter-revolution.

Starting in the spring of 1981, the antisocialist and extremist political centers in Solidarity became more and more active. This activity was demonstrated by: a growing wave of strikes, the organizing of the provocation in Bydgoszcz, the formation of illegal political parties (Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, National Democratic, People's Rightwing). The parties then being formed, despite their differences in programs, were joined by one common goal, which was the elimination of the socialist political system and the pull-out of Poland from its alliances: the CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, but principally the breaking, by Poland, of its alliance with the USSR.

The transformation of the Solidarity trade union into a sociopolitical movement changed the arrangement of political forces in the country. The stimulators of antisocialist activities from KOR and KPN made sure to guide the workers' union onto the tracks of a political struggle with the party and the people's government. At the same time, the consummate opposition leaders, such as J. Kuron, K. Modzelewski, A. Michnik, A. Maciarenicz, A. Gwiazda and J. Litynski, prepared Solidarity for a direct attack on the socialist state.

Part of our society at that time regarded the activity of the antisocialist groups as a relatively autonomous phenomenon of the Western centers of ideological diversion, or at least as a phenomenon which is not inspired by these centers. But after a short time many people understood that this was the wrong viewpoint. The connection between our internal enemies and the inimical centers in the West were evident and amply documented. But we are not referring here simply to the financial and material aid, which always flowed from there, but to something more. Every political program, every action which is aimed at destabilizing the socialist political system and weakening the people's state is supported.

The Western diversionary radio stations, mainly the American (Radio Free Europe and Voice of America), played a special role in inspiring the activities of the counterrevolutionary groups. In August 1980 these stations took an active part in instigating antisocialist events in Poland, convincing their listeners that the strikes and resistance to authority were presumably right. The radio stations said that it was necessary to convert the socioeconomic demands into political ones. The programs often contained elements of instruction and training, and some of them actually suggested courses of action which would be good for imperialism.

At this stage of the political struggle three main courses of activity by the antisocialist sources in Poland could be distinguished:

a) the destruction of actions currently underway by the authorities, especially in the economic and social areas. All actions taken by the government and local authorities were negated. Particular attention was centered on the critical sectors of the national economy: the energy and mining industry, the food economy and foreign trade. They were paralyzed by endless strikes and protest campaigns;

b) the undermining of the credibility and the weakening of the state's political institutions. Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA was also the object of propaganda attacks. The mass media was fiercely attacked, and especially the radio committee, striving to paralyze them and then take control over their propaganda activity;

c) the attacking of the theoretical foundations of the socialist political system in order to disparage the principles of socialism and the achievements of People's Poland. Nationalistic, and primarily anti-Soviet slogans were used widely.

In the second half of 1981, Poland, as a result of the activities of the counter-revolutionary and extremist forces in Solidarity, supported by Western centers of diversion and intelligence, found itself in a crisis without precedent in its postwar history. The disastrous economic situation, the collapse of social discipline, the increase in crime, and the strikes--which became a daily event--all of this began to shape society's mood. Depression, doubt, and lack of confidence in the ability to independently and peacefully come out of the difficult situation in which the country found itself began to dominate.

The unending wave of strikes during this period cost the economy over 300 billion zlotys. Because of them, industrial production dropped by approximately 500 billion zlotys, export fell about 7 billion dollars, and the national income in 1981 declined 13 percent. The economy was headed for disaster. The nation's survival, economically, was threatened.

In an atmosphere of anarchy and social unrest, Poland was swept by a wave of crime, prison mutinies, acts of terrorism and vandalism, and moral terror. People were forced to strike, and those not agreeing with the opposition were ostentatiously hauled out in wheelbarrows. There were clashes among crowds in the streets, people were threatened with lynching, and a mob psychology took over. All of these actions were intended by their instigators to lead to the takeover of authority. The only consideration was which tactic of struggle to employ: evolution or open confrontation, which meant civil war.

The evolutionary tactic was finally abandoned on 3 December 1981 after the meeting of the presidium of the National Commission and chairmen of the Solidarity regions in Radom. At this meeting it was stated that "confrontation is inevitable and confrontation it must be. The people must be informed of this." At the same time, at this same meeting, the government's proposal on national conciliation was rejected.

The tactic of confrontation was affirmed in the resolution of this same assembly in its deliberations in Gdansk on 11 and 12 December 1981. The following measures were approved: the organization of large street demonstrations; the announcement of a general strike which was to be the answer to a request that the Sejm pass a law suspending strikes for a certain period of time; the assumption, by the rank-and-file, of authority in the workplaces and in the cities; the elimination of local state structures; the conduct of a referendum on a vote of no confidence in the government; and the threat that "independent" elections for the people's councils would be organized.

As the above shows, the political opposition, pushed by the antisocialist forces and inimical centers in the West, emboldened by the results of its actions in December 1981, decided in favor of a confrontation with the socialist state.

IV.

The imposition of martial law (provided by Poland's Constitution) was necessary because of the deepening anarchy and gradual collapse of the economy, the danger to the security of the citizens and the functioning of state institutions, and the direct threat of civil war.

To save the country, a Military Council for National Salvation was constituted which set the following goals for itself: Ensure the country's security and guarantee the reliability of Poland's alliance with the Warsaw Pact; defend the socialist system and state against internal and external attacks by the enemy; provide law, order and safety; combat crime and create an environment in which the nation can work in quiet and implement the economic and socio-political reforms embodied in the resolutions of the Ninth PZPR Congress.

By this, the army assumed responsibility for eliminating the threat of the collapse of the state and the loss of its sovereignty, and for surmounting the crisis which was destroying the country. Already in the beginning of the formation of People's Poland, the army was not only the main tool of the new state in realizing the liberation desires of the Polish nation, but it was also the armed support of the people's authority in implementing the revolutionary social-systems reforms defined in the Polish Committee for National Liberation Manifesto. Now, too, the army is one of the main pillars of the Polish state's internal and external security.

The law-and-order, organizational, inspirational and control activity of the army in public life made it possible for the central and territorial organs of state administration to function normally. Safety and order in the country were restored. The activities of many elements in the state apparatus gave great support to the work of the military commissars and inspection-and-control groups.

The most important assignments which the army performed during the period of martial law were: The defense and protection of facilities and equipment important to the functioning of the state and public life; the security of transportation routes and the communications infrastructure; the maintenance, jointly with the Citizens Militia and the Security Service, of law and public order in the country; the reinforcement of the state administration by the professional cadre of the Polish Army.

In the politically and economically difficult period after August 1980, the army was one of the few elements of the state which did not fall apart, but remained a politically and organizationally cohesive force watching over the fundamental interests of the nation and the state.

V.

At the turn of 1981-1982 the main forces of the Polish counterrevolution were defeated. But shortly afterwards the word "underground" appeared in our political dictionary.

Throughout Polish history the word "underground" most often meant a synonym for struggle for national liberation, progress and social justice. After 13 December 1981 the political enemy adapted it to its propaganda needs.

In preparing itself for its takeover of authority, in the fall of 1981 organizational preparations were made in Solidarity in case of a sudden confrontation with the authorities. "Secret replacement structures" were formed in the regional areas. These were to be made up of the second team of activists, who,

because they were not as well known, could avoid detection and take over the leadership at the moment the confrontation began.

In the first weeks of martial law, these structures took actions aimed at provoking and calling strikes and street demonstrations. The inspirers and promoters of this tactic were mainly those activists of Solidarity who managed to avoid internment in the first days of martial law. Among them were such familiar pseudo-union troublemakers as: Z. Bujak in Warsaw, B. Lis in Gdansk, W. Frasyuniuk in Wroclaw and W. Hardek in Krakow.

In a situation in which the basic leadership core of Solidarity was powerless, the main center of inspiration for the political underground, for leadership and for safeguarding the technical materials for these activities moved outside the country, to the Western countries. These functions were assumed by the centers which specialize in anti-Polish activity: the Western Polish-language radio stations, the Paris KULTURA, or ANEKS. In addition, with large help from official institutions of the Western countries, a so-called "Solidarity emigration" was organized, which attempted to exert pressure on the Western governments not to forget about the "Polish matter." The representatives of this emigration actively participated in organizing anti-Polish propaganda campaigns. It was Western inspiration which became the instigating force in determining the antisocialist activities of the Polish political underground.

When hopes for drawing parts of society into the struggle with socialism were shattered, the underground leadership decided to follow the instructions of the Western diversionary centers. They advised that new structures be built, and new program concepts developed for long-range action. Initially, basic directions of conspirational action were approved. They were published by the illegal TYGODNIK MAZOWSZE (No 1-2, 1982) in an article titled: "What Is To Be Done?" In it, the conspirator's handbook of instructions is presented. The instructions contained come down to: Continuation of the struggle with the legal authority of the state, including a strike; demonstration of Solidarity's continued activity at every step; the formation of an extensive underground, including a financial and material infrastructure; and the enrollment, through a wide-scale propaganda and information campaign, of new activists and supporters for the Solidarity underground.

It was typical that the extremists in hiding could be noticed on the political arena only thanks to the political, material and propaganda support of the West. Therefore, it is not surprising that in Western terminology this small handful of troublemakers has risen to being called a Solidarity underground. During the entire time it fulfills the function of a tool which artificially creates the "Polish problem."

After almost three years of activity on the part of the conspirational structure of the political opposition, assembled mainly under the Solidarity logo, despite large propaganda efforts and material outlays, it has not been possible to create cohesive organizations on the national scale. Organizations of significant scope. Nor, despite many attempts, has any cohesive program been developed for the political opposition in Poland, despite the considerable assistance which the Paris KULTURA center has unceasingly given and continues to give.

After the fiasco of attempts to implement the "one leap" idea, i.e., a general strike which under favorable conditions was to transform itself into a national uprising, it was finally decided to implement a "long march" strategy. As part of this strategy it is proposed that a conspiratorial information, press and publishing network be established, that "independent education" be developed, and that an "informational" campaign be conducted among various social groups. Out of the "long march" strategy the idea of an "underground society" evolves as a program of struggle with the socialist rule and the destruction of state structures.

In order to coordinate the activities of the underground, recently some more attempts have been made to formulate a new program. These attempts have been made by L. Walesa and a group centered around the underground newspaper POLITYKA POLSKA.

Walesa's speech in December 1983, which was widely broadcast by Radio Free Europe, contained four basic program elements: a) use the 1984 elections to the people's councils to arouse social tensions; b) demonstrate the principles of union pluralism; c) transform the workers' self-managements into centers of political opposition in the workplaces; d) fight for "independent" culture and education.

It appears from Walesa's proposals that he has suggested nothing new. This was simply an attempt to demonstrate the activity of the underground, in the face of its actual lack of activity.

In February 1984, an unidentified group which publishes the paper POLITYKA POLSKA, published a program titled "Between the Poland of Our Desires and the Poland of Our Capabilities." The authors of the program propose comprehensive actions on many planes.

On the international plane they promote the need to fight for "Poland's independence" on the premise that "the communist authority in Poland is not a sovereign agent;" the revision of the Yalta agreement, and a demand that Germany be unified.

On the political-ideology plane they propose the arousal of dissatisfaction in various social groups; establishment of a leadership elite for the underground in Poland based on the "pro-Solidarity" emigration; organization and conduct of illegal "national education," which in practice means the building of a system of "independent education"; development of illegal editorial activity and the organization of a network of "independent" libraries, galleries and theaters; activities in behalf of a moral renewal of society, including the combating of social scourges, among which are abortions and the secularization of society. The authors of the program believe that the Church, as the only moral authority, is able to organize these activities and bring about a boycott of official political actions. This is a task which is repeated in various underground documents despite the lack of public reaction, as shown by attendance at state observances and particularly by the elections to the people's councils.

On the economic plane the program's authors refer to the Solidarity concept. Their demands aim, in a disguised way, to return the economy to private ownership by restricting the control function of the state as regards state enterprises and the private sector.

It should be clearly stressed that the various program ideas for opposition activities in Poland, promoted by Western diversionary centers and our own "ideologues," the essence of which is destruction and destabilization, do not find a public audience, and in the last year and a half no serious disturbances of public order based on politics have been observed.

The factors which serve to isolate the public from the underground include: the gradual detachment of people from antistate and antisocialist activity; the return of a sense of understanding of the nation's most vital interests to a large segment of society; the bankruptcy of the slogans promoted by the leaders of the underground ("the worse the better" or "work at a snail's pace"); the gradual but steady growth of people's confidence in the authorities; the progressive normalization throughout the country; the halt in the decline of production and national income; the restoration of Poland's rightful place in the world; firm resistance on the part of the forces of law and order to the inimical activities of the underground directed at the structure of the state and the economy.

The connections between the illegal antisocialist groups in Poland with the anticommunist and anti-Polish forces in the West are more and more apparent to the Polish people. To put it differently, the political underground has become the agent for the forces inimical to us in the West. Without their moral and material support the underground would cease to function.

The political enemy in Poland, not having broad public support and attractive program ideas, does not conceal the fact that he is counting on all possible unfavorable events in the area of economics. He believes that such a situation will create conditions suitable for more effective destructive activity. Until that time we want to remind us regularly of his existence, attempting to disrupt the process of normalization, creating problems and aggravating them.

As normalization in the country proceeded, and it began first with the suspension and then with the lifting of martial law, the tactics of the underground changed. Only the strategic goal remained the same--the overthrow of the socialist political system. The fact that in the underground's attempts to present a program to the people there were no constructive elements proves this incontrovertibly.

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POLAND

BLUMSZTAJN DESCRIBES SOLIDARITY STRUGGLE AT HOME, ABROAD

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[Interview with Seweryn Blumsztajn, chairman of the Solidarity coordinating committee, on the occasion of his return to Poland; date and place not specified]

[Text] After three years in France Seweryn Blumsztajn, chairman of the Solidarity coordinating committee, is returning to Poland. As a special target of Polish propaganda, he risks arrest on arrival. Why that choice, when his countrymen seek to flee? He explains in an interview with LIBERATION.

Orly South, 5 February 1985, 3 p.m.: aboard the Polish LOT airliner preparing to take off, a man is staking his future. In two hours the plane will be over Warsaw. After three years of "forced" absence, he will stand on his native soil. His name is Seweryn Blumsztajn. A KOR (Social Self-Defense Committee) and Solidarity militant from the very first, and the bete noire of the regime, he was in France when the state of siege was proclaimed on 13 December 1981, and thereafter remained there. Today, after three years of forced exile, he has decided to return, at whatever cost and without signing anything--neither a declaration of allegiance nor a disguised repentance, and bearing as his only official papers an expired Polish passport stamped with a French exit visa.

Landing on the West German coast from cruises, thousands of Poles fled their country last winter. Seweryn Blumsztajn, for his part, fights for the right to return, alone and against the tide. Before buying his ticket --one way--he weighed all the risks of his gesture: arrest on arrival, a "show trial," threats, interrogations.

Imprisoned several times--particularly for his participation in the 1968 student movement--he already knows the full range of the regime's repressive tactics. In Poland he had lost count of his arrests. Classed very early as a "disturbing element" in the eyes of the regime, Blumsztajn has every defect: a hothead in secondary school; a political agitator at the

university; a notorious adversary since the 1970's; and, to top it all, a Jew. One last black mark was needed to make him the ideal scapegoat--that of "agent of imperialism." He earned it in Paris, by heading the Solidarity coordinating committee in France.

Assailed for his contacts with the Polish "antisocialist" emigration movement, and accused of being linked to the "nerve centers of imperialism"--in which were indiscriminately included the CIA and anti-communist unions--Blumsztajn became at the time of his exile--as many Parisian exiles do--a choice propaganda target. The zealots of the regime stopped at nothing. With his surname eagerly emphasized, Blumsztajn was invariably described as a "sharper" or "racketeer" who had made a fortune in the West from Poland's misfortunes. Hammered out by the official press, his case was made an example by the regime in its demoralization campaign.

An irony of fate is that when the "state of siege" proclamation caught him in France, Blumsztajn was on his first trip to the West, at the invitation of French unions. With borders sealed, airports closed, a military and police dragnet, and waves of arrests, Blumsztajn hardly had any choice. He stayed. In France, unions, parties, and public opinion were joined in a shared emotion. Blumsztajn is still dazzled by memories of all those demonstrations of support.

Soon, he became one of the key men of the coordinating committee of the Solidarity union in France, which was created in the following weeks. In 1982 Solidarity's impetus was at its peak. Each day, in the committee's modest but hyperactive offices set up at the back of CFDT headquarters on Montholon square, volunteers opened hundreds of letters enclosing donations in support. In addition to channeling incoming aid, the committee, which represented the TTK (clandestine leadership) abroad, had to spread the news from Poland. Quite naturally Blumsztajn, who had started the KOR's bulletin and led Solidarity's information bureau in Warsaw, took over direction of the news bulletin in the committee's organ. Over 100 issues have already appeared, in both French and Polish, presenting selected excerpts from the underground press and statements by the movement's principal figures.

Chain-smoking cigarettes--Gauloises by choice, with the bearing of a late adolescent and a timid air masking a ready irony, and with eyes bleary from too long hours, Blumsztajn does not spare himself. On a whirlwind visit to committee headquarters he briefs journalists, stops to sign a statement, answers the telephone, gives his advice on the choice of a poster. For months on end, at the pleasure of support meetings, he who never been out of Poland crisscrossed France from end to end, with lightning side trips to West Germany, Britain, and Italy. Valued for his sense of phrasing and keenness of analysis, Blumsztajn also became a favored interviewee of journalists.

And yet that portrait is flawed. Two years after landing in France, the "boss" of the coordinating committee still does not speak a word of French.

"I have no gift for languages," he invariably says through an interpreter, with a fatalistic shrug. But it is not that simple. Among his Polish friends in Paris, "Blum" makes no secret of it: he is homesick. A KOR member from the very first, a friend of Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, but compelled to follow events at a distance of thousands of kilometers, Blumsztajn in Paris seems to live apart, with his mind in Poland and his body in France.

As if he feared being caught in a trap, he resists integration. He himself admits that. Only in the last few months, as he began to learn French, did he discover the charms of Western society. A good sport, he now confesses he will miss at least two things: espresso coffee and ski resorts.

As an unwilling exile, the idea of going home never left him. With the amnesty of July 1984, he feels this is his last chance. He has made his decision--irrevocably. The reservations of his recently freed Polish friends, whom he informed of his decision by phone, could not shake him. Hastily, he dictated to a tape recorder his autobiography in the form of a plea, "Je rentre au pays" (I'm Going Home), published yesterday by Calmann-Levy, saw his friends for the last time, and packed his bags.

At the time when he finds "this world is better," why take the opposite path? In his exclusive interview with LIBERATION, Seweryn Blumsztajn explains:

Question In the past few months thousands of Poles have taken the "cruise route" to emigrate. But you are taking the opposite path--going back. Why?

Answer First of all, I never wanted to emigrate. As early as 1969, I had already faced such a choice (at the time of the anti-intellectual and anti-semitic campaign launched after the 1968 student demonstrations--editor's note), when all my family had emigrated--my sister to Paris and my parents to Sweden. Although my personal situation was one with no future--for I had just come out of prison, the doors of the university were closed to me, and I had no chance of finding satisfying work--I never considered leaving.

To me it seemed self-evident that it made no sense to "live" Poland outside its borders. By leaving, I would forsake all that was most important to me. That can be called roots, or something else. Today, after three years in the West, that feeling is further strengthened. Everything being done here for Poland, my very life, seem to me but an appearance. It is something very subjective.

Question You mean you have lived in Paris as in transit, certain that one day you would go back?

Answer It's not that simple. In that type of situation, you think for a long time that you will go back. Then you stay. I know Poles who have lived for decades with suitcases packed. For me, what triggered my decision was last July's amnesty, when all my friends were freed. I realized it was now or never. If I did not go back now, I never would. And if I stayed, it would be with a feeling of defeat.

Question What defeat?

Answer That again is a personal feeling. It is difficult for me to explain what it means to break with one's roots. Except this: Poland is what matters most to me in all the world. I am totally committed to it. How can I tell you? At times we live in a reality that is foreign to us. It is not that the world back there is a better one. On the contrary, I think this world here is better, not only because it is more free, but in a certain way more human. But it is not my own.

If I had to sum up this bond in a sentence, I would say that in Poland we are conscious of a collective destiny. All Poles feel it--those who are militants, and those who do nothing. That is perhaps one of the rare gifts from history to us. Poland is a country which involves people intimately. Even in fighting for Poland, I cannot recapture that feeling here.

That is not to say I am unappreciative of the work being done here for Poland, or that I condemn those who emigrate. My decision is dictated by a personal choice--that of the place where I want to live.

Question You have been a militant for over 10 years. Have you also taken a political stand?

Answer The political aspects of my action are but secondary. My decision, as I see it, has a dual symbolic dimension. First, to those who stayed back there and continued to struggle, the return of someone who runs some risks by that act does, after all, take on an optimistic meaning. As a gesture, it may be likened to the refusal to emigrate by the "eleven" (the seven directors of Solidarity and four KOR leaders who were charged with "plotting against the state" and finally amnestied in July--editor's note), though I do not compare myself to them. Then, vis-a-vis the authorities who seek to goad Solidarity militants into leaving, I am making my own demonstration of refusal.

Since the last "revolution," that of Solidarity, emigration is the highest cost Polish society has had to pay. If we consider the most recent events (the 16 months of Solidarity--editor's note) as a national insurrection, it can be said to have run its course without national losses. True, there were a dozen or so deaths, but there was no massacre. Historically, that is virtually negligible. Emigration was the high price paid. That, too, I want to say by my action.

Question You are taking the plane on 5 February. The amnesty deadline was 31 December. So you refuse to benefit from it?

Answer In any case, to take advantage of the amnesty I should have appeared at the Polish consulate in Paris to sign a political statement (particularly a commitment not to initiate actions directed against order and the existing system in Poland--editor's note). Moreover, if I had returned before the deadline, even without signing anything, the authorities would have insinuated I wanted to take advantage of the amnesty. My return in February complicates their task.

Question How do you assess the risks you are taking?

Answer I greatly fear this return, and so I tend to overestimate the risks it involves. Over the past three years I have been among the favored targets of propaganda directed abroad. That makes it necessary for the authorities to take certain steps. On the other hand, what protects me is the political cost of my possible trial. At present, I think, conditions are not favorable. At the same time, I cannot foresee. What charges, for example, would be made against me? In that sphere, arbitrariness is the rule. It is also quite possible for them to let me be. But whatever they are, I take the risks. To do otherwise would be to jeopardize everything that makes my life.

Question What were the reactions of your friends in Poland when you informed them of your decision?

Answer Quite varied. Most of my close friends tried to dissuade me, by saying I would recognize nothing. They are very fearful for me--not so much of prison, which is a lesser problem

Of those who know me less well but have heard of me, the great majority were warm in their reaction. They see something very positive in this return.

As for the authorities, there is for the moment no reaction--except perhaps for a special emissary from Polish television, who came to Paris about two months ago and appeared before the Solidarity committee to conduct an investigation of emigration! Perhaps it was just a coincidence, or perhaps he wanted to know my intentions. It's hard to say.

The most sympathetic reaction was a letter from a friend reporting to me on the reaction of Bujak (former head of Solidarity in Warsaw, who today leads the underground--editor's note): "If you want to come back, you will be welcome; here you will choose the work which suits you best."

Question You are going back because your roots are in Poland, but do you think you will be useful there?

Answer That did not enter into my choice. My decision first of all has a personal dimension. It is not a question of discipline, as in the army or the party. The fact is, I don't know whether I'll be more useful there than here, but it's there I want to live.

Question When you land in Warsaw, what will you do first? What scenario do you imagine?

Answer I see myself getting off the plane--nothing more. After that, perhaps I'll leave the airport, and go and say hello to my friends who expect me.

Question You had never come to the West before this "forced" stay in France. After three years, how do you see France and the French?

Answer First, I cannot say I know the West. Not speaking the language, I have seen France as through a screen. Moreover, I have been in contact, essentially, with Poles or with Frenchmen concerned with Poland.

In Poland people often have a stereotyped view of the Westerner as someone much more egotistic and self-centered than a Pole. But I had the opposite impression. In the West I have met people who were incredibly warm, both towards me and towards the problems I represented--particularly in France.

Question And how do you explain that special interest on the part of the French?

Answer There is a myth concerning relations between France and Poland. I have found it to be a reality. Beyond certain historic stages and cultural affinities (Catholicism among others), I think the recent political evolution of France--the coming to power of the Left, the exit of Communists from the government, and the arms' length stance vis-a-vis Moscow--has further strengthened ties with Poland.

In France, Solidarity has fascinated everyone, from the Catholics to the Left. Each of them sees something of value in it. The leftists tend to play down the role of the church, and the Catholics to minimize the leftist aspects of Solidarity's program, but all have accepted the movement as a whole.

Question You were saying that in Poland Westerners are seen as very egotistical. But in France people are at times exasperated by the self-centeredness of Poles, who tend to see everything in terms of their own problems.

Answer Poland's misfortune is such that Poles do indeed tend to ignore the misfortune of others. And then, they have the conviction they are in the front line of battle against communism, and so consider the free world has a duty to help them.

If we had not concentrated so fully on our problems, our resistance might not have been so strong. Finally, Poles consider it very important that they are a part of Europe.

Question Seen from France, has your view of Poland changed?

Answer Of course. Some things can be seen only from here. For example, the "work ethic." There exists here a bourgeois work ethic, several centuries old, which has never existed in Poland. I knew this in theory, but was able to verify it. So I was particularly struck by small tradesmen and their zeal for work. I never saw anything like it in Poland.

To sum up, after three years in France it seems to me that Poland's problems are problems of the past and not of the future. From here, it can clearly be seen that our civilization has fallen behind. I am not speaking of penury and other matters of that kind, but of the "work ethic." My view of the problems facing Western societies has changed. I had thought them illusory; but they are real problems. Sometime hence, Poland will confront them.

When I arrived in Paris I had the typical attitude of all those who come from totalitarian countries. I thought all questions could be easily resolved in the West. Today, I find it hard to stand Poles who complain of penury and deride French people's worries over the rising cost of living. Likewise in Poland, people do not realize that the existence of a free trade union movement in France does not solve everything, or that that movement is even going through a severe crisis. We may face that same crisis some day, when we shall have to resolve the contradiction between the defense of workers' interests and the advance of technology.

Question What strong impression of your stay in France will you take with you?

Answer I'll answer with an old Jewish joke: "I'll always miss no longer being here." It's the story of the old Jew who, wherever he is, is always uneasy because he is not somewhere else.

One scene I shall not forget is the demonstration in Paris on 14 December 1981 (the day after proclamation of the state of siege--editor's note), for which thousands of people gathered from Montparnasse to the Polish embassy on the Invalides esplanade. We felt all Paris was with us.

Question How do you foresee your life back there?

Answer I shall live a bit as I did in the seventies (the earliest beginnings of KOR--editor's note). But back there, people have changed a great deal over the past three years, just as I have here. The experience I am taking back is a rare one.

At the time of KOR, and even of Solidarity, relations between people were easy and friendly, even lyrical. Now, the situation is much harder. Various structures jostle each other. Only friendships have remained intact, and Solidarity's aims identical.

Question What situation do you expect to find after your long absence?

Answer The movement has evolved. When we read the underground press of the past few months, we find it is freeing itself. No longer does it function solely against the authorities; it now works for itself. For example, internal self-censorship is tending to disappear from the movement. Open discussions between persons and groups are multiplying. Fewer and fewer writings are devoted solely to bringing charges against the regime in power. Social problems are approached as such. The movement is progressively turning its back to the authorities.

Take the debate which arose following the assassination of Father Popieluszko ("chaplain of Solidarity" kidnapped 19 October by militiamen and found dead 30 October--editor's note). Never had such a diversity of opinion been heard: Lytinski debating with Kuron (both KOR members--editor's note), with Walesa, for his part, saying things altogether different, etc. For the first time, too, people have stopped considering the regime as a welded indivisible bloc.

Question The trial of Father Popieluszko in Torun is about to end. What do you think of the way it went?

Answer That trial is wholly controlled by the authorities. Up to now, nothing has been said that really threatens the regime. No very highly placed name has been cited. I don't think Poles expect much from it, except for the verdict. Will a death sentence be pronounced? There is an average of ten executions a year in Poland. Consequently there can be no failure to condemn to death a policeman who tortured and assassinated a priest. In that case, a plea for clemency can be expected from the opposition, which would place General Jaruzelski in a very delicate position.

Question Do you think the "Popieluszko affair" serves the Jaruzelski regime, or the opposite?

Answer The trial certainly strengthens his image abroad, and also within the country. For the first time, we have heard Walesa declare that this crime implicates all Poles, including Jaruzelski. Of course, everyone knows the ultimate responsibility belongs to the regime in power, but some are convinced that a still more evil power may exist.

In the long run, only two things remain important. First, Solidarity henceforth has a saint, and the full consequences of that cannot be measured. Secondly, from now on no policeman in Poland will be sure of his impunity.

Question You have decided to return, but why did you write this book, "I Am Going Home"?

Answer It is first of all a protection. In case I am brought to trial, I will have presented my version of the facts. Perhaps I also felt the need to clarify certain points. If I have to express myself at the bar, all I shall have to say is in this book.

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POLAND

GUCWA DISCUSSES LEGISLATIVE RECORD OF EIGHTH SESSION

Warsaw ODRODZENIE in Polish No 3, 20 Jan 85 p 3

[Interview with Stanislaw Gucwa, marshal of the Polish Sejm, by Danuta Frey]

[Text] [Question] In the next few months, the Eighth Session of the Sejm will end, leading to some sort of balance. What was the most important activity in the Sejm during this period?

[Answer] It is extremely difficult to express in a short statement all of the accomplishments of the hundreds of Sejm sessions, over 160 laws and around 2000 commission meetings. This activity was conducted during a period of great social strain and deep crisis. But if we have to state the most important activity, then I would have to say that it was to aim for national understanding and socialist renewal. This was the main issue during the Eighth Session of the Sejm and it will continue to be. The crucial matter was to work out a formula for this understanding. This political function, which has been strongly accentuated during the past 4 years, differed this Sejm from its predecessors. But in this regard it is similar to the National People's Council and the Sejm's Second Session (1957-1961). Both were working in difficult periods. The spectacular expression of this Sejm was the declaration of national understanding on 3 May 1982.

[Question] Which achievement of the Sejm's Eighth Session would you regard as the most important? The most significant? Which changes in work methods should be emphasized?

[Answer] In speaking about the achievements of the Sejm's Eighth Session, I must say that there were a lot of them, but the atmosphere for leading to reform was especially good. This atmosphere distinguishes this Sejm from the others. The difficult situation in which a large portion of our citizenry has found itself has made it difficult for them to understand the deep range of the reform. But this will not alter the fact that these changes are very important for the future of our country. I have in mind especially the economic reform and new legislation for the people's councils and territorial self-government. The many changes that have been introduced in such a short time have been discussed for many years, but it was never decided to introduce them for real. This is why these reforms are linked with heavy criticism of the past. This explains the depth of the reforms and the hope that they will be guaranteed through legislation.

It is not an accident that the Sejm has conducted extensive analyses of the weaknesses and faults of state activities during the second half of the 1970's. Proposals from these analyses were introduced in the opinions of the Commission on Constitutional Responsibility. This was a follow-up to the commission called by the PZPR Central Committee to evaluate the causes of social conflict and its process in Poland. We are implementing recommendations made in these reports. In summary, the most important function of the Sejm's Eighth Session was to create legal norms for the reform, whose results will not be seen for many years.

The answer to the second part of your question is bound to what I said a moment earlier. The distinguishing mark of our work during the past 4 years in our openness. Openness to new ideas, conceptions, opinions and points of view. This has given birth to the need for social and scientific advice, consultations and expertise. The answer to this demand was the creation of the Socio-economic Council in the Sejm and the Team of Sejm Advisors. The openness of our discussions has broken with unanimity and shown the true differentiation of opinions and views signaling the tensions and difficulties. And at the same time, it creates the possibility to overcome them. This change in atmosphere is apparent to anyone who has observed our debates and caucuses.

[Question] Many times you have pointed out the role played by the Sejm in trying to soothe tensions and seek understanding. But has this role as mediator--a role totally new after the Second World War--been fully developed? Can or could not the Sejm have done more? More successfully?

[Answer] The answer to this question is not easy, primarily because it is from a subjective point of view. Besides, things look differently when we evaluate them from the present. To be sure, history rather than ourselves will be able to evaluate events more objectively. In addition, there should be no doubt that from the beginning of the crisis there was a desire to avoid social conflict. And no one should question the role of the Sejm in implementing this policy.

It is worth remembering that in November 1980 the Sejm examined the conditions required to implement the agreement between the workers' representatives and the Extraordinary Commission whose role was to carry out the agreements.. The role of the Sejm to serve as mediator in some issues was a stable element of Sejm activity. This was especially relevant in negotiations with the unions on workers' self-government or the law regarding state enterprises. The mediator role took many local conflicts to the Extraordinary Commission. I think Dr Szczepanski, the chairman of the Extraordinary Commission, could say more on this subject.

One should remember that to terminate political conflicts, it is necessary to have a compromise that will be satisfactory to all sides. This will to compromise did not exist among the Solidarity leadership. There were restricted possibilities to limit social conflict through economics. It was difficult to satisfy the growing avalanche of demands used as a political weapon. Even more desired was a dialogue with society showing the danger of the true tendencies of the political opposition. A large role was played at the time by live broadcasts of Sejm sessions. Could more have been done in this situation?

Of course, we can say that all this activity was not successful, as it led to martial law. But the truth is different. The actions of the Sejm, like those of the government, political parties and the press, were designed to defend the constitutional order and martial law was implemented in accordance with the law. This met with understanding on the part of a large part of society. Therefore, I think that in light of the complicated socioeconomic situation, the difficult process of change in the party and other political parties, the deep economic crisis and hostility from the West, the Sejm played a major role in preventing a drama that could have occurred on our soil. And this was not just in the cooling down of large or small conflicts, but also thanks to the laying down of political lines to follow in favor of reform and dialogue for society toward socialist renewal.

[Question] The current Sejm has introduced completely new forms of action. I am thinking of Sejm meetings with the Executive Committee of the National Council of PRON. What is the purpose of these contacts? What goal do they have?

[Answer] We attached importance in the Sejm to PRON activity in terms of the movement toward national understanding. We discussed at the meetings the level of cooperation between the Sejm and PRON and we discussed the implementation of proposals brought by the First Congress of PRON to the Sejm. The last meeting on 16 November 1984 was devoted to exchanging information on PRON's project on social consultation and a referendum on the Sejm's project concerning the Constitutional Tribunal. The fruit of this effort was the continuing work of the Sejm on the law concerning consultations. As you can see, these contacts are useful for exchanging information and opinions. In this way, PRON is a social subsidiary of the Sejm and a resource of valuable inspiration.

I feel personally that we should have more cooperation between the Sejm's commissions and similar commissions of the National Council of PRON. We already have some practice here. Second, there should be more cooperation between provincial deputy teams and the provincial councils of PRON. This can be especially useful in dealing with provincial problems and transferring them to the Sejm.

[Question] There is talk that the Eighth Session of the Sejm was a period of increasing constitutional position of our parliament. PRON wants to be even more secure in this position. But we have different positions too. We have heard that the so-called model of parliamentary democracy today in the world is falling into disuse and making room for a strong authority and resolute government. Of course, I know that the issue of Sejm-government relations is a delicate matter. But if we are to be honest, I must ask you about this relationship today in contemporary Poland.

[Answer] I would not include here the occurrences characteristic of the capitalist countries, as there is there a crisis of the parliamentary system and a one-sided tendency to strengthen authoritative power. In reality, socialist parliamentarism is governed by different standards and the changes derived therein have an upward character. The history of People's Poland confirms this. Even during periods of temporary regression during this

40-year period, the role of the Sejm has increased steadily to approach a constitutional model. This process has accelerated in the last several years. The Supreme Chamber Control again came under the Sejm's control and the Tribunal of State was appointed. The Sejm's range of authority was broadened in the national economy and commissions obtained the right to state opinions on candidates for ministers. But the most important factor is that the Eighth Session of the Sejm fully used and is using old and new authority and playing the most important role in our country during the past few years.

The essential element of the Sejm's position has been Sejm-government relations. Mildly broadening the openness of political and state life has relaxed the "delicate" character of these relations. It has broadened not only the range of the Sejm's decisions but also the subject matter of debates. For example, a very "delicate" matter for many years was the state balance of payments. The Sejm was not informed of this condition. Now the Sejm decides and announces the balance of payments. This year the government gave the Sejm extensive information on around 40 subjects.

Around 650 interpellations and questions concerned different aspects of state administration, both nationwide and local. If we add the enormous number of commission meetings and the passage of resolutions and opinions, then you will have a picture of the almost everyday workload on Wiejska Street to oversee various aspects of the state administration. On the other hand, we have to point out the openness existing for any doubts and reservations on the part of the deputies.

Of course, with respect to the Sejm-government relationship, there are frequently diverse points of view and opinions expressed during the course of the legislative process. Projects enter a final evaluation after long hours of work. There are cases of suspended work on a project, as it is sent back to the government for more work. There are different opinions expressed on the evaluation of activity conducted by some institutions. In summary, one must emphasize that the possibilities for influence on the government by the Sejm have increased. Also, the government is more open to new initiatives, considerations and opinions from the deputies. The deputies are taking advantage of this position by receiving more information, material and help.

As regards the question of the relationship between the Sejm and the party's political authority, although I understand this to mean all of the political parties, it is my conviction that the party in conjunction with the other parties has led to the increased role and activity of the Sejm.

[Question] During the course of the last few years, the Sejm has passed more than 160 different laws. It may go down in history as the "legislative Sejm." But was such a large number of new laws of the highest rank really necessary? Doesn't "legislative fever" sometimes in effect depreciate these laws? It is public knowledge that recently passed laws already have been changed. If we are to preserve the high rank of the law, can we constantly change the laws?

[Answer] Personally, I feel that the legislative work of this Sejm session will be judged fairly. And yet various viewpoints are trying to diminish the value of its work. The number of 160 new laws frequently is brought up. But

there have been times when the Sejm passed many more laws. There was a Sejm that passed 394 laws and confirmed 349 decrees. During the First Session of the Sejm, 42 acts were passed and 161 decrees confirmed. There were 174 acts passed in the Second Session. But the issue is not in the numbers. I remember them only on the margin. On the contrary, we are posing the following question: can we introduce such extensive reforms without enacting numerous legal changes? After all, economic reform alone needs new laws. Would governmental acts, as was the case in the past, be better? Since we decided to implement these broad reforms, we have to live with the consequences. And can we avoid bountiful social law that provides protection and public peace? Of course, not every passed law was absolutely necessary. But we have to remember the social pressure from different circles, organizations and associations for new laws. After all, these acts frequently have provided the criterion of faith in our policy of reforms and national understanding.

The concern that this many changes in the law may shake the rank and stability of the law is frequently expressed. We share this concern. We have to remember that nothing shakes stability more than if the laws do not respond to relations and social expectations. This is the case with many laws that have to be superseded with new regulations.

Emphasizing the meaning of new legal regulations for the process of socialist renewal, we also must criticize the naive belief that the best medicine for every problem is a new law. Likewise, that this new law automatically will change reality. The issue is not how many laws exist but rather how they affect social relations. I want to assure you that we are drawing conclusions from our work during the Eighth Session of the Sejm. We want to improve legislative work, reduce the complexity of the law, avoid novelization of the law and strengthen the legislative commissions.

[Question] But despite all of this, we still are awaiting various laws, like the law on the Constitutional Tribunal, which has been worked on since 1981. This was discussed during the last meeting of the Sejm's presidium with the presidium of the Executive Committee of the National Council of PRON. The latter gave the Sejm a project concerning social consultations with the goal of giving it legislative course. Will this pass before the end of the Sejm's Eighth Session?

[Answer] Exactly! A few minutes ago, we were discussing the large number of laws passed this session, and now the question concerns more legislative demands. But this is reality. I can say that work on the Constitutional Tribunal almost is finished and everything appears that this project will be introduced to the Sejm in the near future. But it is difficult for me to say when the project on social consultation will be introduced. The first proposal on this project was introduced by PRON to the Sejm on 16 November 1984. But the exchange of views showed that many issues still have to be worked out. In the end, this project should be in proper legislative form. We shall try to work out the problems during this Sejm session. But it is difficult to give a specific date.

[Question] We must break the isolation in which our country has found herself for the past several years. I know that you, as a member of the Sejm, have made a few international visits. How can the Sejm help to break this isolation?

[Answer] Last year in Poland we had 16 parliamentary delegations from Italy, France, West Germany, Japan, etc. Delegations from the Sejm visited 16 countries, among them West Germany, Sweden, Austria, Japan, and Finland. The last few years have seen very fruitful contacts with the highest authorities in the socialist countries. We have exchanged delegations with practically all of the socialist countries. We have to look upon this as the Sejm's role in rebuilding our position among the socialist countries. I also would like to emphasize that the Sejm has had very good cooperation with the parliaments in Latin America, Africa, and the Arab countries. We can say without exaggeration that the Sejm has opened the way for the government to renew contacts for Poland with various countries.

[Interviewer] Thank you for the discussion.

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POLAND

VATICAN CRITICIZED FOR ATTACKING 'LIBERATION THEOLOGY'

Warsaw IDEOLOGIA I POLITYKA in Polish No 11, Nov 84 pp 150-159

[Article by Jerzy Klechta: "Liberation Theology Censored"]

[Text] The Vatican's "Instruction on Certain Aspects of Liberation Theology," published last September and signed by the prefect of Rome's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the West German Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, has stimulated lively worldwide ideological and political discussion. Diverse emotions manifested themselves within the bosom of the Catholic Church itself, but above all the world of the poor felt itself menaced once more.

In a nutshell, the Vatican's instruction criticizes those priests who proclaim and practice so-called liberation theology. Its spokesmen have undertaken as their paramount goal a struggle for the right of the poor to a life of dignity. They declare that in this struggle God's words should be accompanied by deeds. As a result, in the countries of the Third World, chiefly in Latin America, where this movement was first born, the popularity of the people's Church or, as some prefer to say, the militant Church, has increased. This is a struggle against the order established by the world of the rich.

The Vatican's "Instruction" quite clearly reflects its solidarity with the world of oppression and exploitation. That is one of the reasons why it has engendered worldwide discussion and protests.

The Birth of the Movement

Liberation theology is a reflection of the sociopolitical situation and the situation of Catholicism on the Latin American continent. It arose as a result of the evolution of the Latin American Church following the Second Vatican Council. The premises for changes were provided in the 1960's by John XXIII, who, modernizing Catholicism, stressed the Church's operating mode and turned attention to two questions: the Catholic Church should be God's people rather than a hierarchicized society blindly subordinated to the pope; as for the Bible, it should be regarded as the fundamental scripture for Christianity, stressing God's presence in history.

This approach found a favorable soil in the Church of Latin America, a continent on which at that time the Cuban Revolution had scored a major psychological triumph; the peoples of the Caribbean and the entire Latin America were engulfed by a wave of enthusiasm and hope. It was realized that impossible things were becoming possible.

Latin America is a Catholic continent. Priests began to join the ranks of the guerrillas. At the same time, a problem of theory arose. As early as at Vatican II two personages drew the attention of 2,000 bishops to Third World problems. One was Helder Camara, the present-day archbishop of Brazil, at that time auxiliary bishop of Rio de Janeiro and secretary general of the Brazilian Episcopate; the other was Larrain (died in 1966), at that time the bishop of the city of Talca (Chile). The bishops resolved to hold regular meetings for the purpose of candid discussion of specific social problems. They were supported by young theologians. Their activities resulted in the publication, "The Second Vatican Council Adapted to the Situation in Latin America."

In 1968 a general conference of Latin American bishops was held in Medellin (Colombia). That was a historic event. The opening session was attended by Pope Paul VI. The "Medellin Document" became a program for the pastoral renewal of Latin American, a guidepost for the solution of urgent problems. [abrupt transition] But while priests have joined national liberation movements, they did so only in isolated instances. The Bible was not yet read under the peasant's thatched roof. But both the results of the Medellin conference and the earlier social encyclicals, and above all the national-liberation revival, led to rapid changes within religious circles in town and country. A Bible read among the poor begins to make sense of the God of the simple people. The "basic church community" movement arose.

Jesuits, middle-level clergymen and bishops are active in this movement. These communities began to become an arena for discussion. The social awareness of the poor and wronged people began to awaken. The Bible opened eyes to social injustices, e.g., to the loss of land by peasants, to the lack of elementary necessities in cities. Not only theological reflections were the subject of meetings. Liberation theologians began to consult the social sciences in order to work out the needed analytical instruments. This is how certain Marxist concepts began to be employed.

In its instruction on liberation theology the Vatican states that a cardinal doctrinal and political sin is the use of Marxist analysis. The founder and "father" of liberation theology, the Peruvian clergyman Gustavo Gutierrez, comments as follows on the use of Marxist analysis in theology: "Clearly, this concerns utilizing modern social sciences in order to cognize the social reality. Social sciences contain elements deriving from various sources, and one, and far from the sole, of these sources is Marxism."/1/

The church communities, undermining the established social order, rapidly became the political enemy of the rightist regimes. Since the beginning of the 1970's they have been subjected to repressions. Conservative circles of the

Latin American Church also have become terrified by the political consequences of the renewal movement, since the further growth of the communities might lead to the rise of an unhierarchical Church. This was the background against which arose the wave of criticism directed against liberation theologians by the Vatican, which at present firmly defends the hierarchicized Church.

The Vatican's Europocentrism, or more exactly its Roman option, causes the Vatican hierarchy to fail to understand or refuse to understand the intention and vision of the Latin American Church.

The Vatican's document regarding liberation theology ensues from "a typically Europocentric vision" according to Prof Rev Leonardo Boff, a leading theoretician of the movement (a Brazilian). He comments: "The vision of the Latin American Church is different. The starting point should be the genuine activities already accomplished by the poor, by the trade unions, by the basic communities, by the associations of mothers, by the historical and social bloc of the poor, within which we have Christians who wonder whether faith can help them in this revolution. It is precisely by proceeding from this analysis of the social movement that they develop their theological reflections. To the Roman Catholic Church the oppressed are the 'historical subject' of liberation. The Church should join this movement.... The position underlying the document of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith continues to be of a 'paternalist' nature. The Church says that the poor should be struggled for, but it does not say that it is on the side of the poor. This is a position that means aid from the Church but not liberation. In this process it is precisely the poor and not the Church who have the 'hegemony.' The Church should, along with other groups, join this movement. Yet so far it has been a companion of this movement, following only its own motives."/2/

Leonardo Boff further comments thus: "The Christian community itself must become an instrument of the liberation. What is of interest to us is not the theory but the practice of faith." The Brazilian Bishop Kraeutler, an ally of liberation theologians, derives the following conclusion: "Wherever misery, torture and murder are among daily occurrences, resurrection and life pertain not only to the liturgical domain, and belong not only to religious terminology, but also become an impetus to the poor in their arduous struggle for survival. We cannot preach the Gospel to those who already are dead."/3/

Liberation theology has become a distinctive expression of natural revolutionary aspirations on the Latin American continent. Its spokesmen attempt to counteract the spiritual inertia of timid defenders of the Catholic doctrine. Liberation theologians read not only the Bible but also Karl Marx. The liberation proclaimed by the Gospel is thus construed by them as liberation not only from the yoke of sin but also from the various forms of yoke associated with exploitation. They deal with temporal forms of this yoke. Instead of saving the soul alone, they engage in repairing sociopolitical structures, because they perceive the main wellsprings of misfortunes, hunger and misery to lie in these structures and not just in the struggle between good and evil which, according to Christian doctrine, exists in man.

Liberation theologians claim that faith commands them to be in solidarity with the disadvantaged and oppressed and argue that this solidarity imposes the duty of changing unjust social conditions. In practice, this has meant the formation of trade-union movements in the countries of Latin America, the establishment of agricultural cooperatives and, above all, the organization of Bible reading courses. It is precisely from the Bible that villagers and the urban proletariat have been learning the ABC of political and social struggle. The utilization of Marxist concepts by liberation theology in its analysis of social and political problems has produced in the Vatican the fear, also manifested by John Paul II, that "The church groups, parish groups and urban communities that grow with the development and maturation of liberation theology represent a potential challenge to the traditionally hierarchic structure of the Vatican."/4/

The Grand Inquisition

Cardinal Ratzinger, the prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, stands guard over the Church's ideological purity, and by virtue of his office he cannot tolerate "a confusion of concepts." In an interview granted to the Catholic HERDER-KORRESPONDENZ he admitted that even some of the pope's comments are susceptible to this danger. The Instruction issued on 3 September 1984 concerning liberation theology is precisely an example of that concern for not crossing the boundary line of the doctrine even with respect to actions that serve man, help rescue him from misfortune and poverty.

The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has been attacking liberation theologians for their acceptance of certain theses of Marxist ideology. The Vatican stresses that not all elements of liberation theology are erroneous, but nevertheless it considers reprehensible the acceptance of an innovative interpretation of Christianity which, in Ratzinger's opinion, clearly deviates from the Church's doctrine or even constitutes its repudiation.

The Instruction on Liberation Theology criticizes "dubious" elements of that theology and traces them to the influence of Marxism. Of course, most liberation theologians wanted to simply utilize Marxism as an intellectual tool for social analysis. It is clear, however, that some have become influenced by it even while retaining profound faith in God.

The Roman Curia is opposed to that trend of liberation theology which favors a Marxist interpretation of Christianity. The Vatican makes the accusation that certain liberation theologians caricature Christ by placing in his hand the insignia of a temporal liberator and harm Christian morality by basing themselves on Marxist analysis.

We read in the Instruction that "The creation of a destructive amalgam of the poor shown in the Holy Scriptures with the proletariat of Marx" is the chief sin of Latin American theologians. The Rev Boff explains: "Marx interests us insofar as he helps us understand the reality of exploitation and signals the possibility of overcoming the antipopular system represented by capitalism."

The truth is that in Latin America the dilemma posed by the Vatican--Christ or Marx--is absent. This is a problem of the struggle for bread. And if that is at the same time a problem of the class struggle, it is no fault of Marx that he called things by their proper names.

The pope's personal views on liberation theology are bound to be of interest. After the Instruction was proclaimed, liberation theologians stressed that it lacks the papal signature, but legally this affects in no way the significance of this document. This is an official document of the Vatican and as such it is a papal document. It also is true that it is difficult to find among the utterances of John Paul II an unequivocal condemnation or approbation of liberation theology. In 1979 in Puebla (Mexico) John Paul II offered the reminder: "Presenting Christ as a revolutionary, a subversive from Nazareth, is inconsonant with the Church's catechesis." (This view coincides with Ratzinger's "Instruction," which states: "The specific nature of the liberation brought to us by Christ consists in that it is above all liberation from sin, which is the source of all evil".) Yet it was in Puebla too that Pope Wojtyla took a positive stand on such classical concepts of liberation theology as the concept of the sin reflected in the very structure of an institution.

Soon after the Instruction of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith had been issued, in his talk with journalists while aboard a plane en route to Canada, John Paul II denied that the intent of combatting Marxism should be imputed to that instruction: "This document says nothing that directly attacks Marxists or Marxist governments."/5/ Nevertheless, an analysis of this document leads to a converse conclusion, showing that essentially the conflict between the Vatican and liberation theologians as well as a large part of the Latin American Church is a conflict of a purely political nature--in the sense of ecclesiastical policy.

The Italian journalist Gianni Baget Bozzo observes in his article, "John Paul II and Liberation Theology": "Following the Second Vatican Council the Catholic Church faced a fundamental dilemma: either abandoning the Roman system, i.e., a rigorously hierarchic concept of ecclesiastical authority at whose summit stands the pope himself, or 'opening itself' to a different kind of relations between local churches and Rome, on the one hand, and between the consciousness of the individual and ecclesiastical authority on the other. This concerned a qualitatively new turnabout by the Roman Church, commensurate with the concept of ecclesiastical autonomy posed by the Eastern Orthodox Church, as well as with the question of the freedom of Christian conscience, which in its turn is linked to Western Protestantism. The reform of the Church which began following the Second Vatican Council signified a radical change in the nature of Catholicism as the dominant Christian religion--though it was not and is not the sole branch of Christianity--so dominant that in the general awareness it often is identified with Christianity as such. Could the pope nullify the hierarchic structure of the Catholic Church with the pope as its main reference point and at the same time preserve the essence of the Catholic religion or, too, more precisely speaking, could he demonstrate that the Catholic religion is in reality something different from the conventional primacy of power of the pope in whom are personified supreme power and

authority? The attempts at modernization and updating being undertaken to this very day have failed because, as it turns out, conventional modernization and updating are not the point here. They failed, despite the hopes reawakened by the Second Vatican Council, because the Roman tradition is something more than papal authority. If we now analyze the difference between the Polish language of the Church and the language of /liberation theology/ [emphasized], we find that it consists precisely in that the latter focuses attention on the reform proposals that have been abandoned by the Church. The Latin American Church stresses strongly the specificity of local churches, whereas the Church in Poland--particularly now, given the Polish pope--stresses its Roman nature. This is doubtless a result of the peculiar situation resulting from the emphasis on the role of the hierarchy. The pope and the primate are nowadays the image of the Church in Poland. Moreover, Latin American liberation theology and the Church's experience emphasize the growing role of personal choice, of decisions taken by individuals who join in political struggle, a struggle which becomes less and less monolithic in form and is increasingly differentiated and waged on many planes. In other words, the clergyman who has made a political choice is in the foreground. All this results in exacerbating the crisis of the Roman Church based on the hierarchic system and discipline. The matter becomes even more serious when we consider that in Latin America, repeatedly in the liberation struggle, a major role is played by monastic orders which--precisely owing to Rome--have gained a basic independence vis a vis the hierarchy."/6/

Furthermore, in the opinion of Prof Thomas Sheehan of Chicago, John Paul II has never felt comfortable in the company of the Latin American liberation theologians: "He did not like their use of Marxist concepts in the analysis of social and political problems and feared that the church groups, parish groups and rural communities which grow in measure with the growth and maturation of liberation theology represent a potential challenge to the traditionally hierarchic structure of the Church."/7/

It is to be expected that in the future the pope's position on liberation theologians will be in the spirit of dialogue. Otherwise, this largest Catholic reservoir in the world may elude Rome's control.

In Latin America the Instruction on Liberation Theology was received as a proceeding of the Inquisition. The Archbishop of Brussels Cardinal Dannels commented after his return from Latin America (where he toured Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and Chile): "We can't abandon these people, and we should support liberation theology... there is something tragic in what is happening at present regarding liberation theology. It has arisen in confrontation with that vast poverty which we can daily view on television. But it is quite different when one personally witnesses that poverty and gets to know closely human suffering and terror."

The Rev Leonardo Boff was summoned to Rome after the Instruction of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith had been published. Whether this coincidence was intentional or fortuitous does not matter. He was asked to clarify certain theses of liberation theology because in his recent book, "The Church: Charisma and Power," he transferred the class struggle to within the

Church. To the hierarchy, which he identifies with the ruling class, he opposes a Church of the people. This is precisely the kind of Church that the Sandinistas of Managua demand. Boff admits that he is thinking of a Brazilian Church, a Latin American Church, and not of the Church of St Peter in Rome, and this is the principal cause of the conflict. Boff accepts Fidel Castro because in Cuba he does not see that poverty which is the common lot of Brazil. "It is enough to keep one's eyes open. I did not see anything to which I should be particularly on guard (after landing in Cuba--J. K.). I got out of the plane, was driven through the city, shown the villages. I look around and ask: 'Where are the favelas ('slums')? Where are those districts of poverty in which Brazil abounds, where children die of diseases and hunger reigns? In Cuba there are no favelas. I talked with people on the beach, in theatres, in cabarets: how much folk culture, what participation! By contrast here in Brazil we have 35 million illiterates."/8/

The author of "The Church: Charisma and Power" expresses in it impatience with those forms of institutional worship which perpetuate the injustices of history. In the ecclesiastical policy of compromises and concessions to capitalists the Rev Boff perceives the symptoms of an ossified theology. Rome stands guard over a hierarchy established centuries ago, pursues an anachronistic policy. This also applies to the Vatican's document on liberation theology, Boff comments. "This text reveals a time lag of theory of the order of 30 or 40 years," while liberation theology "aspires above all to respond to the protests of the oppressed against injustice."/9/ The defense paper presented to Cardinal Ratzinger by Boff on 7 September 1984 formulates two challenges that the Church in Brazil must face: "the social challenge" and "the ecclesiastical challenge."

According to the Rev Boff, "The social challenge may be characterized by the universal crisis experienced by the poor Christian people. This is reflected in such data as 12 million unemployed, 25 million illiterates, 2 million children not covered by elementary education, 25 million abandoned minors (more than the entire population of Central America). In addition to these cold figures we also perceive the specter of hunger, of constant violation of the basic rights of the individual. The Church is present in capillary form in the social tissue of the Brazilian people." Boff adds that the ecclesiastical challenge is no less important. "Ever since the nation began to exist the Church has been present, but it has never had a sufficient number of churchmen to satisfy the religious needs of the people."

Characterizing the Brazilian Church, Boff states that "It has worked out its option of preference for the poor and in behalf of social justice. Among us the proletariat is not a large segment. In Brazil there exist different social strata, the historical and social bloc of people relegated to the margin of life in the countryside and cities, people who lack steady jobs. Two-thirds of Brazilians are people deprived of means of livelihood. The Church, focusing on the poor, perceives with increasing clarity that the society must change structurally. The Church has no particular political or economic plans. It merely favors greater participation of the people in the adoption of decisions of importance to the entire nation, and it supports popular movements which

advocate labor justice and favor organizations which struggle not so much for a poor or rich society as for a more just and fraternal society."

In Boff's opinion, the Church's social mission was confirmed by Pope John Paul during his pilgrimage to Brazil in 1980. Boff declares: "The point here is not at all any promotion of a society under the sign of Marxism-Leninism, ... but a more democratic society in which the people, rather than only the classes privileged by the socioeconomic system, can be the subject of historical destiny."

The Brazilian theologian replies to his critics: "Being on the side of the poor requires of the bishops that they again become more simple (persons), closer to the struggles waged by the people of the Gospel." This also requires "of the monks and nuns that they move from the directing center to the peripheries, and of theology that it be not simply an educational exercise for candidates for pastoral service but a moment of illumination and criticism on the Christian path, that it be a work developed together with the communities of the faithful."

As regards the accusations concerning the use of Marxist analysis by part of liberation theology, Boff believes that such accusations are intended to deprive this ideological trend of credibility within the Church and "associate it with elements unacceptable to faith, with the class struggle, confine it to the domain of politics." He adds explicitly: "Essentially, the problem is not the use or non-use of certain concepts of Marxist tradition in an endeavor to identify the causative mechanism of popular poverty; the intention [of the accusers] is to avoid the necessary transformation of the society in a manner in which the people could live more fully. All those who explore the paths of such changes are stigmatized and accused of being Marxists and depraving Christian faith." At the same time Boff stresses, "The aim [of the accusers] is to avoid popular freedom and progress toward more dignified forms of social relations and social and political participation."/10/

In addition to the Rev Boff, Peruvian bishops also were summoned to the Vatican prefecture of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The subject of the conversations was the activity of Father Gustavo Gutierrez, one of the founders of liberation theology, who in his book "Liberation Theology," published in 1973, was the first to develop the theology of Christian response to social injustice and ways of eliminating it. Gutierrez was accused even earlier of interpreting the Christian message on the basis of the Marxist concept of history.

The present-day inquisitors also condemned the activities of Olodovis Boff and Antonio Moser, who were forbidden to give lectures at the papal university in Rio de Janeiro.

The dispute between the Vatican and the Latin American priests proclaiming the ideas of liberating the poor from oppression has entered upon a decisive stage. This is a dispute over the future of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the interview granted to the Spanish agency EFE; quoted from the Spanish Catholic daily YA of 11 September 1984.
2. LE MONDE, 13 September 1984.
3. These opinions were voiced by Bishop Kraeutler on the Vatican Radio; quoted from DIE ZEIT, 7 September 1984.
4. Prof Thomas Sheehan (philosopher, lecturer at Loyola University in Chicago), in an article in THE NEW YORK TIMES, 16 September 1984.
5. From the account by Hansjakob Stehle, DIE ZEIT, 14 September 1984.
6. This article was published in the Roman LA REPUBBLICA and reprinted in the Madrid EL PAIS of 13 September 1984, from which this translation is taken.
7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 16 September 1984.
8. Interview, L'EUROPEO, 22 September 1984.
9. Interview, LE MONDE, 13 September 1984.
10. From the report of Sergio Soares Ferreira to the Italian agency IPS.

1386

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POLAND

CHURCH SEEN EXACERBATING WLOSZCZOWA CROSS CRISIS

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 12 Dec 84 p 4

[Article by Anna Krawiecka: "Prayer or Politics?"]

[Text] An article entitled "Prayer or Politics?" which we are reprinting below appeared in SLOWA LUDU, No 1318.

On 1 December 1984 students at the ZSZ [Trade Schools Complex] in Wloszczowa hung crosses in 17 classrooms and in the school store without permission from the principal.

Article 32, paragraph 2 of the Constitution states: "The church is separate from the state."

That afternoon, the crosses were removed.

2 December. The previously planned parent-teacher meetings were held, at which the teachers justified the removal of the crosses. The parents received this news without reservation.

The secularity of public institutions is an element of separation of church and state. This means that public institutions do not get involved in the religious life of citizens. After all, the overwhelming majority of citizens have the legal and physical right to choose their religious life freely. In the case of schools and education-upbringing facilities, neglecting the small number of special discipline upbringing facilities and facilities for children who cannot move about freely because of physical handicaps, the great majority of children and youth in the schools and education-upbringing facilities have access to religious life outside the school.

3 December. The students come to school but do not attend classes despite the appeals of the faculty. They sing religious songs. After the discussions held with the students by representatives of the provincial authorities and the regional education and upbringing authorities, the hope arises that the situation would normalize. However, the local priests appear at the school and emotions heat up again. At the request of the principal, the vicars leave the building. However, they return shortly with a mission--so they declare--from the bishop of Kielce, who was then passing through

Wloszczowa on his way to Czestochwa from Warsaw. He said that "he was proud of the students' stand." The priests remain in the school, disregarding the principal's request that they leave the building. The attempts of the authorities to contact the priests' superior are unsuccessful. In the meantime, the church hymns grew louder in the school, and the corridors are decorated with religious emblems. In view of this, the principal asks the priests once again to leave the school, but without results. They are requested again, in writing, but still without results.

The young people do not return to their classes. Lessons cannot be conducted. Therefore, it is decided to suspend classes until further notice. Despite this, the students remain in the school. About 150 students and both priests spend the night in the school.

Freedom of religion does not mean freedom to demonstrate one's religious beliefs everywhere, always or on any occasion.

4 December. The young people remain in the school. They are visited by their parents, outsiders, parish priests and priests from outside their parish. Friends also join them. A mass was celebrated for the intention of the strikers. Leaflets are distributed calling for solidarity with them. Attempts were made, without success, to involve other communities in this religious dispute. The discussion with the parents conducted by the superintendent of schools are fruitless. The children remain in the school despite the principal's request, for the third time, that everyone leave the ZSZ building.

Late in the evening the emergency crew removes a girl who fainted. Later she returns to the building.

This time, also during the night, there are about 150 students, parents and priests.

5 December. Today the Kielce radio station broadcasts the Wloszczowa events. Then I drive to Wloszczowa.

Votive lamps in the shape of a cross are laid out on the ground before the ZSZ. A few flowers are nearby. "God is with us" and a cross are painted on the doors. There are also notices to the effect that the door is open every half hour and that classes are suspended. A group of adults is waiting to be admitted. There is supposed to be a meeting with the parents. At the sight of the notebook in my hands, comments are made: "The young people want to learn, but the crosses must remain," "This is our school," "The priests have arrived and are now inside with our children," "They are not demanding that the crosses be eaten," "There are no classes so that everyone would go home," "A person learned well when there was a cross, and it was good, not like today when young people drink beer from early morning."

The doors open. We are in the corridor, and it is full of boys and girls standing in groups, sitting against the walls and on the steps. Some of them hold in their arms small wooden crosses wrapped in a black ribbon. Then the chants begin: "The radio lies," "The press lies." And they asked the

news photographer: "Sir, are you with us or against us?"; "The struggle here is about truth and not pictures!" A tall, young priest with a stylish haircut states immediately: "We are not giving any interviews." I reply that I absolutely do not want to talk to him. And the choir echoes the priest: "The press lies," "We are not giving any interviews."

Article 25, paragraph 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948 as a declaration, in contradiction to international agreements not requiring ratification by individual countries, established the limits of human rights as follows: In making use of his rights and freedoms, every man is subject only to those limitations that are established by law to assure that the rights and freedoms of others are properly recognized and respected and to comply with the just requirements of morality and public order and the universal welfare of a democratic society.

I am looking over the school paper I happened to obtain by chance. "Remember, man, that the spirit of God dwells within you, and a man who wants to do something can do it." Along with this quotation from Stefan Zeromski's "Dziennikow" there is a large black cross in the background. Beside it there is a poster such as one can see on the streets and in institutions entitled "For Our Peaceful Home." A peaceful home....

There is a pile of binders, overcoats, sleeping bags and blankets upstairs. The classrooms are locked. Thus everything lays in the corridor, which is now a closet, bed, and a church. Yes, a church because black crosses also hand on the doors here, and something shaped like an altar is near the windows. There also are crosses on the school emblems and duty sashes. During this time sales of emblems amounted to 3,000 zlotys, at 15 zlotys per emblem. Everyone wants to show that he too is participating. One does not wear the emblem every day because teachers check.

The principle of freedom of conscience and religion does not in the least give one the right to place religious symbols anywhere one pleases. Establishing the limit of freedom of conscience and religion is not a new idea. It has been in force since the end of the 18th century, since the time when freedom of conscience and religion, as one of the citizens' rights, was beginning to be implemented in modern society. During the Great French Revolution, Article X of the famous Declaration of Human and Civic Rights proclaimed by the National Assembly on 26 August 1785 stated that "no one can be harrassed because of his beliefs, including his religious beliefs, providing that their manifestation does not disturb the legal public order."

I go to the principal's office. A mother laments to the school principal. What should be done with her son? He is big, and they will not be able to carry him out on their shoulders. I do not want him there.... The teachers sit where they can, waiting for news. What will result from the talks between the authorities and parents? They are tired; admittedly they only have the duty sashes. But they continue to come here hoping that perhaps the conflict is already resolved. I cannot determine exactly how many students are taking part in the strike. cursory calculations indicate that about 150 are

participating at night and perhaps 300 during the day. About 700 students attend the school. No one is compiling a list. It is all somewhat idiotic. All of them live here and want to live here in peace. They have children. But in the city it now seems that someone will do something spiteful. Families are also being affected. A small elementary school girl approaches her mother, a teacher, and asks: Why do you not want a cross? The mother recalls this and weeps....

The process of the separation of church and state was legally concluded, especially in the schools, by the law of 14 July 1961 on developing the education and upbringing system. Article 2 of this law states: "Schools and other education-upbringing institutions are secular institutions. All teaching and upbringing in these institutions are of a secular nature...."

A small boy peers into the principal's office. He asks for the key to the entrance doors because one of his schoolmates, a girl, has fainted. He is followed by the priest, urging him on. Immediately, one can also hear the concerted choir: Open the doors, this is not a jail! The key is quickly handed over. Yesterday a team of doctors was at the school; they lectured on how to avoid infections, and they checked the sanitary conditions. Right now all needs are met. They were also present today. Unfortunately, the moment I arrived during their talks with the priests and young people the vicar was saying: "We will not talk with the press present."

I tried to determine how this whole affair started. I have been told that the school's ZSMP [Polish Union of Socialist Youth] administrator can explain it to me best of all.

Two students came to him at the end of October and announced they wanted to resign from the ZSMP. He told them that they had just become members, that they had not even received their membership cards yet and that they still had not accomplished anything and therefore should think about it for a week. Immediately, on All Saints' Day, during the sermon at the cemetery, it was proclaimed that the professor does not permit resignations from the ZSMP. One week later, a whole group of 22 individuals came forward with a pronouncement stating that the youth organization is like the party, demanding secularity, and that ZSMP members are party members. Assurances of complete tolerance did not convince the students. Then two more classes declared their resignations from the ZSMP in their own way. But somehow these occurred without pronouncements. But quite a few tickets, 160, were sold for the discotheque organized by the ZSMP. Attendance was somewhat smaller at the next outing arranged by the sportsmen's club because at the same time crosses were being blessed in the church. Even before this occurred, "one does not dance on Friday" (and this was St Andrew's Eve) and "Solidarity members will not participate" were written on the posters announcing the disco much earlier. The following day, on 1 December, the blessed crosses were hung in the classrooms.

In August of 1980, in Gdansk, the Interfactory Strike Committee wanted to include the return of religion in the schools among its 21 postulates. The Polish Episcopate opposed this because the church prefers to provide religious

instruction after school. Why? Because the church would not have to obtain the approval of the Education Ministry for its programs and textbooks. In giving religious instruction after school, the church is completely free to teach that which it believes to be suitable without interference from the state.

We hear more shouts from the crowd in the corridor: "Parents, do not give in!" A proposal was made to resolve the crisis: permit one cross to remain. It was not accepted. The demand remains the same: replace all the crosses that were removed and guarantee that all those taking part in the strike will not suffer any consequences.

I want to make contact with the students. I want to find out exactly why they decided to demonstrate their views in this way. It is not easy to overcome the barrier of mistrust. Even as someone starts to talk a colleague arrives on the scene and significantly lets him know that he is wanted downstairs and that we must stick together. Finally I meet some young people whose bitterness, sorrow and even anger do not permit them to remain silent. They begin severely:

"Why do you lie? You, you of the press, radio and TV. You all lie. Reporters, teachers and even at times parents, all of you. Why?

"The reasons will be known. You should write the truth. What if they do print that we are like a family, that there is an atmosphere of community, that we ourselves are concerned about law and order, that nothing will disappear and that we share everything? Will they print that the only entertainment in Wloszczowa is that which is offered by the church? Nothing is happening at the Home of Culture, and the same goes for the school in the afternoons. No one devotes as much time and attention to us as the priest does. One can count on one's fingers the number of teachers we trust. If things are not good at home, where can we go? We have been part of the ZSZ for 3 years, but so what? We have not had a single outing or a single trip to the theater. If in general we were able to organize something, it was through sheer aggressiveness. The adults remember us only when they have to fill up the hall for an anniversary celebration.

"Of course, now they care about us. They send hams, sausages, pastries, butter and medicines. They are supporting us in spirit. Father Marek also. He said such strikes are also taking place elsewhere and that threatening letters are being received, just like Father Popieluszko received....

"How did this all begin? Inconspicuously. Recently the priest asked if we had crosses in the classrooms, and he was surprised to hear that we did not. He asked if we wanted crosses in the classroom. Of course. He obtained them, blessed them, and then we hung them, even though the director did not approve. The teachers also were not pleased. Were we afraid that a strike would start? No, we were not concerned about that. We did not expect the crosses to be removed. We protested in this way because we know of no other way."

May I ask: How did you become acquainted with this form of protest? Where have such strikes as this one occurred in Poland outside Mietna? Perhaps in France, where the church is separated from the state, or in Italy? No.

The lack of religious symbols in school does not mean that anyone's beliefs or feelings are discriminated against. However, the existence of these symbols does violate the principle of separation of church and state and the secularity of the school. It is an attempt to force the beliefs of a minority on the majority who have different beliefs.

Negotiations between the parents and the authorities are going on during the entire time I am at the school. Decisions concerning the lack of a list of postulates multiply. During the entire time songs continue to be sung, such as "Today the next 1,000 years depends on Poland's youth." In addition, an audio tape of the radio broadcast of the events is replayed.

Since I know that once again another large group of students and the priest will spend the night at the ZSZ, and that another appeal from the school director will be ignored, I leave town.

6 December. Similar to 5 December.

7 December. Similar to 6 December. How many more such days?

Trying to recover lost time is difficult. It is not the fault of the young people that their time is wasted. They have to make it up later on, and the school also has to make it up. But what about the moral and psychological wounds? Who will heal them and when? It will not be easy as long as irresponsible people continue to exacerbate and provoke the war of the crosses. It will not be easy.

As I left the school, again I heard a part of Father Marek's song: "Why does the atheist fight God, and we say nothing? Why do they remove the crosses, and we merely look on...."

I do not know what it is: a prayer or politics? And not only Father Marek's politics. If it is a prayer, then its answer is contained in the Gospel of St Matthew: "And when thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites are, for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen of men. Verily I say unto you, they have their reward. But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut the door, pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly.

"But when ye pray, use not vain repetitions, as the heathen do, for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking. Be not ye therefore like unto them, for your Father knoweth what things ye have need of before ye ask him."

* * *

[Inset] The principle of freedom of conscience and religion is fully realized in our country, without limitations. Whoever wants to can participate in religious practices in churches, chapels and catechetical facilities. Currently, there are 10,256 churches and 4,000 chapels operating in Poland. In Kielce Province there are 262 parishes, 258 churches and 136 chapels. Catechetical facilities are in operation in every parish, in accordance with the needs specified by church authorities. Despite this, school halls were leased for catechetical purposes six times during the 1984-1985 school year. All of the needs voiced by the curia in this respect were satisfied.

During the 1971-1981 period, permission was granted in Poland to build, reconstruct, modernize and expand 1,072 churches. Many, very many churches are being built, as never before in the history of the Polish church. Compared to 1945, there are now twice as many churches and three times as many parishes. Six large churches are being built right now in Kielce Province. During the 1981-1984 period alone the diocese was given permission to build 75 churches and sacral buildings. The state does not hinder their building, despite the fact of its immense investment needs for health services, housing and public buildings. In education alone, 585 new buildings are needed, including 138 primary schools, 238 teachers' homes, 137 nurseries, and 24 other upbringing facilities having a total value of 20 billion zlotys.

11899

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POLAND

CENSORED COVERAGE OF POPIELUSZKO MURDER TRIAL CONTINUES

Krakow TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY in Polish No 5, 3 Feb 85 pp 3-5,6

[Abridged account by Jacek Ambroziak, emissary of the Press Office of the Episcopate of Poland, fourth in a series of articles: "The Trial for the Murder of the Rev Jerzy Popieluszko"]

[Text] Following the recess, the defendant Grzegorz Piotrowski resumed his testimony. He spoke in a calm and controlled voice:

Piotrowski: "I'll begin my testimony with the moment when Popieluszko was placed for the last time in the trunk. After the trunk lid was shut, we drove off in the direction of Wloclawek. The car's speed was very low, and there was apprehension that it might stall. There was a moment when we wondered about being pursued, and there was a moment when we wanted to drive in the direction of Lodz. There was a moment when my associates said that Popieluszko should be abandoned, because we couldn't take him to Warsaw. There was a moment when Chmielewski also said that Popieluszko was moving inside the trunk. There was a moment when Leszek Pekala said that Chrostowski could identify us. These comments met with no response. I wanted to bring him [Popieluszko] to Warsaw.

"At one moment Waldek [Chmielewski] said that Popieluszko no longer showed any signs of life. I turned around, leaned back slightly and saw Popieluszko's face inside the trunk, which was illuminated. I saw that face. It seemed to me the face of a dead man. The movement seen by Waldek was a movement of inertia. I have seen many dead people, e.g., my mother, and I have been to revival rooms; thus I was certain that Popieluszko was dead. I voiced the thought that a dead man could not be abandoned on the road. We neared a fork in the road. A militia patrol car could be seen. A militiaman emerged from the car and motioned us to stop. Leszek slowed down. I showed the pass. The militiaman motioned us to proceed. I leaned over again, and again I saw the face of a dead man. Then I told Pekala: 'Turn around. We'll drive across the dam.' All that time I was convinced that it was I who had killed Popieluszko. We passed

the militiamen and crossed the dam. I got out of the car, ran to the rear and saw some buildings there. I looked down [into the river], returned and said that we must get rid of him here. There would be no chance and no point going any farther. We turned the car around, drove to the guardrail on the dam, got out, extracted the body of the Rev Popieluszko and threw it into the water, in which it sank. I can't say who held which part of the body. Then we drove off. Leszek Pekala said that the Rev Popieluszko was dead. I said I agreed. I can't describe the atmosphere reigning in our car.

"Leszek said that Chrostowski would identify him, that he would be thrown to the wolves. I thought and told them that this was impossible, because we had guarantee. I said this to cheer them up. Leszek said something about a hangman's noose. I said that if the body is not found we must keep silent. The general atmosphere was that of fear. I felt it my duty to cheer them up. I said that we would probably be saved.... [-----] [Censored--Translator's note] [Decree of 31 July 1981 On the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised 1983, DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)]. I had to say something to them. At one moment Leszek declared that he must drink some vodka. That was drinking not in honor of something but to dull one's awareness. We downed the vodka quickly. Silence reigned in the car. The nature of road checks in Warsaw is too well known for me to discuss them. But as for that road check in Wloclawek, I sensed it to be a militia blockade. We arrived at the ministry. Pekala was driving. We reached the space in which Leszek's personal car was parked. While the militia in Wloclawek stopped us at 2350 hours, the body was thrown into the water at 2355 hours. Leszek transferred to his car and Chmielewski was now driving our car. Before then we had considered throwing out things from a bridge in Modlin. We threw out the three sticks and the keys to Chrostowski's car.

"We reached my home and stopped. A sack was taken out and Leszek and Waldek put everything in it. I put my jacket in that sack. Waldek put a piece of brick in it. Someone lifted it and said it was too light. I took a stone from the nearby construction site and threw it into the sack. Then I threw in another, heavier stone. We drove to the bridge across Czerniakowskie Lake and there I dropped that sack into the water. I must emphasize and make it clear that there was no second sack with stones. The three stones that were in the sack I collected near my home; they show traces of paint and plaster. Then we drove on and, in the environs of Czerniakowskie Lake, burned Chrostowski's documents and Popieluszko's papers, on first pouring gasoline over them. We drove back and, outside my home, agreed that Waldek and Leszek would report for work tomorrow afternoon. I had to be in my office tomorrow morning. It seems to me that I reached home at between 0300 and 0400 hours in the morning.

"In the morning I went to my office. In fact, I showed up there even earlier than I had to. Once there, I became upset by a phone call from General P. His first question was whether I knew what happened to Popieluszko. I guessed that an alarm was raised at the ministry. I answered that I knew nothing. The general summoned me to see him. I left to see him. Adam Pietruszka and one other deputy director were in his office. He repeated his question. I said that I knew nothing. At that moment I glanced at Adam Pietruszka, who was

sitting calmly. I decided to claim ignorance until I could talk with him. I was shown two telegrams from Torun. I tried to maintain calm. I was asked whether anyone had been driving a car to that city. I answered no. This conversation lasted an hour, but now I'm summing it up. The phones rang continually. The chief needed more than two hands to pick them all up. At that time the general also called the security chief at the Office of Internal Affairs for the Nation's Capital and asked whether over there they knew anything about Popieluszko, because they had been investigating him. Torun also was called. Finally, I was instructed to take some steps, because we had a lot of material on the subject.

"I was also to investigate whether Popieluszko traveled to Stalowa Wola. In addition, I was to investigate the hideouts of underground conspirators and their collaborators: we had various addresses and names, including the address of the former hideout of Cezary Filozof, who was connected with the Przemyk affair [the murder of Grzegorz Przemyk by ambulance attendants and militiamen]. I excused myself and returned to my office. A moment later Adam Pietruszka called and I went to see him. It was then that I returned the "W" Pass to him, or placed it on his desk. Next, Adam Pietruszka asked me, 'Well, what?' I answered that I couldn't say that Popieluszko was alive. He asked whether Popieluszko was recoverable. I said that it was not up to me. He asked if anyone saw us, and I said no. He looked extremely nervous at the time. My answers probably shook up Adam Pietruszka. All this looked very idiotic. There were several such conversations with Pietruszka and Gen P.; there was considerable movement in the building. That day I saw Adam Pietruszka several times. We engaged in small talk although we both knew what was what. At the time I didn't make any report to Adam Pietruszka on the event. He was interested only in knowing whether we had left any clues, and whether Popieluszko was recoverable. W. was also summoned; he came to see me and then to see the general. Then the following statements were made: 'Look, Leszek, we all were going to do it, but somebody got ahead of us.' Leszek W. showed doubt on his face. Owing to my sleepless nights the chronology of events and utterances may be blurred, but even so I repeat these facts more or less precisely. There was a moment at which I gave Pietruszka to understand that Popieluszko was not recoverable. Then Adam Pietruszka reacted very strongly.

"Sunday morning I again showed up for work. I had been summoned in the morning. When I arrived, Adam Pietruszka summoned me and said that our car had been seen in Bydgoszcz and its license plate number was known. He told me that number and said that our car was parked in the courtyard under my very nose. I returned home to pick up the spare keys, [came back and] entered the car, drove outside the gate onto the street, saw Waldek Chmielewski, picked him up and told him what happened. We drove to Powsino and changed the license tags there, whereupon I drove Waldek to his family as he had some personal matters to settle.

"Saturday Adam Pietruszka had informed me that Chrostowski noticed in the car the characteristic red fan button. I went to check it out and said that there was no such button. He also asked where the radio set was located, because Chrostowski said that it was placed on some special shelf. I said that there was no such shelf. He asked whether the car was cleaned. I answered yes. The

radio set was simply not visible. Adam Pietruszka said that some red-herring operation was needed. I proposed demanding a ransom. He liked the idea. Later we carried it out. But here I wish to avail myself of the right to decline answering questions on this matter, because it was completely idiotic.

"Sunday at around noon I again saw Adam Pietruszka in his office. He told me that we should not talk inside [as the offices were bugged] but I don't want to discuss that. I informed all my associates about it. Adam Pietruszka had written down a license plate number WAB plus 4 digits which resembled, after suitable processing, our number. He told me that the daily [TV news broadcast] would specify precisely this number and said that, immediately after the TV news broadcast the enforcement agencies named in the broadcast should be telephoned and told that a car bearing that license number was seen.

"On Sunday Adam Pietruszka asked me, pressured me into answering as it were, what I would do to free Popieluszko. He asked where the priest was now. Then I answered that insofar as I know Popieluszko was in the Vistula. Adam Pietruszka's reaction was violent; evidently he was greatly shaken. He stopped asking me what happened to Popieluszko. I have accurately explained all the telephone calls made, but this was so incredibly stupid that here I wish to avail myself of the right to decline answering.

"Sunday I was home, then I was summoned again. Adam Pietruszka drove to the garage and asked about our car. I happen to know that on Saturday Leszek Pekala wrote the mileage report. The car was had been parked Monday by our official driver. It was probably Monday that Adam Pietruszka told me that things were not looking good because we had been seen and there were witnesses. Drawings of our faces were made, and he even said that one of the drawings depicted Pekala to a T. When I saw them [Pekala and Chmielewski], I didn't tell them how bad things were. At the time I myself was practically awaiting arrest. I did not even ask Adam Pietruszka about that 'top' [higher-ups] which was supposed to take care of us. He and I decided to save what couldn't be saved. I told my associates that they must establish alibis and if disaster comes then they shouldn't admit guilt, because I alone would take the entire blame, because it was I who involved them, since Adam Pietruszka did not deal with them. I was besides convinced that I had killed Popieluszko myself.

"On Monday Adam Pietruszka said that the business with our car couldn't be concealed, because it went through official channels. He ordered me to write a statement about what happened to our car. I wrote that statement. It was an untrue statement. Adam Pietruszka read it on the stairs and said that it was good. On Tuesday I was instructed to complement that statement, which contained the declaration that the car was used for a mushroom-gathering trip in the environs of Torun and Bydgoszcz. I complemented that statement; in other words, I wrote an additional statement [-----] [Censored--Translator's note] [Decree of 31 July 1981 On the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)].

"During my initial conversations with the interrogating officers I declined to answer. My one goal was to save Pekala and Chmielewski. But one day after my arrest, when the interrogating officer told me of the manhunt in the forests being carried out by many hundreds of people, I told him: 'Stop the search. Popieluszko is in the Vistula.' Besides, on that same day, or on the next day, I learned that Waldek and Leszek were arrested. I became uncommunicative. Once again I told the prosecutor that I acted alone, but he didn't believe me. I had also mentioned to another interrogating officer that Popieluszko was in the Vistula. I mentioned this on 24 October. But I didn't tell just where in the Vistula. All the depositions I made until 31 October were incomplete. At times I shirked the truth. They are the depositions of a man who made them in the conviction that he was a murderer. All my other depositions starting with 1 November are consonant with the reality, with what took place according to me. While I didn't mention certain things that I could have mentioned, what I stated is true.

"I'd like to clarify a couple of details. I was alone in my office when Adam Pietruszka showed up and said that Pekala should disappear somewhere. He asked me where could he travel in the line of duty. I answered that he could have some official duties to perform only in Nowy Sacz. Just then D. entered. Pietruszka was exiting as he met him at the door, and said 'Well then, fine.' I told D. that Pekala had to leave for Nowy Sacz. My deputy was to instruct Pekala accordingly. Monday evening, Adam Pietruszka asked whether there were any [seat] covers in our car. I answered no. But Tuesday I realized that there were arm supports on our seats, but no covers. Then I told the driver to bring those covers from the garage. I don't know if he did so, because by then I was arrested.

"As regards the permit for the trip on 19 October, this is a mystery, because it was partially erased. Monday or Tuesday I glanced at the car's logbook. I believed that Pekala jotted down data on mileage to and from garages. Let me add that the figures on the mileage to Gdansk were incomplete, not including the fuel bought in state-operated gasoline stations, for which I had the bills. It was then, on Tuesday, that I found the permit for 13 October, but I couldn't find there the permit for 19 October. Then I summoned my driver. I gave him the permit for 13 October and the bills and told him to take care of them and that it was okay with me for him to make use of these papers when settling the accounts.

"There also were questions about throwing the body into the Vistula. First, let me explain that we had problems removing the body, because the cassock had snagged on the trunk, and also it was difficult to extract the feet as they were blocked so to speak. In turn, to return to the anonymous phone call to Bishop M., let me explain that his choice was not accidental, because precisely this bishop provided the strongest moral support to Jerzy Popieluszko. It is no accident that the dossiers of the case, the interrogation records, contain the statement that the apartment was bought by Popieluszko or his aunt, and that the things [incriminating evidence] were planted by some scoundrel. Besides, various [slandorous] comments concerning the Rev Popieluszko had been many times before addressed to the hands of Bishop M. But he didn't react to them. That was either cynicism or stupidity.

One phone call was also made to the parish [rectory] of St. Stanislaw Kostka, because someone was also on duty there."

Presiding judge: "Did you check to see whether Popieluszko was alive?"

Grzegorz Piotrowski: "I can only assume that he was dead. Only a physician could be certain."

Presiding judge: "How wide was that crack in the trunk?"

Piotrowski: "About 5 cm. It was permanently dented. We had problems trying to eliminate it."

Presiding judge: "Was the light in the trunk always on?"

Piotrowski: "I don't really know, but at that time I saw that it was on."

Presiding judge: "Was he gagged?"

Piotrowski: "I saw the tape. I didn't insert the gag."

Presiding judge: "Who inserted the gag?"

Piotrowski: "I don't know."

Presiding judge: "What about that travel authorization for 19 October?"

Piotrowski: "I filled out the form and Director Adam Pietruszka signed it."

Presiding judge: "It contains traces of an erasure. Was that form already damaged or did the defendant make the erasure?"

Piotrowski: "No, it wasn't a damaged form. Besides, why should I have to make erasures on it considering that we had hundreds of such forms at the office? This form must have gotten into the hands of someone to whom doctoring it was important."

Presiding judge: "But it was done clumsily."

Piotrowski: "Perhaps that clumsiness was intentional. I must explain that I handed the authorization on 19 October to Leszek Pekala and he kept it all the time. I didn't see it again until my pretrial examination, although I had looked for it before my arrest. Had I found this form I would certainly have destroyed it."

Presiding judge: "Didn't the defendant ask Pekala about the authorization after returning from the trip?"

Piotrowski: "No. On Saturday and Sunday I didn't ask him, and on Sunday I saw Pekala for the last time. That's besides all that I wish to explain spontaneously in this matter."

Presiding judge: "In Adam Pietruszka's office there was a conversation on some exhibition in honor of the 40th anniversary [of People's Poland]."

Piotrowski: "At one time W. provided me with photographs from the exhibition organized in the church by Jerzy Popieluszko on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of People's Poland, they were specific photographs of the photographs displayed at the exhibition and mainly dealing with the unrest and upheavals that took place during that period. I passed on these photographs to Adam Pietruszka [and] Gen P. As regards the words that were spoken on that occasion to the effect that only the earth could straighten out such a scoundrel, it seems to me that they were uttered by Adam Pietruszka, but I didn't attach importance to them. They may have been uttered in connection with that exhibition. I interpreted them to mean that we in the Service were powerless to act. That's how I had construed these words when they were uttered. They were uttered just by and by. I felt irritated by the fact of such an exhibition being organized in a church, by that display of photographs that were extremely inflammatory and inciting to people."

Presiding judge: "The defendant said that Jerzy Popieluszko's activities aggravated him."

Piotrowski: "I wouldn't say so. The relationship between the activities of Jerzy Popieluszko and legality. It amused us rather than aggravating us."

Presiding judge: "Yesterday the defendant drew a parallel between Popieluszko and Malkowski."

Piotrowski: "Yes. But Popieluszko was more of a heavyweight. I'm mild by nature and don't lose my poise easily. Besides, on thinking about the relations between Jerzy Popieluszko and myself I knew that his attitude toward the authorities was that of hatred. I can say that his attitude would also apply to the persons seated behind the judges' dais here. But my personal attitude toward him was indifferent. I had never given him a thought after 4 o'clock in the afternoon. I had no feelings about Popieluszko. He was violating the law, and I felt more irritated by the powerlessness of the law rather than personally by Jerzy Popieluszko."

Presiding judge: "We must trace the origins of this operation. In this connection, we must consult the dossier of case No VIIK772/84, Regional Court in Warsaw, against Jerzy Popieluszko, accused under Article 194 of the Penal Code in conjunction with Article 58 of the Penal Code, and Article 282a, Paragraph 1, of the Penal Code in conjunction with Article 270, Paragraph 1, and Article 273, Paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, and also Article 286 of the Penal Code. We are aware that the bill of indictment was not acknowledged by the court, because the case found its epilogue when, by virtue of the amnesty, and in view of the loss of material evidence such as cartridges and a great deal of literature, that court resolved to quash the proceedings."

The presiding judge at the trial opened Volume 1 of the dossier of the case against Jerzy Popieluszko and read from folder 44 containing a notice about a

a mass to the effect that participation in Holy Mass at the Church of St Stanislaw Kostka was invited [-----] [Censored] [Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)]. The Court also read from folder 67, containing a letter from Jerzy Giedroyc [editor of the Paris-based Polish emigre periodical KULTURA--translator's note] to the Rev Popieluszko, in which Giedroyc confirms receipt of material and asks what was the response to it. At the same time, in connection with the contents of that letter, the Court decided to read excerpts from folder 80, containing questions addressed to the Rev Primate [Cardinal Glemp] with critical overtones about his political attitude and comments.

Here the presiding judge commented that appeals for peace, for reconciliation, could hardly conflict with the Gospel. He then continued reading a passage concerning, e.g., the attitude of the Rev Primate toward Solidarity, his comments on that subject.

Attorney Olszewski: "I beg your pardon, Your Honors, but I can't tell which is the contents of these folders and which is the personal commentary of the presiding judge."

Attorney Wende asked to speak and requested that the material read by the Court be not included in the material evidence, inasmuch as the contents of these jottings and documents and their authorship are unknown and the priest could never have taken a position on them, since he had not pleaded guilty during the investigation and declined to make any deposition. At present it is not possible to take any position on all this.

In this place the prosecutor took the floor and declared that the dossiers of the case in dispute are, in the prosecutor's opinion, to be incorporated in their entirety in the material evidence in the present case and that he is at a loss to understand why the attorney for the prosecution claims that the priest could not have taken a position on this, considering that the priest had declined to testify and thus there was no opportunity for him to take a position.

In this place Attorney Wende rose and declared that the priest actually did not plead guilty and hence the authorship of these documents has clearly not been proved and their origin remains unknown.

Attorney Olszewski took the floor and declared that, with reference to the defendant's comments on his attitude toward Popieluszko, a reading of the material introduced by the prosecutor might be necessary, but reading it right now would disrupt the trial procedure, because the defendant still has not completed his testimony, and besides perhaps the defendant's further testimony itself would clarify his attitude toward the Rev. Popieluszko.

Attorney Grabinski also took the floor and said that if the court considers it necessary to read from these documents then perhaps Piotrowski should be asked whether he himself had added such documents to, e.g., the dossier on the Popieluszko case. Besides, he can state that the attorneys for the prosecution

themselves see no obstacles to the addition of that material to the material evidence, and would themselves have proposed it, but reading these documents, which concern the murder victim, during the present part of the trial seems to him a premature and improper procedure.

The prosecutor rose and declared that he nevertheless requests that this material be made public.

Also taking the floor was the attorney for the defendant Piotrowski, Attorney Ilasz, who declared that he understands the position of the attorneys for the prosecution on the matter but, in consideration of his client's interests, he requests that this material be made public in its entirety and is not opposed to its reading in court and incorporation in the material evidence. At the same time, he requested a 5-minute recess as his client desired to consult him.

In reply to the reservations voiced, the presiding judge stated that in his opinion the reading of these documents in the court is needed in order to clarify what the defendant meant by an "indifferent attitude." In this connection, it is indispensable to make public a part of the material, because that may be linked to certain statements made by the defendant during the pretrial examination.

At the same time, the court decided to make public the defendant's deposition of 26 October 1984, made in writing during the pretrial investigation.

The Presiding Judge of the Court Artur Kujawa read that deposition in its entirety [-----] [Censored--translator's note] [Decree of 31 July 1982 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised, 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)].

Next, Attorney Wende again took the floor and, referring to the provisions of Article 334, Paragraph 1, of the Code of Penal Proceedings [KPK], declared that in the event that a defendant declines to testify or provides testimony that differs from his previous testimony, the reading of the text of his previous testimony is permitted at a trial but, in his opinion, the reading of any extraneous material is premature and the proper sequence should be preserved in presenting that material. Consequently, reading the material pertaining to the proceedings against the Rev Jerzy Popieluszko violates the mandatory provisions of the KPK.

The court ordered an half-hour recess.

After the recess the Presiding Judge Justice Artur Kujawa asked the defendant whether the documents contained in the dossiers of the case against Jerzy Popieluszko were known to the defendant.

Defendant Piotrowski: "They're known to me. The document which Your Honor had read is an excerpt from a record of questions and answers during a meeting between the primate and the clergy of the Warsaw Archdiocese, which was circulated in a large number of copies among the clergymen and in Warsaw. At

the same time, Your Honors, I wish to state that I misled you in one of my statements. The bill of indictment contains the statement that 'Piotrowski directed certain things with premeditation.' This word, 'premeditation,' pains me, because there was no premeditation. Hence also the question of what was my attitude toward Jerzy Popieluszko was answered by me as 'officially cool.' It was not officially cool. My attitude toward the whole of the problems was somewhat different. My work dealt with all kinds of instances of lawbreaking by the Roman Catholic clergy." (In this place defendant Piotrowski began to attack part of the Catholic clergy, particularly Archbishop G., Bishop T. and Bishop W. In connection with these imputations the Press Office of the Episcopate of Poland has issued a declaration which was published in the previous issue--Editors.)

Presiding judge: "At the same time, in reply to the proposals of the attorney for the prosecution, I wish to state that the Code of Penal Proceedings does not provide for protests. It may be that this term was uttered under the influence of yesterday's television film, but it does not apply to Polish procedure. Polish judicial procedure neither provides for nor designates the timing of the reading of such documents. For the correct manner of presentation of the matter, in order to demonstrate that the defendant does not tell the truth, documents that may serve as evidence thereof can be used. Hence, it was necessary to demonstrate from the documents of the proceedings conducted against the Rev Popieluszko that the defendant does not tell the truth. The defendant has now himself admitted that he did not tell the truth. At the same time, pursuant to the provisions in force, the court of venue decides just when may documents be read or made public. Therefore, the request of the attorneys for the prosecution has to be declined."

Attorney Olszewski asked to speak and said: "I wish to state that this situation has rendered it impossible for the parties to take a position on the Procurature's proposal concerning the documents that should be added to the material evidence, and also that it has disrupted the course of the trial and of the presentation of questions by the parties."

Presiding judge: "Defendant, there exist many contradictions between your testimony in this courtroom and the depositions you made during the pretrial examination."

Piotrowski: "Until 31 October I shirked the truth, owing to my psychological state."

Judge Maciejewski: "Was the defendant able to speak freely during the pretrial examination?"

Piotrowski: "Yes, insofar as my psychological state permitted."

Judge: "The defendant stated that he had plans regarding the Rev Popieluszko in the event of his abduction and placement in the bunker. He stated that he had intended to extract information from the Rev Popieluszko on a tape recorder. He didn't make any mention of this during his pretrial examination."

Presiding judge: "For example, what's the meaning of the expression 'jealous husband'?"

Piotrowski: "I had information on relations between Jerzy Popieluszko and a certain lady. I've proofs of their meetings at hotels and in apartments. I can even give her name if the Court so desires. It had seemed to me that I could blackmail Popieluszko."

Judge Maciejewski: "Is the defendant familiar with the subject of contacts with the clergy?"

Piotrowski: "I had such an idea, after it all happened. When Adam Pietruszka came forward with that initiative after reading the deposition of the witness who was in the same cell with me, I wanted to demand a confrontation with the Rev L. of Bialystok and the person who mentioned these contacts. It was then also that I conceived the idea that Adam Pietruszka was in some kind of configuration [as published] with the clergy."

Judge: "Was there agreement on the eventuality of death as a result of the pressure exerted on the Rev Popieluszko?"

Piotrowski: "No one has told me explicitly that Popieluszko had to die. That was solely my own interpretation of Adam Pietruszka's mention that Popieluszkó had a bad heart."

Judge: "What did the defendant himself know about the health condition of the Rev Popieluszko?"

Piotrowski: "I know that he had stomach trouble. I know that female physicians who were friends of his had him placed in a hospital. I even knew that the ordinator once wanted to remove him from that hospital. I knew that he was getting medical certificates in order to avoid having to show up for interrogation, and that these certificates were false because during that period Popieluszko was traveling throughout Poland. I didn't take the possibility of death into consideration, although something could always happen to the heart. I merely visualized such a situation."

Judge: "Why did the defendant assume that death might occur?"

Piotrowski: "At first, while the question of moral harassment or intimidation of Popieluszko was being considered, death was not mentioned. Later, when the idea of Popieluszko's possible death arose, I changed my position during the conversation I mentioned previously."

Judge: "Why did the defendant go to Pietruszka in search of safeguards?"

Piotrowski: "In order not to act under the marquee of the Security Service."

Judge: "The plan had been to abduct the priest and hide him for 2 or 3 days. Was the abduction to last that long?"

Piotrowski: "My codefendants in their testimonies did not make this distinction. They did not distinguish between ideas and plans, whereas in reality we toyed with various ideas, e.g., that of spreading the rumor that Popieluszko went underground in order to meet with Bujak [a Solidarity national leader]."

Judge: "There you were, two healthy and strong men. Couldn't you have coped with the priest without using a truncheon?"

Piotrowski: "Perhaps, if that were a normal, legal situation, but it wasn't. At the moment when we overtook the Golf I realized that the matter was beyond our technical possibilities."

Judge: "Then why didn't the defendant back out at that moment?"

Piotrowski: "The way it was, I couldn't anymore. Please don't expect logical answers from me."

Judge: "Did the defendant gag the priest?"

Piotrowski: "I've the impression that I did."

Judge: "Why didn't you place the priest on the rear seat as you had planned, and instead placed him in the trunk?"

Piotrowski: "There was such a plan, but I thought that if Chrostowski, who was sitting in the front seat, were to see us place the Rev Popieluszko on the rear seat, he might grab the steering wheel and cause an accident to our car. For purposes of camouflage we told Chrostowski that he, I mean the priest, had escaped."

Judge: "What does the defendant admit regarding Chrostowski?"

Piotrowski: "I'm employing legalese: I intended to deprive Waldemar Chrostowski of the possibility of freedom for the duration of several hours, until the morning. We were going to keep him tied up at the first suitable spot in the forest."

Judge: "Does the defendant believe that Chrostowski would be or was deprived of freedom?"

Piotrowski: "Of course, yes."

Judge: "Was the treatment of Chrostowski special harassment, or wasn't it?"

Piotrowski: "Legally perhaps yes, but I viewed it as relatively mild treatment. As for throwing that stone, I term it banditry; that's how I feel about it now. To the plaintiff this may be harassment. After all, I didn't want him to suffer any physical harm."

Judge: "Does the name 'M.' mean anything to the defendant?"

Piotrowski: "Yes, that's an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs."

Judge: "Did the defendant speak with that person after 19 October?"

Piotrowski: "I told him that I was involved in that affair but didn't do it [the murder]. It seems that I said something about the higher-ups. I said that I'd never have undertaken this in my life. [-----] [Censored---Translator's note] [Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised, 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204).]

Judge: "But there is a difference between what was stated during the pretrial examination by the defendant concerning his conversation with Adam Pietruszko and what the defendant is stating now at this trial."

Piotrowski: "I never considered seriously the formulation of a heart attack or a shove from a train, but I considered seriously that Adam Pietruszka considered the possibility of death. That idea of shoving [Popieluszko] from a [moving] train sounded not credible to me, but the possibility of a heart attack was a serious consideration to me."

Judge: "Would the defendant have carried out these activities without Adam Pietruszka's prompting?"

Piotrowski: "First, that would have been impossible owing to formal considerations, because then I couldn't have gone any farther than 100 km from Warsaw. Secondly, acting without the knowledge of one's superiors would be impossible. It would be difficult to call this 'prompting.' That was a task assigned to me."

Judge: "When did the defendant feel convinced that he was a murderer, and when did he abandon this conviction?"

Piotrowski: "Until the day when I learned about Prof Byrdy's autopsy report I had been convinced that I was a murderer and associated Popieluszko's death with the blows I dealt him. I had been convinced that Popieluszko died owing to these blows, because they were strong."

Judge: "Were the blows dealt with great force?"

Piotrowski: "I can't say. I don't know the strength of my own blows. I had struck rapidly, violently and strongly."

Judge: "What did the defendant think after he learned of the autopsy findings?"

Piotrowski: "I felt relieved. I don't want to describe my feelings any more closely."

Judge: "What's the defendant's attitude toward this matter at present?"

Piotrowski: "I believe that, despite everything, I'm still a normal person and react normally to evil. We all are standing here today stripped of all pride and dignity. Of a certainty I'm to some extent guilty of that death. I'm also guilty of causing pain to a mother to whom no one can restore her son. I no longer dare to ask forgiveness. I'm guilty of the death [in the civil sense] of three functionaries who conducted the investigation and lost their lives: there are my codefendants. Waldemar Chmielewski was a normal, healthy male whose child is about to be born. Leszek Pekala enjoyed a normal life, was a normal young man. It's difficult for me to consider that my children will have to change their last name in order to avoid unintended cruelty from other children. At any rate, a verdict on me will be declared in this courtroom, but this verdict will no longer affect me, because I died as of 19 October 1984, and civil death is sometimes worse than physical death."

The court adjourned the trial till 10 January 1985.

10 January 1985, 9th Day of the Trial

Grzegorz Piotrowski continues his testimony. He is being cross-examined by Judge Maciejewski.

Judge: "Does the defendant have a criminal record?"

Piotrowski: "Other accusations have been made against me. There was the accusation that I agreed to fix a passport in return for the repair of a car."

Judge: "Were other measures planned against the Rev Popieluszko prior to 13 October?"

Piotrowski: "Yes. We considered other possibilities [-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)].

Judge: "Were other actions taken even earlier?"

Piotrowski: "As far back as a year ago we attempted to destroy the car by causing its mechanical damage."

Judge: "What were your relations with Adam Pietruszka?"

Piotrowski: "Pretty good. There wasn't any special animosity. I regarded Adam Pietruszka as a superior with an extremely high intellect, ability to relate facts and rapidity of reaction. There was never any conflict between us."

Judge: "Was the defendant Adam Pietruszka instrumental in obtaining awards for the defendant?"

Piotrowski: "I don't know who proposed the awards."

Presiding judge: "Did the defendant receive awards?"

Piotrowski: "Yes."

Judge: "Could decisions on granting awards to the defendant be taken without the participation of Adam Pietruszka?"

Piotrowski: "No, that was rather impossible."

Judge Debkiewicz: "Until what moment does the defendant decline to testify?"

Piotrowski: "After buying the oil at the CPN [gasoline] station."

Judge Debkiewicz: "Until that moment did the defendant hear the Rev Popieluszko struggle in the trunk?"

Piotrowski: "Yes. Just before stopping at the CPN station these sounds were heard."

Judge Debkiewicz: "In the defendant's opinion, what was the cause of the death of the Rev Popieluszko according to present-day knowledge?"

Piotrowski: "It seems to me, suffocation."

Judge Debkiewicz: "And what used to be the defendant's opinion?"

Piotrowski: "It had seemed to me that he died owing to my blows."

Judge Debkiewicz: "When did the defendant have his last physical contact with the Rev Popieluszko?"

Piotrowski: "I'm convinced that it was the last time we had stopped, when we jointly placed the Rev Popieluszko in the trunk."

Judge Debkiewicz: "The assumption was that the Rev Popieluszko should be kept as healthy as possible. How does the defendant account for his failure to respond to the excesses of his subordinates, which conflicted with that assumption?"

Piotrowski: "It's difficult for me to speak of any excesses. I didn't witness the moment when and how he was tied up and what caused his death. As I stated before, after Torun I said that I couldn't touch him again."

Judge Debkiewicz: "Why was the Rev Popieluszko stopped in the environs of Gorsk considering that the place where he was to be kept was 200 km distant?"

Piotrowski: "It seems to me that it was because if we had not overtaken him then, Chrostowski would realize that he was under constant surveillance."

Judge Debkiewicz: "Why didn't you have Popieluszko sit next to you in accordance with the original plan?"

Piotrowski: "There was such an assumption, but when it was time to carry it out a car was approaching and we had to act quickly, so we threw him into the trunk. Secondly, we didn't want Chrostowski to realize that ours were lawless actions."

Judge Debkiewicz: "What about frightening Chrostowski with a gun?"

Piotrowski: "It seems to me that there is a great deal of weapons in the hands of the underground."

Judge Debkiewicz: "Why didn't you use another gun as an instrument for intimidating the Rev Popieluszko?"

Piotrowski: "I don't know how to explain it."

Judge Debkiewicz: "During the ride it was cautioned that someone could be identified by Chrostowski."

Piotrowski: "It was Pekala who mentioned this."

Judge Debkiewicz: "Didn't you expect it earlier? Chrostowski already knew Pekala and Chmielewski, or at least Pekala. Why didn't you think of it earlier?"

Piotrowski: "Leszek had taken part in the search [of Popieluszko's] apartment a year ago. That's a fact that I had forgotten about at the time."

Judge Debkiewicz: "After the Rev Popieluszko's detention, was the idea of his physical liquidation considered?"

Piotrowski: "There was only the intention to conceal his body. A different idea was conceived only in the last stage."

The court read in this connection a passage from the defendant's pretrial deposition from which it ensues that defendant Piotrowski had stated that while the physical liquidation of the Rev Popieluszko was not presumed at first, it was decided upon owing to several factors. One of these factors was the possibility of pursuit following Chrostowski's escape; another was Popieluszko's escape attempt; and a third was the militia road check. All these factors caused anxiety and generated various ideas. An argument in favor of Popieluszko's liquidation was that Chmielewski and Pekala were known to Popieluszko.

Presiding judge: "There was mention of a 'top' [higher-ups] which approved this. When did the defendant conclude that there was no such 'top'?"

Piotrowski: "All that time I had been convinced of its acceptance. The first moment of doubt I felt occurred already following the return from Bydgoszcz."

Presiding judge: "Did the Ministry of Internal Affairs have only that dilapidated Fiat at its disposal? Didn't it have better cars? Did you have to borrow handcuffs? Couldn't you have procured the uniform in a different manner? Didn't that suggest to you that no one was helping you after all, that the 'top' wasn't giving you anything? And another question: Did Adam Pietruszka, the superior of chief Piotrowski, warn him about bugging? If the 'top' was supposed to approve of your activities, how come the bugging?"

Piotrowski: "When Adam Pietruszka warned me against talking inside the offices, I realized that something was wrong. Evidently, I sensed that Adam Pietruszka was also scared. There was no time left for me to ask about that 'top.' And as for the gear, cars, handcuffs, etc., that didn't seem suspect to me, because the point was not to leave clues leading to other departments of our ministry, clues that would be practically the equivalent of leaving a visiting card. At the time that hadn't seemed suspect to me."

Prosecutor: "When did the defendant realize that Pietruszka was scared, how did he realize that there was no 'top'? [-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)]. Why did the defendant hand an untrue statement to Pietruszka considering that a [true] statement was demanded by P.?"

Piotrowski: "Pietruszka entered as I was writing that statement. He read it, picked it up and said it was fine. We said nothing else to each other at the time."

Prosecutor: "What was the defendant's attitude toward his superior?"

Piotrowski: "It was unequivocal. The question of loyalty was fundamental. I never went over his head in case of controversial decisions. I didn't consult Gen P. or higher-ups about Pietruszka's orders. I realized that the whole operation was an operation aimed against the ministry, against the superiors; that was the finale that took place. But I was convinced that I acted in accordance with Pietruszka's orders."

Judge: "Is it possible to undertake illegal actions, actions that are criminal under the penal code? Is that in the interest of the ministry and the state?"

Piotrowski: "It seemed to me that this operation was the lesser evil compared with Popieluszko's activities."

Prosecutor: "Didn't you consider it possible to initiate legal proceedings against the Rev Popieluszko?"

Piotrowski: "For many months I had been proposing such proceedings. The procurature did not accept our legal evaluations of Popieluszko's utterances. The only proceedings we succeeded in initiating were against Jerzy Popieluszko and Henryk Jankowski of Gdansk. Never, for example, did we succeed in

initiating proceedings against Rev J. of Nowa Huta."

Prosecutor: "It's my understanding that the defendant commenced his own private investigation."

Piotrowski: "That is your own idea, sir. I decline to answer this question."

Prosecutor: "What did the defendant do in order to conduct that planned talk with the Rev Popieluszko?"

Piotrowski: "I made preparations. I collected the material needed for that talk. I took along a tape recorder."

Prosecutor: "Who killed the Rev Popieluszko?"

Piotrowski: "I don't know."

Prosecutor: "Your plan presupposed an abduction. Why didn't you lead the Rev Popieluszko to the bunker?"

Piotrowski: "Unforeseen circumstances occurred. The principal circumstance was that he died."

Prosecutor: "The defendant said something about the delicacy of his feelings."

Piotrowski: "I don't recall having made this statement."

Prosecutor: "What was the purpose for which the defendant beat Popieluszko so hard that he had even thought this to be cause of the priest's death?"

Piotrowski: "I struck Popieluszko to neutralize him. In the course of my blows I rendered him unconscious. I had had the conviction that he may have died owing to these blows."

Prosecutor: "Is the defendant familiar with the autopsy report of the Forensic Medicine Laboratory?"

Piotrowski: "Yes."

Prosecutor: "Will the defendant comment on the traces of the beating as described in that report?"

Piotrowski: "They don't conflict with my deposition."

The court read an excerpt from Piotrowski's pretrial deposition in which he stated that he asked [in the car] whether Popieluszko was still alive.

Judge: "Does the defendant agree with the statement that he was, after all, the leader of this operation?"

Piotrowski: "I would say that I was the strongest personality. Earlier I told my associates that there would be no superiors [during that operation], that we all were equal. Our tasks were performed collectively."

Judge: "The defendant heard his codefendants say that he issued instructions--let's call them requests--pointed out the route, etc."

Piotrowski: "It so happened that I led and that I specified what route we were to follow. This could have been equally well done by Pekala if he were in my seat. However, any objection I'd have made would have been followed. I would term as periodic passivity this behavior of my associates."

The judge read an excerpt from the defendant's pretrial deposition in which he stated that he remembers only three moments: Torun, the CPN station and the tying up of the Rev Popieluszko. There was also a moment when the Rev Popieluszko moved inside the trunk. They then stopped and Pekala together with Chmielewski tightened the priest's bonds. Chmielewski apparently said that shooting the priest dead was more likely than bringing him to Warsaw. Pekala also mentioned that out of fear he began to choke Popieluszko."

Piotrowski: "It seems to me that this conversation about choking occurred later, probably only after the car was halted and while I was adjusting the gag. There was also the situation with the gun, but the only purpose was that Popieluszko would hear it and feel scared."

The court read another excerpt from the pretrial deposition of the defendant Piotrowski, in which he stated that at the moment when the decision on Popieluszko's death was taken he did not think that the ministry would care. At the time he had been greatly frightened. That was an obvious decision. He didn't consider himself a killer because he killed the Rev Popieluszko only out of fear.

Piotrowski: "I admit having made this statement. I had believed that I caused the death of the Rev Popieluszko. However, to use a terminology that is routine to me, [first degree] murder is associated with premeditation, and this is unacceptable to me. In sum, what happened was that I became dominated by fear."

Prosecutor: "The defendant stated that Popieluszko was exterminated, and that this was an obvious accident. What do you mean by 'accident'?"

Piotrowski: "By 'accident' I mean an unforeseen event."

Prosecutor: "The defendant stated that he used jargon expressions during his conversation with Adam Pietruszka, i.e., instead of 'harassment' he said 'processing.' He said this with reference to the bunker. Is that true?"

Piotrowski: "Yes, it is. I did speak thus. I wish to stress that my deposition was not literal but merely a paraphrasing of the events and the words uttered during these conversations."

The prosecutor next read an excerpt from the defendant's deposition from which it ensues that the defendant said that it would be a bandit attack, that the higher-ups planned this operation and he did not want to harm the ministry.

Piotrowski: "Yes, I stated so. I was thinking of a temporary abduction that could be so organized as to conceal the traces of the SB's [Security Service's] hand behind it."

The judge asked the attorneys for the prosecution whether they had any questions.

Piotrowski: "Your Honors, I wish to avail myself of my right to decline to testify and I shall not answer the questions of the attorneys for the prosecution, because I know these gentlemen well and can tell what they will ask me."

Attorney Grabinski: "Your Honors, there is no provision for this situation in the procedural rules. The defendant has no right to stop the parties from asking questions."

The prosecutor declared in reply that at any rate the defendant has the right to decline to testify, but it is up to the court to decide on this matter.

The attorney for the defendant, Attorney Ilasz, declared that, pursuant to Article 63 of the Code of Penal Proceedings, a defendant has the right to decline to testify and to decline to answer particular questions without stating his reasons. Therefore, the defendant has the right to avail himself of the rights to which he is entitled, which are inviolable, and he is not dutybound to answer any question asked by the attorneys for the prosecution and, in his opinion, the opinion offered by the attorney for the prosecution is inconsonant with this regulation.

Attorney Grabinski declared that the defendant has the right to decline to testify, and he also has the right to decline answering questions, but that should be clearly stated. However, the defendant has no right whatsoever to exclude any party from the trial. He cannot declare that he is going to discriminate against any one party. Furthermore, he added that the defendant has stated several times that he declined to testify, but thereupon he did testify concerning the same circumstances, that is, he took a completely opposite position.

The attorney for the defendant, Attorney Ilasz, claimed that the interpretation offered by the attorney for the prosecution is completely arbitrary. He further stated: "I myself believe that the defendant has the right to decline to answer any question whatsoever of the attorneys for the prosecution, which does not mean that the defendant will not answer my questions."

Prosecutor: "The defendant has the inviolable right to decline to testify, but this does not mean excluding a party from participation in the trial, considering that the party continues to participate in it."

Following the exchange of these opinions, the court decided to declare a recess.

After the recess the defendant arose and made a statement.

Piotrowski: "I simply wanted to avail myself of my right if I could. I don't know whether Your Honors have completed reading the dossier."

Presiding judge. "Yes."

Piotrowski: "I wanted to avail myself in general, beginning with this moment, of the right to decline to testify any further. With the exception, if such an exception can be made, of answering the questions of my own attorney. I wanted, if that is possible, with a literally single sentence, to refer to...."

Presiding judge: "There can be no such exception."

Testimony of Adam Pietruszka

The presiding judge asked the defendant Adam Pietruszka to testify. He asked the defendant Adam Pietruszka whether he understood the accusation in the bill of indictment.

Defendant Adam Pietruszka said that, yes, he understood the accusation in the bill of indictment.

The presiding judge asked whether the defendant admits perpetrating the deed of which he is accused, and whether he pleads guilty.

Defendant Adam Pietruszka: "I don't plead guilty, and I don't admit perpetrating the deed of which I'm accused. The accusation is based in its entirety on the imputations of the defendant Piotrowski."

Next, the judge-adviser, Judge Maciejewski, declared that in view of the doubts expressed by the mass media concerning the sequence in which the defendants have been cross-examined, he wishes to explain that the reason for choosing this sequence was that the defendant, who according to the testimonies of other defendants is supposed to be the "head" of it all, would be enabled to take a position on the entirety of the testimonies made by the other defendants in the courtroom. At the same time, he asked the defendant Adam Pietruszka to comment during his testimony on the statements made by his codefendants.

After that, he asked the defendant Adam Pietruszka to briefly describe his background, education and employment.

Adam Pietruszka: "In 1952 I completed elementary school. Then I started attending a mechanics technikum in Kalisz. Since our entire school transferred to Poznan and was renamed a railroad technikum, I completed the technikum in that city. Following my graduation, in 1956, I became employed at the Directorate of State Railroads in Szczecin. Subsequently I did my military service, and afterward I returned to my previous place of employment. In 1961 I enlisted in MO [Citizens' Militia] and SB [Security Service]. From then on until the day of my arrest I had been a functionary of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At first I worked in Szczecin, but later I was officially transferred to Warsaw, to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as a deputy department chief. I became deputy director in 1980.

"It seems to me that at the time when I started working there Chmielewski was not yet an employee. In this place I wish to add that Waldemar Chmielewski graduated from a militia officer school in Szczytno. In principle, that school is designed for employees who are to work in militia agencies. I have known Waldemar Chmielewski since the second generation, so to speak, because his father works in my department. Proceeding from these premises, and since I know both his father and Waldemar Chmielewski, I proposed to Gen P. that Waldemar Chmielewski be accepted for work in our department, and that such a change of generations occur. My opinion of Waldemar Chmielewski can be contained in one sentence: he's an absolutely model employee so far as the performance of his duties, discipline, life in the collective and relations with his superiors are concerned. He had worked for me for about 2 or 3 years. Gen P approved my request and Waldemar Chmielewski was accepted for work at our department too.

"Grzegorz Piotrowski came to us as deputy section chief from the Lodz Province Headquarters. By that time I was probably already a deputy director. Grzegorz Piotrowski held the post of deputy section chief for about one year and half. Later he was transferred to another section as its chief. The reasons for his transfer were as follows: First, Grzegorz Piotrowski started work with us as a very young man and junior in rank. This created natural barriers of age and rank between Grzegorz Piotrowski and the entire remaining personnel of our section. [-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)]. This led to natural and understandable friction and difficulties in performance of work. Another reason why Piotrowski was transferred to the post of chief of another section was because his new section was easier. It was said at the time that he should go and win his spurs. That was also to me a kind of relief, the solution of a difficult situation. Perhaps the reason for these various difficulties was that Piotrowski advanced so rapidly and at such a youthful age. These were sometimes the opinions of frustrated persons. To be sure, I don't share these opinions, but they did exist. That transfer was not my idea, but basically I was content with it. Subsequently, after several months, Grzegorz Piotrowski returned to our department, a department over which I exercised substantive supervision, and became its chief. It is difficult for me to evaluate an individual with as rich a personality as Grzegorz Piotrowski. He displays a number of positive traits such as immediacy of action and absolute devotion to the Service. Grzegorz Piotrowski

never resorted to saying that he was tired or did not have the time to perform an assignment. Grzegorz Piotrowski placed great stress on his performance, his personal commitment to his work. On the other hand, he devoted little attention to the supervisory, inspirational or monitoring functions he was supposed to exercise by virtue of his post. He himself used to say that scribbling and office chores bored him. Grzegorz Piotrowski is a relatively young man and in his further work he was able to compensate for these shortcomings. This answers the question of his promotions and good standing. Because these traits reliably indicated that he would in time become a good chief. Because one has to believe in man. Because there was nothing else for us [to believe in]. Piotrowski also displayed a certain trait which could be termed self-will, but previously I had looked at this differently. Objectively speaking, there may have been his tendency toward a certain insubordination. But this could have been termed otherwise, as it only verged on insubordination and involved only isolated instances. It happened that he would fail to perform a particular task in time and on schedule, but he would then provide an explanation. Now in our work it is difficult to establish precisely whether an assignment could not be or was not performed. As for the day of 13 October, he arbitrarily altered the purpose of the trip to Gdansk and in this connection failed to perform the assignment. He informed me subsequently rather than immediately of the change in purpose and task. He had no right to make that change. In conversations with my superior I often raised the question of transferring Grzegorz Piotrowski to another department because, in view of his personal traits, a part of the work that should normally be performed by his section was taken over by another section. I was concerned about this, but unfortunately the realities of personnel policy were against it. It is quite difficult to find a chief, because that is a post whose holder is expected to be available on a regular round-the-clock basis. As he said himself, there are no Saturdays or Sundays. Sundays merely exist on the calendar. Absolute devotion to the Service has to be decided upon. At that time there were no possibilities for working in shifts.

"As for Leszek Pekala, my contacts with him were limited. I based myself chiefly on the opinion of Grzegorz Piotrowski, who said that he had a good opinion of him. I've very little direct knowledge of him. Besides, I have never received negative evaluations regarding him. The chief was subordinate to me, and I was subordinate to the Department Director Gen P.

"And now I wish to point to the scale and importance of the phenomenon, the importance of the matter conventionally linked to the Rev Popieluszko. I understand that following 20 October opinion has been rather focused on this subject. There is the unequivocal assessment of the consequences of this tragedy, the unequivocal assessment of the political consequences of this event. But I wish to explain how I had viewed this in the past.

"There are some 15 or so priests of Popieluszko's type in this country. A type of priests who wear the cross on their chest and wear singleminded hatred in their heart and express this hatred by exploiting their priestly functions, priests who desire to involve the faithful in this. As can be seen, despite their efforts, they fail to accomplish the results they expect. This has been mainly a local rather than a central problem.

"Grzegorz Piotrowski exercised supervisory duties, as otherwise he would have attended to this matter personally. These duties included a problem, let's call it the problem of the Rev Popieluszko. On the national scale that was a minor problem and, in my opinion, it was justly handled by the province offices of internal affairs, in this case by the Office of Internal Affairs for the Nation's Capital (SUSW). That may account for the scale of this phenomenon, the ranking of concerns of this kind.

"I'll now discuss the heart of the matter. On about 20 September I asked Chief W. of the SUSW and Grzegorz Piotrowski to appear in my office. The reason for this meeting, let's call it a conference, was the question of hostile public utterances by priests, and more precisely the subject of the meeting was 'Effectiveness of our countermeasures regarding the politically harmful public utterances of priests in the Warsaw area.' Hence the need for such a meeting. During August and September a growth in sermons of this type, in the organization of prayers for the fatherland, and organization of prayers in connection with the anniversary of the Hitlerite aggression against Poland, had been observed. I wish to add here that these prayers for the fatherland and anniversary prayers bore deceptive names. Your Honors, these prayers in reality turned into political quasi-meetings, let alone the nature of the utterances made from the pulpit. These prayers were, as a rule, followed by definite aggressive behavior of--I don't want to employ the term 'the faithful,' because I wouldn't want to insult authentically believing individuals--the persons leaving the church. Because I understand and assume, perhaps too hastily, perhaps too much a priori, that persons of authentic faith did not take part in these subsequent excesses. All this was the rationale of that meeting, or of that conference. I began to utter aloud my reflections by considering the necessity of securing [i.e., preventing] the public utterances of the Rev Malkowski. In this connection, I raised the following issues: I declared that the need to secure these public utterances ensues in particular from these matters, and above all from the unambiguously harmful nature of the utterances of the Rev Malkowski concerning the political sphere. Unambiguously harmful, not in order to indulge in empty phraseology but because to the Rev Malkowski comparing our sociosystemic reality with the most totalitarian systems of society, comparing our reality with fascism would be, I would say, still a comparatively euphemistic comparison--of course, as he viewed this. Aside from this, I raised the next issue, which concerned the reasons for this kind of concern, i.e., the elements of hatred, elements of hatred toward persons thinking differently, elements of hatred toward persons not associated with the Church, and particularly elements of hatred toward persons associated not only with what I would term the Marxist world outlook.

"We availed ourselves, Your Honors, of the opinions of other people, opinions of priests-professors from ecclesiastical educational institutions as important as the Academy of Catholic Theology, or even of the opinions of priests-professors working at the Papal Theological Academy in Krakow. They were persons representing such disciplines as homiletics, Bible study, exegesis or also canonical law. And hence this was not some well-meaning or--let's call it so, without imputing anything to that term--a kind of

parochialism; they were assessments and opinions on the sermons of the Rev Popieluszko and the Rev Malkowski and other priests, for which there is no need to describe them in this place, because they are unrelated to this case. Your Honors, the point is that the unanimous gist of these opinions was that such utterances explicitly violate doctrinal principles. They all in unison concluded, employing such an integral concept, that after all from these doctrinal principles ensues the saying and the behest, 'Love your enemies.' I presented arguments of this kind at that meeting, stating the need for a more active surveillance of the Rev Malkowski's political utterances, legal evaluation of the wording of these sermons, and utilization of that wording for protest actions. At that time Grzegorz Piotrowski of course agreed with this view, but he claimed that, in his opinion, the emphasis should rather be placed on the Rev Popieluszko. One of the reasons he gave was that if we begin with the Rev Malkowski then the Rev Popieluszko would become more active in order to relieve, as it were, the Rev Malkowski. This view of Grzegorz Piotrowski was supported by Chief W., with whom I also agreed, and it was established that Chief W. would tighten the surveillance over the public statements of the Rev Popieluszko and pay greater attention to recording the entire course of those prayers and their consequences. It was also established that assistance of this kind would be provided to W. by Chief Piotrowski, but in view of the post and duties then held by Piotrowski, that assistance would, by a kind of mental exercise, reduce more to intellectual rather than material assistance. That was because Piotrowski had at his disposal a dilapidated car, whereas W. had two cars and was thus better situated. That intellectual assistance was to reduce to assessing the priests' utterances more strongly and energetically and then protesting against them.

"Also at that meeting I formulated the view, with which both Piotrowski and W. agreed, that the Rev Popieluszko would relinquish, or, let us say more realistically, curtail his politically harmful activities only in the presence of the simultaneous operation of three assumptions. The first assumption was that he must be made sensible of a genuine pressure, a genuine danger owing to his abuse of priestly duties for politically harmful purposes. The second assumption was that the genuineness of that pressure, of that danger, would exist only if it came from the superiors of the Rev Popieluszko, i.e., the Warsaw bishops or even Cardinal Glemp. And the third assumption was, let us stress it more strongly, that a campaign of protests addressed to the representatives of the Church was to serve to extort these measures. That campaign of protests was to be, so to speak, organized in a twofold manner, i.e., on the one hand, Chief W. would intervene with the Warsaw Curia through the mediation of the Office of Religious Denominations, Capital City of Warsaw, and on the other we would intervene with the Episcopate, that is to say, the Secretariat of the Episcopate, also through the mediation of the Office for Religious Denominations. At that conference it was also established that in the course of daily surveillance activities Chief W. was to pay attention to obtaining material compromising the Rev Popieluszko, material like the finding we once made that, in addition to his apartment in the rectory, Popieluszko owned a private apartment in Warsaw. This fact, supported by a press article whose heading I remember well, "The Bachelor Apartment ["Garconniere"] of the Rev Popieluszko," created an unfavorable climate around the Rev Popieluszko, generating comments such as how could it happen

considering that there are families with a severe housing problem who are still awaiting the allocation of an apartment, whereas that priest, one of whose attributes should have been a distinctively construed poverty, owns an apartment in the city. Besides, judging from the scanty information at our disposal, the question of the poverty of clergymen is a myth, at least in Poland. Such was the entire range of our concerns and means discussed at that meeting.

"As subsequent experience showed, that assumption was justified, because, as I read in TRYBUNA LUDU after I had already been arrested, Cardinal Glemp forbade the Rev. Malkowski to preach sermons. I don't pretend to the name of a prophet, but even then I had knowledge of the Rev. Jankowski who, after making guest utterances in Warsaw was, as I have been informed, forbidden to preach sermons on the territory of the Warsaw Archdiocese. This opinion provided to me an inspiration for the matter and the question of the Rev. Popieluszko.

"Neither at that conference nor at any other meeting concerning the matter of the Rev. Popieluszko, was there any recommendation made for using physical force on the Rev. Popieluszko. There was not any such recommendation for two reasons, which are no mere empty phrases. First, because, being educated under the rigors of socialist humanism, we adhere to the principle that, while the political enemy should be combatted, this should be done only by means of political and social argument, that is, by means of a particular reasoning rather than of coercion or the fist. Secondly, while that first reason may be considered a powerful moral imperative, the second reason derives from the legal sphere of prohibitions and orders dictated by our basic operational principles: the principle of legality, the principle of objectivity, the principle of effectiveness, and the principle of secrecy of action. If only for the reasons relating to these two domains, no recommendations of this type could have been made.

"Now let me describe the conference with General P., which took place early in October. I also wish to take a position on two factors mentioned by Piotrowski: that 4 million [zlotys] in Popieluszko's home. Amazed and astonished, I began to listen to his words, because I as his former superior should have known something about this. But this was to me a kind of revelation. Who else in addition to Piotrowski may have known of it? And why didn't I know of it? Moreover, the supposition that the investigation was not comprehensive also was a revelation to me. My competences were as ensuing from my duties. I'm not familiar with any instances of lawbreaking by persons in whom we were officially interested (and I don't mean the clergy alone) which have not met with the proper response. After all, the penal code is not always immediately involved every time. There are matters which are conditioned by the principles of our state's religious policy.

"As regards the possession of compromising material about some romance between the Rev. Popieluszko and a woman, Grzegorz Piotrowski did indeed have material of this kind but inasmuch as that person had subsequently entered into matrimony, and to us the institution of matrimony, the institution of the permanence of wedlock, is a supreme good, Grzegorz Piotrowski was instructed to destroy that material. It couldn't be utilized.

"In late September or early October a conference was held in Gen P.'s office with an out-of-town chief concerning the harmfulness of the political utterances of priests. Those present included Chief W. At that conference, which was presided over by Gen P., those present included W., Piotrowski and myself. Utilizing the general's presence and the occasion of the conference, I pointed to the consideration that, as regards the attitude and activities of the Rev Popieluszko, we had not achieved the results we expected. Following these statements, Gen P. did not oppose what I said and did not take a different view. Because one of our principles is the principle of effectiveness. This meant repeated pressure on Chief W. and not on Piotrowski, because the question of Popieluszko, or of other priests from the Warsaw area, as regards their hostile utterances, was neither the sole nor the dominant topic. So much for that conference, in my opinion. Until 13 October there were no other conferences of this kind.

"I wouldn't want to avoid an unequivocal answer; the topics considered at the conference were presented unequivocally, but in our everyday contacts we had to report what the conference yielded, how the matter was progressing. Those were the ordinary daily work reports. The statements I made to the effect that an end should finally be put to the Rev Popieluszko's activities, that our actions should border at a collapse, but not in the medical or mining sense, were made between 15 and 19 October.

"Since I myself have experienced a cardiac arrest, the terms I used derive from my own experience. I did actually employ such terms. I didn't speak to Piotrowski about a shove from a train. That's an untrue statement by Piotrowski. Had I really said it, Piotrowski should have gone to Gen P. and told him that Pietruszka was crazy. I never uttered such words.

"Sometime after 6 October--a memorable date to us--following the militia and SB holiday, I discussed with Piotrowski the need to make a trip to Gdansk about a matter unrelated to the Rev Popieluszko, absolutely unrelated. At that time no specific information about any trip by Popieluszko to Gdansk was available. First fact: Deputy D. and employee Z. rushed on October 13 to Gen P. with the electrifying news that Popieluszko was going to Gdansk. That was at noon. Piotrowski's declaration that he traveled [to Gdansk] exclusively for that purpose is a deliberate untruth. That formula was at least geared to the fact that I was aware of or approved certain matters. The purpose of Piotrowski's trip to Gdansk was to act as an advance emissary. He was to perform an inspection in order to subsequently relieve D., after the latter's arrival, from exclusive reliance on the opinion of the local department [of the SB]. After discussing that matter I told him that he should decide when it would be convenient for him to depart. He answered that it was fine with him. I told him: 'Speak with the people in the other departments who are conversant with the matter.' He came on 12 October with an instruction which I signed. I gave him a 'W' pass exempting him from road checks.

"What Pekala said concerning that pass and how he picked it up corresponds to truth. Since Pekala claims that I wished him success, I may have done so, impulsively. Pekala may have construed the whole scenario presented by

Piotrowski as meaning that it had been secretly approved [at the top]. It was only on becoming acquainted with the results of the pretrial investigation that I learned that Waldemar Chmielewski also went to Gdansk. In conversations with me Piotrowski said that he was taking along Pekala because he could be useful or needed on the spot. Piotrowski didn't mention to me at all that he was also taking along Waldemar Chmielewski to Gdansk.

"On 15 October I summoned Grzegorz Piotrowski and asked him to report on his trip. Already at the outset it turned out that Piotrowski altered the purpose of the trip. He claimed that on departing in the morning he had received the news that the Rev Popieluszko was traveling in that direction and, in view of the previous conference and his cooperation with W., he decided to get involved. Early during my pretrial examination, at the moment of my arrest, I answered negatively to the question about Gdansk and Popieluszko. I was asked whether Piotrowski had traveled to Gdansk in connection with Popieluszko, and I answered no. That was because, first, I was aware the real purpose of that trip and second, he denied having met Popieluszko, so that was why I answered no. Only after an arduous attempt to reconstruct the whole thing in my memory I remembered what I had said to Piotrowski: 'Piotrowski, aside from self-will and official consequences, this is a violation; but tell me about your stay and that of Popieluszko [in Gdansk].' Piotrowski didn't elaborate on the topic. He said that he missed Popieluszko, failed to find him, and there was nothing to talk about. Today I understand what he meant, but at the time what he said was meaningless to me. In our further conversation the word 'trouble' was used; I realized that they missed the prayer service that was to be attended by the Rev Popieluszko. At the time I interpreted the change in the purpose of the trip as Piotrowski's desire to help W., a desire to report to W. about the climate and course of the prayer service at the church whose rector is the Rev Jankowski, as a desire to report on the negative or attractive elements of the church services that might help make W.'s protest stronger. Piotrowski no longer spoke of any individuals.

"Of course, during that confrontation Grzegorz Piotrowski claimed that it was not possible to provide his superiors with a less than complete answer, that supposedly he had reported to me in detail on the whole matter linked to his trip to Gdansk. On the basis of facts alone his claim can be very readily demolished. He didn't refuse to answer, but he talked all kind of nonsense in the same way as he did after 19 October. Gen P., too, did not say anything about the course of events [-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 204)]. Another aspect of that trip to Gdansk is that while I may be accused of many things such as a sloppy manner of dressing or sloppy management, from the methodological standpoint it is unacceptable for me to approve an operation that culminates in placing the Rev Popieluszko in the car. There is no room for it in the basic methods of the organization of work. Am I supposed to give my consent to this type of operation in which a participant is Waldemar Chmielewski, an employee whose father is more than a friend to me? Am I supposed to assign him to such an operation? I understand that a converse reasoning is possible, but my relationship with Chmielewski Sr. would make such a thing unacceptable to me.

"Now about the particular meeting which took place in the presence of W. I asked Chief W. to come, and I also asked Chief Piotrowski to come, because it was related to the activities of the Rev Popieluszko, on which some stress was placed at that meeting. Piotrowski did not comment or advise on or object to the presence of Chief W., contrary to what he said. At that meeting I was able to state that it is finally time to put an end to the activities of the Rev Popieluszko, because our superiors were interested in the matter.

"A material proof of the interest shown by the higher-ups was their acceptance of all the information transmitted to the Office for Religious Denominations--information that also concerned activities of priests of that type. The Office for Religious Denominations then dispatched 'pro memoria' protest letters to the Episcopate concerning such activities of the priests and the need to cease them.

"A material proof of the interest shown by the higher-ups in these matters was that, in the more drastic instances of this kind, the protest letters addressed to the Episcopate or to particular bishops were signed by the deputy minister supervising the work of our department. Basing myself on these facts, I formulated the opinion that our superiors were interested in this matter. I didn't employ terms like 'the top' as my subordinates construed them, because I too regarded myself as '[among] the top' [one of the higher-ups] within the ministry, perhaps immodestly. In this connection, all these questions evaluating the decision as that of the political 'top' are unacceptable to me.

"During the trial I noticed that, even with respect to the pretrial investigation, so much has been said about this operation, so many comments and fears sprang up like mushrooms after a rain, that I wish to state in general that these things are untrue and are merely intended to confirm the theory advocated by Piotrowski.

"On 19 October, in addition to the routine morning meeting with Gen P., after discussing matters that occurred the night before, I deputized for Gen P. in his office while he had left it. That was necessary because his office was the center of all the means of communication and received information relating to the department's activities. That is a highly time-consuming chore which necessitates limiting the number of visitors received.

"I wish to state that on 19 October I did not assign Piotrowski to Bydgoszcz. First, as far as I know, the department hadn't even received any information from Bydgoszcz about the arrival of the Rev Popieluszko. I didn't know about his departure. In such cases a department chief is not dispatched from the central office, because they are properly attended to by the local office of internal affairs. The doubts mentioned by Piotrowski concerning the trip to Bydgoszcz were insubstantial for these several reasons.

"I learned of the Rev Popieluszko's departure for Bydgoszcz only the next day, i.e., on 20 October, although on 19 October I had been on duty; I was a the so-called director on duty, until October 22, but no such report had arrived earlier.

"On 20 October, i.e., on Saturday, Gen P. called me in the morning and asked me to come to the office quickly because something happened to the Rev Popieluszko. That was all he said, and he instructed me to show up.

"After I arrived, I entered my office at the same time as did Grzegorz Piotrowski, who was carrying a folder containing a 'W' pass. He said that he had to go on an out-of-town trip and got the pass from W., but nothing came of it. I took the pass and asked him whether he knew what happened to the Rev. Popieluszko, because the general was summoning me. He said tersely that he didn't know. The secretary said that the general was expecting me, so I left.

"When I entered the general's office, P. stated that Popieluszko was abducted and showed me the information received from Torun, which contained a preliminary description of the event as narrated by Chrostowski. Thereupon, if I recall correctly, other deputies, or at least one, had arrived. Gen P. telephoned Piotrowski and asked whether he knew about the matter. He probably also asked for an evaluation. Piotrowski said that this was new to him and that he didn't know anything about it. But that conversation didn't last one hour, contrary to what Piotrowski stated, because the general ordered all the chiefs to show up, including also Piotrowski. He presented the information based on the data in his possession and issued the following orders: identify the KZC license tag numbers, explore the views of the ecclesiastical community on this fact, and explore the opinions and views of other milieux concerning this event."

The attorney for the defendant, Attorney Marczuk, asked the court to order a recess owing to the poor state of health of the defendant.

11 January 1985, 10th Day of Trial

Defendant Adam Pietruszka resumed his testimony:

"We also drafted a communique for television. It would be untrue to say that the fact that Piotrowski took the pass from the driver didn't arouse deep suspicions. I learned about this fact in the morning, when Piotrowski came to my office to return the pass to me. He said that he took it from W. for a trip that wasn't made. I didn't record the driver's story about this incident. Besides, I talked with the driver later, after 1500 hours. There was no specific procedure for giving the pass. On that day the driver picked up the Polonez from the repair shop.

"Now to return to the question of the pass, I began to suspect that Piotrowski may have followed the Rev. Popieluszko to Bydgoszcz, but I fought against this suspicion. The scale of the deed and the duties of Piotrowski were inconceivably incommensurate. The question asked of Piotrowski by Gen P. was another factor. And the third factor was the finding of a militia-hat eagle emblem near the Golf. This last fact could only be interpreted as a political provocation against our agencies by the underground. Therefore, it was impossible for a chief from the central office to have been involved in this matter.

"The permit is required for a trip and for refueling with gasoline. They also had civilian fuel coupons, though insofar as I know these are not supposed to be used on official trips. Since he had these coupons, he hardly needed our permit, which is required for getting gasoline from our official gasoline stations. I was shown that permit during the pretrial investigation. I hadn't signed any such permit for 19 October. In principle, I couldn't have assigned Piotrowski on an out-of-town trip for 19 October, because deputy director D. was already present at the destination, in Gdansk. Of course, there are exceptions to this principle, but the chief or his deputy would have to coordinate this with me and name the person remaining on duty in the department, but no one of them did that.

"The permit I was shown was covered with a strip of celluloid, and it looked obscured and suspicious. I moved that celluloid aside and declared that that was my handwriting. I was shown the permit in a manner limiting the possibilities for my indicating any alterations in it. I declared that I did sign that permit. That was my seal and my signature. I felt powerless in face of this fact and couldn't advance any arguments. Toward the end of that interrogation session, my interrogator drew my attention to the findings of the autopsy. I don't recall whether a permit was issued to Piotrowski for 19 September [as published]. All I know is that Pekala was then traveling to Nowy Sacz. I can't confirm that I did sign any permit for that date, 19 October. The permit forms were readily accessible, being stored in cabinets and secretaries' offices. I believe that no record of them was kept. It may be that a record of them was kept at service stations. I'm not familiar with the circumstances under which Piotrowski obtained that permit. I don't know who and when had altered that document. What is not known is the fact that the driver passed on that permit to an employee who transmitted it to my superior. I hadn't seen that permit until the pretrial investigation.

"Piotrowski alleges that I collected the keys to the cars. That is an attempt to throw the blame on me. I came near the car only in the garage, in the presence of the dispatcher. Prior to 19 October I lacked definite information about the Rev Popieluszko's intent to travel to Bydgoszcz. Likewise, the department chief in Bydgoszcz did not know and was not certain that Popieluszko was going to Bydgoszcz. I stated so during the pretrial investigation, and I claim so now, that we knew the program for trips but lacked information about particular dates.

"On 21 October, on Sunday, after I showed up for work before 0800 hours, I was summoned by General P., who said: 'Listen, on reaching the parking lot I noticed a car with the license number WAB 6031. This number was seen in Bydgoszcz. It's a number from Piotrowski's department. Summon Piotrowski,' [-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981 On the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAWA No 44, Item 204)]. Next, the general came back from the deputy minister, because reports from other services arrived there. Several license tag numbers with Warsaw registration were observed in Bydgoszcz, and the general informed me of them. Employees of other departments were ordered to trace these numbers. I also instructed Piotrowski: 'Listen, Piotrowski. Your number was observed in Bydgoszcz. Check the alibis of the owners of these

cars, because someone might have doctored his number to look like yours or profit from its resemblance.' I had learned before 0800 hours that these numbers were observed, and I sent a car for Piotrowski. Thirty minutes later Piotrowski reported and declared that he altered that number in conformance with the official registration. I didn't tell him that that number was observed in front of the church, because I didn't know that myself. I told him of this on Sunday morning when he arrived in the office."

"I told him: 'Listen, if this isn't your number, check out the alibis of those having cars with similar numbers.' All this must have happened in the forenoon. From the outset, from the time the first report arrived, the letter part of the number was KZC. But this matter was being concurrently investigated by other departments."

Judge: "Didn't the defendant suspect Piotrowski because he took the 'W' pass and the license number of his car was seen in Bydgoszcz?"

Pietruszka: "The question of coincidences and the question of suspecting Piotrowski were considered separately. It was difficult for me to assume that I was in the presence of a man whose task was to protect legality [but who acted illegally, that is]. I simply couldn't believe that he was capable of doing a thing like that."

Judge: "Was a list of vehicles suspected of having been to Bydgoszcz prepared?"

Pietruszka: "Insofar as I know, Piotrowski prepared a list of such license tag numbers, which were to be verified, but the numbers given by Gen P. were traced by another department, and there were only several such numbers. No list was in existence. On that day we performed various activities in behalf of the group directed by Gen P."

"The essential thing was the departure of G. and L. for Torun. They were dispatched there by Gen P. That was between 1800 and 1900 hours. It should be added that a second deputy director also was present and listened to their report. They passed on Chrostowski's narrative and discussed the numbers in the KZC category as well as the activities undertaken in the area of Torun Province. It is debatable whether their report mentioned the license tag number WAB 6031. L. and G. didn't pass on to me information about that number. In their written statements they declare that they informed me of that number. They even claim that I jotted it down. To me, an argument controverting this claim is that the second deputy director was also present, and he also would have jotted it down. Another argument is that they didn't specify this information in the written report on their trip."

Judge: "Does the defendant believe that both these officers stated an untruth?"

Pietruszka: "Please excuse me from answering this question, because on this side stood these two officers and on that side another two officers. Besides, no bargaining took place among us there."

Judge: "Is the defendant familiar with the information they transmitted to the director at night?"

Pietruszka: "No, the general didn't tell it to me."

Judge: "As of 19 [October] the defendant at the very least had the information that a car bearing that license plate number had been seen in Bydgoszcz. What activities did the defendant engage in?"

Pietruszka: "I understood that information unequivocally to mean that I was excluded [from the investigating team] because this concerned my department, a car bearing the department's license plate number, and because the need to elucidate the matter was mentioned."

Judge: "Did the defendant inform the general of Piotrowski's arbitrary appropriation of the 'W' pass?"

Pietruszka: "I didn't."

Judge: "Did Gen P. ask the defendant whether Piotrowski was in his office?"

Pietruszka: "He did. That question was probably asked after his talk with Deputy Minister C. I said that I believed I did see Piotrowski around. In the morning I stated that I saw him, but later, following a talk with Col L., who said that he hadn't seen Piotrowski, I said that he probably wasn't in. I said that to Gen P. on 22 October.

"As regards Monday 22 October, reports from the area of the incident continued to flow in. The following important events happened on that day: the arrival of Chief D. after 1500 hours bearing the written statements of employees about their activities on 19 October. I believe that this initiative came from the deputy minister. Chief D. brought me these statements. At the time, Deputy Director M. also was with me. We were sitting in the office of Gen P. D. arrived and began by saying that the secretary S. put down so many details in her statement that he doubted whether she could have remembered them all. At the time, I told D. that, if he had so many doubts about it, it would be better for everyone if that statement were shorter. Of course, if I were to order altering it, I would do so only in the presence of witnesses, as otherwise it might be thought that our department is nothing but a den of thieves. That's utter rot. I ordered shortening the text of the statements. I had to do it, but I didn't place any marks on these statements."

Judge: "Does the defendant recall his pretrial deposition on this matter?"

Pietruszka: "I believe that my only motive was the doubts voiced by D. I don't recall having said that I was opposed to my name being mentioned in

these statements. D. took the statement and left it on the desk of Gen P. What happened to it later, I don't know.

"Next there was another meeting of the team directed by Gen P. Following the meeting, the director of the Criminal Bureau said that he wanted to speak privately with the general. Afterward, when he left, the general showed me a jotting from which it ensued that the car seen in Bydgoszcz belonged to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The general said: 'Summon Piotrowski and have him write a statement about his activities on 19 October.' Then he left to see the deputy minister in connection with that note. I called Piotrowski and ordered him to write about his activities on 19 October rather than, as Piotrowski claims, to write about the location of that car on 19 October. Half an hour later I went to Piotrowski to see if he finished that statement. I was intrigued by this whole thing. Piotrowski said that he already had the plan and outline for his statement and wanted to read it to me. I didn't want to listen to him for the time being, and I didn't want to interfere with the text of that statement, but he insisted. He read that text to me. It stated that he felt fatigued, took an official car without authorization and drove to gather mushrooms in the environs of Torun and Wloclawek. En route he stopped for two hitchhikers. At the same time, he realized that Popieluszko was in Bydgoszcz and drove there to take a look-see. I told him that this was naive and unconvincing, but if that was the truth, then that was his affair."

Judge: "Was that the first time you learned from Piotrowski that he traveled to Bydgoszcz?"

Pietruszka: "Yes."

Judge: "The defendant learned revelatory things. He had already known about the pass and about the car license plate number, and now he also learned of this fact. Wasn't that revelatory news to the defendant?"

Pietruszka: "This news facilitated the assumption that Piotrowski had participated in Popieluszko's abduction."

Judge: "What was the precise import of this news?"

Pietruszka: "That was additional information that Piotrowski may have gone to Torun."

Judge: "Why did the defendant characterize that explanation as naive?"

Pietruszka: "In evaluating it I didn't guide myself by the quality of the arguments assessing the trip to Bydgoszcz but only by the arguments of fatigue, the car, mushrooms...."

Judge: "To what higher-up did the defendant pass on this news?"

Pietruszka: "I don't recall the moment at which I did so, but I probably passed it on to Gen P. On arriving, Piotrowski was summoned by telephone to Deputy Minister C; Gen P. was present there. It seems to me that I repeated

the gist of that explanation. P. [and/or] the deputy minister ordered locating Piotrowski's car, because Chrostowski testified having seen a distinctive signal light in the car. I had problems locating that car, because by then it had been taken to the repair shop. I went there between 2100 and 2200 hours."

Judge: "Did the defendant question Piotrowski about that signal light, the seat covers, etc.?"

Pietruszka: "It appears that I may have asked him about the seat covers, because that ensued from Chrostowski's testimony. Piotrowski told me that there were no seat covers in the car. I don't think I asked him about the signal light. While in the garage, in the company of the dispatcher, I inspected the car; we even sat down inside it; we opened the trunk and the hood. The car was damaged. I could notice only one signal light, the hazard light. During my conversation with the deputy minister, he said that the car should be checked for damage and dents. I didn't see any. Something was probably also said about some shelf but I didn't pay attention to that. On returning I reported on my observations and, together with the general, who offered me a ride in his car, I went home.

[-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204).]

Judge: "Did Piotrowski tell the defendant that the priest was not recoverable and that he was thrown into the water?"

Pietruszka: "We used to talk about Popieluszko several times daily. I kept asking Piotrowski about Popieluszko. On Sunday he told me: 'Everybody keeps asking me about that. I don't know. Perhaps he's swimming in the Vistula.' Then, waving his hand in a gesture of disgust, Piotrowski left my office. I was shocked by his statement; I simply couldn't believe that an SB functionary would throw a priest into water. I rejected the idea. It seemed absurd to me. That was due to blind faith combined with irrationality."

Judge: "When did the defendant learn this information from Piotrowski?"

Pietruszka: "That was on Monday, between 1800 and 1900 hours."

Judge: "What did the defendant do with that information?"

Pietruszka: "Nothing, because after the initial shock I deluded myself into believing that this was unrealistic and untrue."

Judge: "Does the defendant admit that he was an SB officer, a member of an operational team established to uncover this matter?"

Pietruszka: "That's so. I was aware of the necessity of uncovering the perpetrators of the abduction. I should have paid attention to every clue and verified information of this kind, but it was simply inconceivable to me. No

one authorized me to verify it independently, because there could not be any such authorization. I didn't mention this during the pretrial investigation, because I couldn't accept the situation in which I found myself. I wasn't adjusted to reconstructing past events and looking for an alibi for myself."

Judge: "The defendant never revealed this information during his pretrial examination. He revealed it only during a confrontation."

Pietruszka: "I stated it probably even before the confrontation. I don't recall what I said during the confrontation. On 21 October Piotrowski didn't make that statement to me in the form mentioned during the confrontation."

Judge: "During the pretrial examination did the defendant state the facts in their entirety?"

Pietruszka: "I corrected only two aspects: the matter of Gdansk, after I had later reconstructed it in my memory, and the date on which I learned about the car license number WAB 6031."

Judge: "Did the defendant deny holding talks with Piotrowski?"

Pietruszka: "I don't recall that. Perhaps yes."

Judge: "Did the defendant deny during the pretrial examination that he talked with the colonels?"

Pietruszka: "I don't recall. Perhaps it was so. My denial pertained to the statement that I talked with L. and G. at 1800 hours, since at that time I was in a conference."

Judge: "The defendant has denied the fact rather than the hour of that conversation. Which is more important, the fact or the hour?"

Pietruszka: "Of course, the conversation counts more, but at the time I was chiefly concerned with the hour specified to me."

The court made public a passage from Pietruszka's pretrial deposition in which he stated that Piotrowski had not made due efforts during his trip to Gdansk, as well as a passage in which the defendant stated that he knew that Jerzy Popieluszko was to be in Bydgoszcz on 19 October, because he had received that information much earlier. He had discussed it and assumed that that visit would be exploited by Rulewski [a Solidarity activist in Bydgoszcz]. He also discussed it with Piotrowski. He learned of Piotrowski's departure for Bydgoszcz only in the morning of October 20. He never gave the pass to Piotrowski.

Pietruszka: "It seems to me that this was from the record of my initial interrogation, at a time when my possibilities for linking dates to facts were still limited. I adhere to my testimony of today. In my opinion, that conversation about the trip was held after Monday. The record of my

interrogation, as read to me, was dated 4 November, when the interrogation ended at 2250 hours. I was at the time still in shock and couldn't associate dates with facts. [-----] [Decree of 31 July 1981 on the Control of Publications and Entertainment, Article 2, Point 1 (DZIENNIK USTAW No 20, Item 99; revised in 1983 DZIENNIK USTAW No 44, Item 204)]. Besides, I was there all the time with other people."

The court read another passage, in which the defendant stated that Gen P. took part in the conversation with Piotrowski and urged him to think it over and tell the truth. On 23 October he himself talked with Piotrowski and urged him to tell the truth, and asked him if he happened to know about Popieluszko. Then Piotrowski answered that in his opinion Popieluszko would not be found.

Pietruszka: "I may have talked thus with Piotrowski, but this detail doesn't stick in my memory. I believe that the statement that Popieluszko wouldn't be found may have ensued from the questions asked by the interrogator."

Judge: "Why didn't the defendant at the time mention the river, the Vistula, as he did mention it today?"

Pietruszka: "It could be said that my statement, 'he wouldn't be found,' was a paraphrase. I have already mentioned my reservations about the first two days."

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CSO: 2600/573

POLAND

JOURNALIST LAUDS PRC ECONOMIC REFORM DRIVE

Warsaw ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE in Polish No 49, 2 Dec 84 p 13

[Article by Janusz Ostaszewski: "The Latest Phase of Reform"]

[Excerpts] On 20 October 1984, the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum which made a "Decision on the issue of the reform of the economic structure," ended after 7 days of deliberations. We flew into Beijing on the 25th of October, following this important political event. One of the first meetings which was organized for us also concerned the assessment of the progress of the reform thus far and its latest phase.

Comrade Zhao Ziyang, the director general of the State Planning Commission, received us there and presented to us statistical information indicative of the progress which has taken place during the 35 years of the existence of the People's Republic of China (the anniversary of the PRC's creation is celebrated on 1 October) and during the most recent period beginning with the December plenum in 1978, which defined the direction and the first phase of the modernization of the Chinese economy. The data presented below and the accompanying commentary are based on his statements and on the document of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum.

"During the past 35 years," states Comrade Zhao Ziyang, "an integrated industrial system has developed, agricultural production has increased, education, culture and science have developed and the standard of living has risen. Between 1949 and 1983, total industrial production increased 56 times, achieving a value of 608 billion yuan (the current rate of exchange of the yuan in terms of the U.S. dollar is floating; on 7 November 1984, it came to 2.55 yuan per U.S. dollar), steel production rose to 40 million tons and coal production increased 21 times to 715 million tons."

During this period, total agricultural production increased five times, reaching a level of 312 billion yuan. Grain production rose 2.4 times to a level of 387.28 million tons; the production of pure cotton increased 9.4 times to a level of 4.637 million tons (the production of raw cotton amounts to approximately 15 million tons). In 1949, only 475 persons in 10,000 had a completed secondary school education, while there were 2.2 students per 10,000 people. In 1983, this index rose to 1,796 and 11.3, respectively.

The overall level of social consumption in 1983 rose 1.5 times as compared with 1952.

However, for various reasons and also because of China's historical backwardness before its liberation and later on as a result of mistakes and an excessive drive for success, severe structural problems appeared in the Chinese economy. The cultural revolution, which caused terrible losses in the economy, worsened these problems.

The Third CCP Central Committee Plenum, which was held in December of 1978, made decisions regarding the regulation, reform, putting in order and growth of the economy. After 5 years of implementing this phase of the reform, it is obvious that it has brought positive results.

After the introduction into agriculture of the principle of individual responsibility for production (which was synonymous with the elimination of communes and the revival of family farms on land leased from the state) and increasing procurement prices for agricultural products, the production activity of farmers (who make up 80 percent of the Chinese population) increased, and in its wake so did agricultural production. Between 1979 and 1983, the average annual growth of agricultural production came to 7.9 percent, whereas during the previous 26 years (1953 to 1978) it amounted to 3.2 percent on an average annual basis. Grain production grew by 15 million tons annually while during this 26-year period it increased by 5.4 million tons; cotton production increased by 465,000 tons annually as opposed to 33,000 tons during the 26-year period. Good harvests helped but the deciding factor was the implementation of policies.

Progress also outlined itself in the area of industry. Between 1953 and 1978, the average annual growth rate of industrial production, indeed, came to 11.2 percent, whereas during the last 5-year period it was only 7.9 percent. However, this rapid growth was not very effective, the quality and structure of the products were poor because heavy industry was being developed above all, while other branches of industry were neglected. This had a negative effect on the growth of the entire economy. Currently, Comrade Zhao Ziyang informs us, "industrial production growth is slower but more effective. A very marked acceleration in the production of the consumer goods industry has occurred (an average annual increase of 11.2 percent) whereas heavy industry has slowed down growth, increasing production at a rate of 5.1 percent. During the current year, the growth rate of both industries has leveled off to approximately 10 percent annually. Thus, the structure of production and the proportion between the production of heavy industry and that of the consumer goods industry have improved, owing to which the tense market situation has been alleviated.

In 1983, the total value of goods sold to the public amounted to 285 billion yuan. Sales increased annually by 12.8 percent, i.e., nearly two times faster than during the 26-year period (6.9 percent on the average annually).

The sale of foodstuffs, clothing, and goods and material for agricultural production increased. The extent of rationing, which currently still includes cooking oil, flour and rice--production which is subsidized by the state even though these products are also sold on the free market without state control but

at prices higher than those set by the state--has been limited. (These are production surpluses of farmers which exceed contractual norms and which they have the right to sell on the free market.)

In 1983, the real income of peasant farmers came to 310 yuan per person. This constitutes an 11-fold increase over 1973. The income of labor-class families in 1983 came to 526 yuan per person annually and rose 66 percent. Public consumption between 1979 and 1983 increased 7.2 percent on an average annual basis whereas between 1953 and 1973, this growth amounted to 2.2 percent.

The opening up of China to the world stimulated trade between China and foreign countries. In 1983, Chinese international trade turnover closed with an amount of 66 billion yuan, which constitutes an increase 1.4 times higher than in 1973.

Between 1979 and 1983, the average annual growth rate of turnover amounted to 19.4 percent while between 1953 and 1973 this amount was 6.3 percent.

Continuation

"These unquestionable successes," remarks Comrade Zhao Ziyang, "do not mean that all problems have disappeared. There continue to be disproportions in the economy. This particularly pertains to the underdevelopment of the power industry and transportation. The production of industrial products still does not fully meet public demand and the requirements of the world market. Rural [farm] trade lags behind agricultural production. The farmer has problems with selling his production and with purchasing the necessary equipment for production. The increase of efficiency in management in various fields and regions is uneven."

The rigid economic system is not adapted to the growth of production power. This results in that the animated, socialist economy has lost its driving force. In this situation, the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum has made a decision with regard to the issue of the reform of the economic structure and the introduction of reform principles to cities and in industry. This reform will change the irrational proportions of interdependence between the base and the superstructure and will animate enterprises. The success of the reform conducted in rural areas facilitates reform in cities. The field of activity and initiative, of increased work productivity and of competent work by the work force has opened up owing to the introduction of the principle of wages for work performed and the personal responsibility of managers for the production results of enterprises.

What Is Reform in Cities Supposed To Be Based On?

According the document of the Third CCP Central Committee Plenum, the reform of the structure of the Chinese economy is the only road to development, and the validity of this assertion is confirmed by both the positive and negative results which were obtained during the past 5-year period. This road is the continuation of economic animation and of opening up to the rest of the world. It is a road of socialist structures which link the fundamental principles of Marxism with the conditions which currently exist in China. The social and economic situation is conducive to the expansion of the range of the reform and to progress in the building of socialism with Chinese specificity.

By following the example of the principle of individual responsibility which was introduced in to agriculture and which proved to be successful, similar solutions were introduced in cities and these attempts were successful. Therefore, the new system should be made widespread.

The current economic structure prevents production growth (low level of productivity, waste and untapped production potential). Industry is not able to keep up with the growing needs of rural areas. The reform in cities must include industry, culture, education and science, and trade and services.

Goals of the Reform

The goal of the reform is to form a dynamic, socialist economic structure. The 35 years of PRC development have proven the superiority of socialism, but this superiority was not fully utilized. The reason for this, apart from the historical and ideological causes, is the rigid structure of economic management. The flaws of this structure include the lack of a clear division of authority between the state administration and enterprise, barriers between ministries and regions, excessive control of enterprises by the state; disregard for commodity production, for value rights and for the regulating functions of the market and excessive egalitarianism in the sphere of the division of power. Enterprises are deprived of appropriate decisionmaking rights while egalitarianism which is binding in relations between the state and enterprises and within the enterprises annihilates incentive for work and development. Excessive concentration on managing the economy, which has its source in the model adopted during the 1950's and in the leftist deviations of the party, causes all attempts of animating and developing the socialist, commodity economy to be branded as "capitalistic."

"The introduced changes do not infringe upon the socialist form of government and are based on interrelated action on the base and on the superstructure. Socialism cannot signify poverty because in its assumptions it strives to eliminate it," states the document.

The reform in cities will encompass 80 million people who work in more than a million industrial, building, transportation, and trade and service enterprises from whose operations the state budget draws 80 percent of its revenues. The reform will affect two basic systems: between the state and the enterprise, and between the enterprise and its work force.

It is stated in the document that the rigid and excessive control by the state of enterprises resulted from the wrong interpretation of socialized property. This concept was understood as the direct control of it by state agencies. Meanwhile, these agencies are supposed to guide, manage, control and correct the activity of economic units by way of economic, administrative and legal measures and not interfere directly in the activity of enterprises. Enterprises are under state control and carry out state plans but they must do this in a flexible manner by independently planning their own operations, by determining supply and sale methods, by keeping part of the worked out profits and dividing them according to the rules in force and using them according to need. An enterprise may independently decide about the recruitment of employees, their wages and bonuses and, in accordance with the rules set by the state, it may set prices for

its products. It may also decide about appointment to managerial posts and dismiss or advance its cadre.

The work force of an enterprise becomes its manager. This is expressed in the responsibility for results and in the participation of the work force, cadre and workers in management.

The state decides about the planning of an enterprise, about changes in the profile of its production, about merging with another enterprise and closing or suspending its operation.

The Role of the Cadre

"The success of the reform," states the document, "will depend on the cadre's involvement in its implementation." There is a need for creating a new generation of managers and at the same time a need for relieving people of their duties who are advanced in years and who are without qualifications. These changes must be carried out quickly and decisively. It is also necessary to set in motion cadre training systems in the field of economics. No one should be permitted to ignore or disregard the significance of intellectual and scientific work.

The party controls the course and implementation of the reform. Party policies must be creative, must take into account the reality of things, must analyze facts and evoke ideas. The reform must consolidate the party. At the same time, no one should be permitted to label and harass people for being "reformists" or "conservatives."

The social and economic situation is conducive to the continuation of the reform. People are involved in putting it into practice. Relying on their wisdom, strength and loyalty to four fundamental principles (preservation of the socialist way of development, dictatorship of the proletariat, leading role of the CCP and loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and to the ideas of Mao Zedong) will assure the success of the reform. Owing to the reform, China is becoming a modern, strong and socialist country with a high level of culture and democracy.

Present-day China is completely different from that which we are used to imagining. The reforms which have already been carried out have radically changed the people and the environment in which they live and work. Of course, this continues to be a country of frequently very sharp contrasts, in which we find a modern Japanese car next to a person pulling a cart filled to the top. However, what seems to be important is that the people want to work and they see the purpose of their work, which is primarily financial. Chinese stores would make many of our heads spin. Wages are still low but they are growing, especially for those who, like the peasants, are working with ant-like perseverance. I will want to write about these matters in coming reports.

The package of Chinese reform is, as can be seen, very broad. It appears that it falls on receptive social groundwork because it creates opportunities.

However, will the processes which must occur as a result of the introduced changes support the process of changes? We have to wait for the answer. Speculations and comments on this subject are various. In my opinion, their drawback is their specific "Eurocentrism." Meanwhile, Chinese civilization has its own specificity. That is why it is difficult to prejudge the success or failure of reforms. In introducing or breaking the general laws or regulations of development, it is necessary to take into account their objective consequences.

9853

CSO: 2600/537

POLAND

PROGRESS OF SELF-MANAGEMENT IN INDUSTRY ASSESSED

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 51, 22 Dec 84 pp 3,6

/Interview with Jozef Barecki, chairman of the Sejm Commission for Enterprise Worker Self-Government, by Stanislaw Podemski and Witold Pawlowski: "Here To Stay"

/Text /Question Let us start with the fact that 1 in 10 enterprise work forces have no self-government. Why is it taking so long? What and who is blocking the way?

/Answer Simply, we cannot force anyone into self-government. This decision must be made by the members of the enterprise work force. If they do not want self-government, very well.

/Question Do we know why they may not want it?

/Answer There are many reasons. An example is a bad economic situation in the enterprise. For some it is a reason to organize a self-government body, for others it is a reason to wait. Then there are unexplained organizational problems in the enterprise, as is customary, or the lack of awareness that a self-government body can function in the enterprise. But there are other reasons--the workers do not want it because they are not yet convinced that self-government can have any affect.

But this is still not the entire 10 percent. A major part of the "one-tenth" of enterprise work forces wants to, but still cannot. Because of their specific situation, a number of enterprises were excluded from the law that went into effect on 25 September 1981 and were to receive their authorizations separately. To this date only the post office and LOT /Polish State Airline are so authorized. The others are waiting for their authorizations.

/Question The courts have not yet registered 3,000 self-government statutes. Those self-government bodies cannot have a good feeling about how long they will be able to continue functioning.

/Answer/ They were not registered because the courts have not received the statutes for registration. Here is a question--why? We have discussed this matter at the last Sejm Commission meeting. The reasons are numerous. For example, the self-government body has not yet approved the statutes, the director is delaying the submission of the statutes for registration, the statutes are circulating between the enterprise and the parent organization... Regardless of reasons, a large percentage of self-government bodies have not had their statutes registered. As for fears and feelings, I believe that there are no machinations against the self-government bodies in these delays. Moreover, even in the cases where the statutes are not registered the self-government bodies can still conduct some activities in all of their basic functions.

/Question/ We have heard statements which were not favorable to the self-government bodies, namely that in the statutes they are trying to give themselves more rights than they are entitled to, and that the courts are approving such documents.

/Answer/ This is not true. As a rule the statutes do not exceed the authority given by law. Deviations are rare and small. Most often they concern an incorrect description in the guarantee for permanent employment granted to a member of the worker council, improper wording in the authorization for pay while not performing work, and the limitations of active and passive voting rights.

The last matter has been surrounded by myths. When one speaks of voting rights, one thinks of big politics, keeping party members away from self-government organizations. The myths have one feature, and that is that they differ with reality. Work forces have elected party members to the self-government bodies where they form over 30 percent of the membership, while the average work force has 15 percent party members. The deviations which occur in proposed statutes are due to the intensification of the voting rights criteria. Some resolutions, even though they run counter to the law, are not without substantiation, for example, the denial of voting rights to workers who have been convicted by a court, or disciplined twice or thrice for breaking work rules, or who have neglected their work duties. Of course, these statutes are returned to the self-government bodies by the courts with recommendations for revision.

/Question/ Staying with the subject of courts, not many self-government bodies go there for help or to settle arguments. Are they not sure of their power or are they uncertain of success?

/Answer/ I would like to remind you that there are arbitration committees. Most conflicts are resolved there. But I think that "conflict" is too strong a word. Most often it is a difference in opinion between the self-government body and the director on a specific

enterprise matter. The courts get cases of a more fundamental nature. I know of no example of mistrust for the courts. But then, the court must settle a matter to favor one side to the other's detriment.

/Question/ Not without reason did I mention mistrust of the courts. There were several instances where the self-government bodies lost even though the law was clearly violated. I am speaking of the cases in which directors were appointed, though according to the law they should have been chosen through a competition process.

/Answer/ This is in the past, a matter connected with martial law. Yes, a number of directors were appointed without the competition process. Our commission has issued a desideratum on this matter. The government shared our position that such practices should not take place.

/Question/ And do they not?

/Answer/ No, But life is such as it is and in their turn the self-government bodies have come to us, in specific instances, to dispense with the competition procedure. The old director has departed, his substitute fulfills the task well. "We know the man, he passed the test in practice," they say. "Why go through the competition?"

/Question/ There are some fears that self-government would take the easy way: give unreasonable raises, squander the profits, push regulations that please them and ignore uncomfortable duties.

/Answer/ Yes, there were such fears. But practice in the enterprise has put them to flight. I will not say that there were no cases where more attention was devoted to the division of profits than to the solution of problems which affected them. There still exists a lack of universal attention to what comprises correct management: low costs, rational employment, control, and initiative. But nowhere is there a squandering of profits. The self-government bodies look at enterprise matters in a broader way and link the interests of the work force to its development. This is how, for example, enterprises gathered reserve funds for modernization, investment, and general renovation, up to 300 billion zlotys. That is twice what was planned. Another example: 2 years ago a cement factory self-government body appealed to its work force to forgo the social fund for 3 years and reserve the money for modernization. The work force accepted this and tightened its belt. The modernization was completed in 2 years. The factory was modernized and no longer pollutes the environment or harms the workers' health.

/Question/ It is well known that relations between the trade unions and the self-government bodies have arranged themselves in various ways. This was even the reason for an opinion issued by the Sejm Commission of which you are the leader. It tries to separate the spheres of influence. Will there be coexistence of struggle between the two parties? What do you think?

/Answer/ I think that it will be neither coexistence nor struggle. It is necessary to look at each matter from a different viewpoint. The self-government body is for the management of the enterprise, the trade union defends workers' rights, its dominion is wages and social conditions. Of course, both of these organizations represent the work force and have common areas of interest, but their authority differs. The trade union can issue pay claims or stand up for each worker's job. The self-government body, in those cases, must ask where the money for the raise will come from. It may be all for preserving jobs, but is it at the cost of having excessive unnecessary employment? These differing views on the same matter were summed up by the leader of one of the worker councils: "One group sees the interests of the worker through the interests of the work force; the others see the work force through the worker's interests."

That is why it will be neither coexistence nor struggle, but discussion, consideration of arguments, and cooperation.

/Question/ We have the impression that what the law brought in visibly through the front door the administrators are trying to slip out quietly by the back stairs.

/Answer/ If it is possible, it is being done.

/Question/ The fact is that we have had a spawning of numerous enterprises "for public use" in which the plan establishes a parent organization or an administration. Is this not a major limiting factor to self-government in the enterprise?

/Answer/ If this concerns the enterprises which, as stated by law, have the goal of current and continued satisfaction of human needs, then there is no deviation from principles. But if someone wants to force a change in the status of an enterprise only to keep his hand in the plan, then this person is acting contrary to the spirit of the law. Our commission is of one mind on this matter. There exists an important guarantee of preventing discretion in this matter. Such changes cannot be enacted without the approval of the self-government body.

/Question/ But a disobedient self-government body can be hamstrung by laws or even dissolved.

/Answer/ Have you heard of such facts? Are we not talking about actual practice?

/Question/ The practice is such that, for example, the regulations reserve the appointment of the director to the "parent organization," but only in enterprises which are "basic to the economy." Meanwhile, on this list we have not only foundries or electrical power plants but manufacturers of orthopedic shoes and furniture accessories as well.

/Answer/ Would you like me to say that the manufacturers of orthopedic shoes are less important than electrical power plants? Such assignment of value during the present national economic situation is deceiving. The law has given the Council of Ministers the right to establish a list of basic enterprises and the Council of Ministers uses it. The list is needed only to separate the enterprises in which the director is appointed by the parent organization from those where it is done by the self-government body. But let us remember that in each case the director must be found through competition and representatives of the work force dominate the competition committees. Each side can come out against a nomination and this disapproval must be thoroughly investigated. Also, regardless of who appoints the director, the parent organization determines the so-called conditions for a work relationship.

The still smoldering "matter of the director" results from various motivations. One of these is no doubt the belief of some activists that if the self-government body decides about nominating the director and sets his rate of pay, then it will be more independent and have a larger voice. In my opinion, and that of many self-government activists, this is a misconception. The entire structure of the management is dependent on the activities of three independent organs in the enterprises, each with its own specific competence. These are: the worker council, the delegates' assembly, and the director. The law gives the right to each of the three organs to express disapproval of a motion or activity advanced by any of the partners. If one of the organs becomes dependent on any of the others then self-government would suffer. Moreover, the director is personally responsible for his decisions and may suffer the consequences, including court-imposed ones, for their effects on the enterprise. It would not be beneficial to have him as an obedient servant rather than as a partner.

/Question/ Let us try to summarize the knowledge and impressions of the commission. What is the condition of self-government in the workplace?

/Answer/ The condition varies, it is hard to give an average, each enterprise has its own situation. It is much better where the situation of the enterprise is clear, where there are raw materials and production possibilities. But it is poor where the enterprise does not have sufficient resources to carry out its normal activities.

But the concept of condition is very subjective. Self-government was created because it became necessary, not because things were good, the economy flowered, and there was no lack of anything but self-government. It was created because it became apparent that the absence of wide participation by the work force in the management of the enterprise is not only contrary to socialist principles, but is a major cause of the progressive weakening of the economy.

This time self-government was tied to reforms, with unusually difficult rules for functioning. For the first time it is not suspended in space. But this means only difficulties for self-government. There existed the danger that self-government would quickly lose its teeth on economic problems, on problems of the incoming reform, which is being shouted down as ineffective. There were fears that the self-government body, being amateur and having little competence, would become a fifth wheel, a decoration, a rubber stamp; that it would be manipulated and become a pawn. And finally, a greater danger, not hypothetical, that the activists would quickly become frustrated. They assemble, work out their statutes, work on the problems of the enterprise, but quick and concrete results are not seen.

/Question/ Which of these dangers materialized? Perhaps all?

/Answer/ None. Let us remember how many irrevocable pronouncements were made during the years 1982-1983 when self-government was being reactivated. It was said that it did not stand a chance, that the administration would not allow it, that the workers would not want it. These voices from the underground, which have made self-government anathema and accused it of being in with the regime, called for a boycott. What happened? Self-government increased its activity in 90 percent of the enterprises, put its structures in order according to the requirements of the law, became a permanent, constructive link in the social organization of the socialist enterprise...

/Question/ But there are voices which say that self-government did not prove itself, the crisis continues, why do we need it anyway? Let us put this more clearly. Is self-government in the workplace merely a novelty or a permanent institutional solution?

/Answer/ What if that question were turned around? How bad would the crisis be if we had no self-government in the economy? We are facing an extremely difficult and complicated process of fundamental changes in the methods for guiding an enterprise, in the relationships between its objects, with changes in the views and psychology of the people. We are at the beginning of this process. Meanwhile, a miracle is expected from self-government. Met in these expectations are the natural reactions of a society that is well acquainted with the results of managing a command-distribution system, and that sees in self-government, in socialized management, a quick and effective remedy for the crisis. Self-government is not able to show results so quickly.

The theory of a miracle functions on another level. Part of the management cadre had, in the past, acted under the security of being under orders, and especially that part of the economic management of enterprises is not reconciled to the changes that democratization is

bringing into the life of the enterprise, into the relationship between the cadres and the work force. This not only supports the excessive expectations from self-government, but the entire responsibility for the efficiency of production is transferred from the professional apparatus to the self-government.

/Question/ Here we have touched upon a very important problem, which to a great extent determines the existence of self-government. This concerns the contradiction between the necessity for professionals and democratic management, between requirements for high efficiency and increased participation of the work force.

/Answer/ This is not antagonism, neither of the two sides can be eliminated. We have learned from experience that limiting the role of the immediate producers in management has led to bureaucratization of the economy, which in effect became one of the factors in the crisis, and not only the economic crisis. It is not possible to eliminate from the management of socialized production the specialized apparatus, for this would lead to chaos and the dissolution of the production process.

The division of authority between the management organs and the self-government representatives of the work force will not permit arbitrary decisions by the professional apparatus without regard for the opinions of the workers. The spread of democratic principles in management is necessarily tied to having representatives of the work force carry out corrections to the decisions of the management apparatus through changes or even cancellations. This should not discourage the management cadres or hurt their professional aspirations. Even the best decisions, as seen from a professional viewpoint, do not achieve the desired effects if those who execute them do not consider them as their own, and do not take interest. At present there is no other way but self-government to mobilize such interest.

Permit me to fall back on a conclusion made by the Politburo: "Self-government is not only a political necessity, not just a lawful norm. It is a way to strengthen the feeling of comanagement and coresponsibility among the work force, and a way to fulfill the workers' mature aspirations."

In this statement is also the answer to the question. Self-government is not a novelty. It is a permanent institutional solution.

/Interviewer/ Thank you for the interview.

12411
CSO: 2600/581

ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU SPEECH ON NOMINATION FOR GNA ELECTIONS

AU211246 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 20 Feb 85 p 1

[Speech by President Nicolae Ceausescu, when receiving a delegation of the Bucharest constituency No 1, on his nomination for the Grand National Assembly 17 March elections--in Bucharest 19 February]

[Text] Esteemed comrades: I would like to express warm thanks to the participants in the meeting in Bucharest's electoral constituency No 1 "23 August" and to all working people in this constituency, and I would certainly like to express thanks to you, as representatives of the working people who have participated in the meeting, for the decision you have made to propose me as candidate in this constituency for the election of deputies to the Grand National Assembly.

I view this especially as an expression of the trust the working people in this constituency--as in fact all working people throughout the country--show toward the policy practiced by our Communist Party which is firmly acting to implement the program of building the comprehensively developed socialist society and Romania's advance toward communism.

It is also an expression of the determination by the working people in the constituency No 1 and--I hope--in Bucharest to do all they can to optimally fulfill this year's plan and the next 5-year plan. During the latter part of last year we discussed a number of problems linked to the "23 August" enterprise, but also to other enterprises in the electoral constituency No 1. In fact yesterday I examined some programs on how the measures we discussed last fall are being carried out. Action must be taken, so that "23 August" will become a front-ranking enterprise and a model unit as far as the organizational framework, the technical level, productivity, and economic efficiency are concerned.

I would like the other enterprises in this constituency and in Bucharest to act in the same spirit.

Once again, I would like to express thanks for the trust shown to me and to assure all working people in this electoral constituency and in Bucharest that I will continue to do all I can to serve the people, the cause of socialism and communism, peace, and international cooperation.

I wish you success in your activity! I wish all working people increasingly greater successes and much good health and happiness! (Loud applause)

ROMANIA

RCP MESSAGE TO FIFTH BOLIVIAN CP CONGRESS

AU141819 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 12 Feb 85 p 5

[RCP Central Committee message to Fifth National Congress of Bolivian Communist Party]

[Text] To the Fifth National Congress of the Bolivian Communist Party:

We take the opportunity of the Fifth National Congress of the Bolivian Communist Party to extend to you, participants in the congress and all Bolivian Communists, warm, comradely greetings of friendship and solidarity, on behalf of the RCP and its secretary general, Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu.

The RCP and the working people of the SR of Romania follow with keen interest the struggle of the Bolivian Communist Party and of the other people's democratic and progressive forces of your country to defend and consolidate the independence and sovereignty of your homeland and to independently utilize the natural resources of the country for the benefit of the working people's masses and for implementing the changes of renewal in society and for promoting socioeconomic progress.

We reassert on this occasion, too, our wish to further develop relations of cooperation and solidarity between the RCP and the Bolivian Communist Party in the belief that these relations will contribute to strengthening and expanding the relations of friendship between our peoples and countries and to strengthening the cohesion and unity of anti-imperialist forces everywhere in the struggle for promoting the cause of independence and cooperation as well as security, disarmament, and peace throughout the world.

We wish you, esteemed comrades, complete success in unfolding the proceedings of your congress, in implementing the decisions that will be adopted, and in the entire activity of the Bolivian Communists devoted to defending the basic interests of the people and the cause of progress, peace, and socialism.

The RCP Central Committee

CSO: 2700/115

ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU RECEIVES NEW ZIMBABWEAN AMBASSADOR

AU252003 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 2010 GMT 25 Feb 85

[Text] Bucharest, 25 Feb (AGERPRES)--President Nicolae Ceausescu received on Monday, 25 February, Tasunungurwa Goche [spelling as received] who presented his letters of credence as ambassador of the Republic of Zimbabwe to Romania.

In his address on the occasion the ambassador points to the good bilateral relations which date back to the days of the Zimbabwean people's fight for liberation from colonial domination, and expresses willingness to further expand them, especially in the economy, in the interests of the two countries and peoples, of the cause of international peace and understanding. He is highly appreciative of the foreign policy promoted by Romania, emphasizing that Zimbabwe, like Romania, supports all efforts toward lessening international tension and establishing a lasting peace worldwide.

In his address, the Romanian head of state expresses his satisfaction at the development of ties of friendship and cooperation between Romania and Zimbabwe, and assesses that favourable conditions exist to boost bilateral collaboration and increase commercial exchanges and economic cooperation which should be underlain by long-term (?agreements) apt to impart them stability and prospects.

In his address President Ceausescu also stresses that Romania and Zimbabwe can closely cooperate in the sphere of international life, in the struggle for a policy of peace, independence, cooperation and detente throughout the world.

The credentials presentation ceremony occasioned an exchange of warm salutes between Romania's President Nicolae Ceausescu and the leaders of the Republic of Zimbabwe, President Canaan Soudindo Banana and Prime Minister Robert Gabriel Mugabe.

CSO: 2700/115

ROMANIA

BRIEFS

PERES LAYS WREATH AT MONUMENT--We want to inform you that this morning Shim'on Peres, prime minister of the State of Israel and chairman of Israel's Labor Party, laid a wreath at the Monument to the Heroes of the Struggle for the Freedom of the People and Fatherland, and for Socialism. The ceremony was attended by members of the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the Bucharest Municipal People's Council, and other officials. The Israeli officials who are accompanying the prime minister in his visit to our country, Romania's ambassador to Israel, and the ambassador of Israel to Bucharest were also present. [Text] [Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1100 GMT 21 Feb 85]

NEW AMBASSADOR TO LIBYA--Tripoli, 4 Feb (AGERPRES)--The new ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Romania to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Florea Ristache, presented his letters of credence. The Romanian ambassador was received by Dr 'Ali al-Turagki, secretary of the General People's Committee of the Bureau for External Relations of that country. [Text] [Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1915 GMT 4 Feb 85]

VIETNAMESE FRIENDSHIP MEETING--On the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the 35th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations with the SRV, Pham Duy Toan, Vietnamese ambassador to Romania, organized a friendly meeting on 1 February. The meeting was attended by Mihai Nicolae, deputy section chief at the RCP Central Committee, Traian Pop, deputy minister of foreign affairs, party and state activists, high ranking officers, and reporters. [Text] [Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 2 Feb 85 p 5]

NEW AMBASSADOR TO SYRIA--By presidential decree, Comrade Paraschiv Benescu has been appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the SR of Romania to the Syrian Arab Republic, replacing Comrade Grigore Comartin, who has been recalled. [Text] [Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 7 Feb 85 p 5]

NEW AMBASSADOR TO ITALY--By presidential decree, Comrade Constantin Tudor has been appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the SR of Romania to the Italian Republic, replacing Comrade Ion Constantinescu, who has been recalled. [Text] [Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 7 Feb 85 p 5]

CEAUSESCU MESSAGE TO AL-ASAD--To Comrade Hafiz al-Asad, president of the Syrian Arab Republic, Damascus. I take particular pleasure in extending to you cordial greetings on the occasion of your re-election to the high office as president of the Syrian Arab Republic. I would like to take this opportunity to reassert my satisfaction with the relations of close friendship and cooperation between our countries and peoples. I believe that in future, too, the Romanian-Syrian cooperation will further develop strongly, in the spirit of the mutual understanding we reached during our meetings in Bucharest and Damascus, for the well-being of the Romanian and Syrian peoples and in the interest of promoting a policy of peace, independent development and security throughout the world. I extend to you warmest wishes for complete success in fulfilling the mandate of high responsibility entrusted to you by the Syrian people and wishes for much health and personal happiness and much prosperity and peace to the Syrian people. Nicolae Ceausescu, president of the SR of Romania. [Text]
[Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 13 Feb 85 p 5]

MUSLIMS VISIT KUWAIT, JORDAN--Kuwait, 22 Feb (AGERPRES)--Shaykh Abir Al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, amir of the State of Kuwait, expressed appreciation for the initiatives taken by Romania, by President Nicolae Ceausescu personally for a political solution to the situation in the Middle East when he received a delegation of the Muslim denomination of Romania, who are paying a visit to that country. During the talks conducted on the occasion, the links of friendship between the two countries and peoples, as well as their development in various fields of activity were underscored. During their visit to Amman, the delegation of the Muslim denomination of Romania were received by Ahmad al Lawzi [spelling as received], president of the Jordanian Senate. The president of the Jordanian Senate highlighted Romania's consistent stance on the political settlement of the Middle East situation, as well as President Nicolae Ceausescu's initiatives and contribution along that line. [Text]
[Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1900 GMT 22 Feb 85]

CEAUSESCU RECEIVES CONGOLESE ENVOY--Bucharest, 25 Feb (AGERPRES)--President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania received, on 25 February, Stanislas Charles Batheas-Mollomb, ambassador of the People's Republic of the Congo in Bucharest, on a farewell call, at the end of his mission in Romania. On the occasion, a talk was held which passed in a cordial atmosphere. [Text] [Bucharest AGERPRES in English 2003 GMT 25 Feb 85]

CSO: 2700/115

YUGOSLAVIA

WESTERN COMMENT ON SLOVENIAN LIBERALISM

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 9 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by Viktor Meier: "Slovenia a Harbinger of Yugoslav Liberalization?--Students Advocate Ridding Political Life of Taboos"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 8 February--Hawking the student paper MLADINA at street corners of the Slovenian capital, young vendors say there is a "new chief editor, but the staff is the same" and mention the "proletariat in short pants" (which probably means it is not doing well). Together with the students' radio station, MLADINA at present spearheads the media movement aiming at ridding political life of taboos not only in the republic but throughout Yugoslavia and apparently enjoys support extending to high political circles. The word is that it is in Slovenia, and not in Belgrade, that the very frontline for liberalization and democratization in Yugoslavia is located at present. The Serbian party, it is being said, despite all the talk about intellectual freedom, carried out its trial of intellectuals. Moreover, before issuing its call for "political changes," it had engaged in untoward incitement against the defendants at that trial in party meetings and had unleashed the police against Belgrade students. In addition, it is being feared both in Ljubljana and in Zagreb, the traditional Serbian hegemonism is a hidden threat behind Belgrade's "liberalization."

The confrontations in Ljubljana are not taking place without contradictions. They are being conducted polemically, but by and large in accordance with a motto issued by Mitja Ribicic, one of the authoritative Slovenian politicians, which says that one should reply "to a book with a book" and not with police action. The existence of opposition stands to reason, for the "taboos" concerned are things which cast an unwelcome revealing light on the past of the communist regime, and lately even on the person of Tito. Or arguments are being voiced which might wake sleeping dogs. Why--for example, the fournal MLADINA aska in particular--is Serbo-Croatian also the official language of the Yugoslav People's Army in Slovenia, and why are signs on the barracks in Slovenia written only in Serbo-Croatian? The constitution does not support this practice. The Belgrade press reacted to these questions almost with alarm, and that, in the view of many Slovenians, showed the "unitarian" and "Greater Serbian" clubfoot of the detente there.

But most of the talk in Ljubljana is about the so-called "Dachau trials." Between 1948 and 1951 sentences were imposed in Slovenia on 20 to 30 former inmates of the Dachau concentration camp because they were said to have cooperated with the Germans and betrayed communists for the sake of personal advantage. There were 11 death sentences, of which 10 were carried out. Most of the defendants were party members, including engineers and technicians and even the executive officer under Kidric, economic dictator of Yugoslavia at the time. The confessions of the defendants, the party openly admits today, were extorted by police methods adopted from the Soviets, Yugoslav secret police having been trained in Moscow after the war. It is a matter of dispute, however, whether it was the Soviets who made the list of the persons and the "evidence" available to the Yugoslavs. Politician Ribicic, who held a high post in the Slovenian Ministry of the Interior at the time, says they did not.

Anyway, the party had to admit in the 1960's that it had done wrong and to begin with rehabilitations. For a remarkably long time, however, it was content to deal exclusively with the judicial aspects, noting "false charges" or "extorted confessions" but staying away as much as possible from the issues involved. The young people, wanting to know the truth, liked this less and less. Last year one of the former defendants published a book under the pseudonym of Igor Torkar, entitled "Dying in Installments," in which he described what he had gone through. The book caused a public sensation. The son of the man who had been the public prosecutor responsible for the trials, Matevz Krivic, thereupon, in the journal NASI RAZGLEDI (which, like the republic newspaper DELO has contributed a lot to the open climate in Slovenia), took up the whole matter on a broad front. He demanded that those responsible at the time should assume their personal responsibility once and for all and not hide behind the argument of "tense foreign political conditions." Ribicic replied sympathetically, saying that it was simply impossible to separate those things from the situation prevailing at the time. He himself, he said, had not taken part in the "Dachau trials" but had to admit that mistakes had been made in his ministry at the time.

The case of the "Dachau trials" assumed a national Yugoslav dimension when suddenly the name of Tito cropped up in the discussion. Defendant Milic said at the Belgrade intellectuals' trial that "Josip Broz" had sought to cover up the matter, and though the judge did not want to admit a discussion of such questions, the Slovene paper DELO published it. There are utterances by Tito that can be documented historically, and have even been published, which lead to the conclusion that the defendants of the "Dachau trials" after 1948 were suspected of pro-Soviet inclinations. To discredit them, they were condemned as "Gestapo agents." The question is why such a thing happened only in Slovenia. In this connection one can hear people say that the affaire surrounding former Croatian party leader Hebrang has not yet been clarified either as yet; he had been arrested in the spring of 1948 before the Cominform resolution of last June of that year. The background of the "Dachau trials" appears to be confused, and it looks like the whole matter is becoming a heavy liability for the regime and the memory of Tito.

The debate about it coincides with the 40th anniversary of the end of the war in 1945. In May that year about 10,000 to 12,000 Slovenian Domobranci or White Guardists--in other words, anticommunists--had been turned over by the British to Tito in Carinthia and then executed at various places, primarily at Gotschee. The leadership political of the White Guardist movement, which became very sizable particularly after the Italian capitulation in 1943, was in the hands of the right wing of the old clerical People's Party. It was inspired by Ljubljana Bishop Rozman, who later emigrated to the United States. The White Guardists were nationalists fighting against the communists. It was hardly their wish but a result of circumstances that they had to wage this fight on the side of the Germans. Now, 40 years later, the slogan of a final "national reconciliation" is emerging in Slovenia. Spomenka Hribar, the daughter of a respected communist, proposed in a journal the erection of an obelisk devoted equally to all the war dead of Slovenia of that era. This proposal evoked strong protests by the communist functionaries, who thought that "treason" remains "treason." But the young people apparently here too want to know the truth--primarily the reason why at that time so many of their compatriots were simply killed without any investigation of distinction. The church for its part incurred the wrath of the functionaries because it had a mass said for Bishop Rozman.

Were all Slovenian nationalists of that time "traitors"? The historian Dusan Biber, who was able to examine the relevant British documents, scored a great success with his presentations in various historical journals. Yet another event of that time needs to be examined. In the last days of the war a Slovenian "National Assembly" had constituted itself in Ljubljana, calling for an independent "united Slovenia" and raising about the same territorial demands as were later raised by the communists. This assembly hoped that the British would advance as far as Ljubljana from Trieste. Apparently the matter now is exciting such interest that Slovenia's representative in the State Presidency, Dolanc, felt compelled to oppose the nationalists of that time, eloquently expressing the opinion that Slovenia had never been as free as in the Yugoslavia of today.

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